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WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXVII, Number 4 July 1975

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ISSN 0043-8871

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WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS

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ABSTRACTS

The Emerging Social Structure of the World

By A. INKELES

An assessment of the forms in which, and the extent to which, the population of the entire world may be coming to participate in a coherent global social system may be made by crude measurement of variations in the degree of autarky, interconnectedness, dependence, interdependence, integration, hegemony, and convergence. In the recent modern era, we can show that interconnectedness has been rising at an exponential rate across numerous dimensions ranging from the exchange of students to world trade. Interdependence is also increasing, but less dramatically. The greater dependence of less developed countries is unmistakable, but integration has advanced very little in the period after World War II. In studying convergence we must differentiate among modes of production, institutional forms, patterns of social relations, the content of popular values, and systems of political and economic control, each of which may change at different speeds and even move in different directions. The argument that there is substantial convergence in political and economic forms at the national level may be seriously challenged. Marked convergence is widely prevalent, however, in the utilization of science, technology, and bureaucratic procedures, and in the consequent incorporation of whole populations into new social roles. These in turn induce new attitudes and values forming a widespread complex or syndrome identified as modern and postmodern. Countervailing tendencies are, however, evident and should be weighed.

Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities

By D. J. PUCHALA

In an operational sense, European integration amounts to the transnational harmonization and standardization of diverse national laws, practices, and norms. Insight into the integrative process in Western Europe, therefore, can be gleaned by looking into problems encountered during attempts at transnational harmonization. Case studies of national attempts to implement EEC directives in the fields of regional aid, pharmaceutical marketing, investment control, and fiscal harmonization point up important interplays between regional harmonization and domestic politics. Evidence concerning the politics of regional implementation shows that the ability of an EEC country to contribute to European integration depends fundamentally upon its government's ability to act politically in its domestic arena.

Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor

By B. ANDREWS

New interest in the domestic sources of foreign policy intersects the notion that arguments about a state's international role are, at one level, arguments about domestic meaning, prohibitions, and responsibility. Even claimed strategic imperatives are neither self-explanatory nor comprehensible only in view of the stringencies of the international arena. Instead, they project a domestic content, referring to (and often transparent in the light of) particular domestic ends, needs, images, or interests. A rule-guided conception of the relation between domestic society and foreign policy is developed, in an analogy with language and forms of discourse, in which discernible social rules will constrain or constitute a state policy—delimiting conduct, or defining its domestic referents, usage, and social conformity or deviance. Looking beneath the rather disembodied plane of ends and means, explanation begins to resemble an excavation; the state is seen not through the lenses of national security and rational behavior, but in the model and role of a domestic social actor.

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The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist and Communist Continuities

By R. E. BEDESKI

The modern state is a theoretical concept and a historical phenomenon which can be examined as force, power, and authority. The foundations of the modern state in China were laid by the Nationalist regime in Nankin after 1927. The Kuomintang's efforts in unification and treaty renegotiation greatly facilitated the labors of the Communists when they came to power. State development since 1949 reflects Nationalist influence in constitutionalism, party role, status of the army, and even world outlook. If the Nationalist and Communist periods are viewed as a continuum, state evolution in modern China appears as a rough recapitulation of the European state's development.

Organizing for Government Intervention in Family Planning

By R. SIMMONS, G. B. SIMMONS, B. D. MISRA, and A. ASHRAF

Family planning programs have encountered limited success not only because of our incomplete understanding of the sociocultural context of fertility decisions, but because the bureaucratic structures entrusted with the organizing task are overextended. Since the implementing agencies are themselves a complex part of the wider society in which they operate, there are important advantages to using an open systems perspective in the analysis of the problems of organizing for transactions with the client population. The status quo in family planning does not have to be maintained. Within political systems one can try to increase the organizational capacity to translate policies into action, or one can devise policies which recognize organizational constraints. In order to accomplish either or both of these objectives, a fresh approach to both action and research is necessary.

Pluralism, the Science of Politics, and the World System

By W. T. R. FOX

Primarily by reference to the writings of Charles E. Merriam, the impact of the Chicago school of political scientists on the study of world politics is assessed. Differences between that school's pragmatist pluralism and political realism are examined, as are differences between Merriam's ideal of cross-cutting human associations in a world of shared power and that of advocates of world government. Better adjusted personalities and international civic education would in Merriam's utopia of science and reason lighten the task of governance within and between states, but he recognized the difficulty of achieving a warless world so long as "the antagonism of value systems which run below the obvious surface of the world" continues.

Past as Prologue: American Redemptive Activism and the Developing World

By L. A. DUNN

Packenham's *Liberal America and the Third World,* although a needed response to more radical critics, does not cut sufficiently deeply into the ambiguities, roots, and patterns of thought of liberal redemptive activism. The problem is to tame rather than to exorcise the redemptive activist belief in a "larger" American interest in the developing world. Modification of the reorientation of American policy articulated by Packenham and the Overseas Development Council is required to: (1) take account of limited agreement upon a conception of global economic equity; (2) develop a more refined response to the excesses of reformist interventionism; (3) avoid the risks of reliance upon a "will and capacity" strategy of developmental assistance. "Proximate pursuit" of the longstanding vision of a world in which the values of liberal democratic order are being increasingly realized constitutes a preferred alternative to both the liberal reorientation and past redemptive activism.

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THE EMERGING SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

By ALEX INKELES*

IN the second half of the twentieth century, laymen and professional intellectuals alike have frequently expressed the sense that the relationship of all of us, all humankind, to each other and to our world, has been undergoing a series of profound changes. We seem to be living in one of those rare historical eras in which a progressive quantitative process becomes a qualitative transformation. Even when, in more sober moments, we recognize that we are yet far from being there, we have the unmistakable sense that we are definitely set off on some new trajectory, and that we are not merely launched but are already well along toward an only vaguely identified destination. The widespread diffusion of this sense of a new, emergent global interrelatedness is expressed in numerous ideas, slogans, and catchphrases which have wide currency, such as "world government," "the global village," "spaceship earth," "the biosphere," and the ubiquitous cartoon of a crowded globe with a lighted fuse protruding from one end, the whole labelled "the world population bomb." Although the pervasiveness of the response to this emergent situation certainly tells us that *something* is happening, its diversity highlights our confusion as to exactly *what* it is that is happening.

Obviously the issue is one which is going to occupy us for a long time to come. Indeed, it is of such fundamental significance that our future welfare, perhaps our survival, will depend on our ability initially to understand and subsequently to guide the processes of change in which we are caught up. Consciousness and concern about this process at the community and national level has become so widespread as to be commonplace and even banal. But it should give us pause—perhaps it is even cause for alarm—that so little attention is being paid to the problem of social change at the global level, at least when one expresses the amount of that attention as a proportion of the time the world's specialists in sociology and political economy spend on other scientific problems and issues. Moreover, such attention as the issue gets is usually sporadic, the methods applied eclectic, the data of dubious validity and reliability, and the "mode of analysis" casual and unsystematic. It will

* Paper presented at the International Political Science Association meetings at Montreal, August 20-23, 1973. The creative research assistance of Dean Nielsen is gratefully acknowledged.

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require a great and concerted effort over many years to rectify our inadequacies in this regard. Of the several tasks which lie before us, it seems to me that one of the most critical, especially at this early stage in our work, is that of clarifying our basic concepts. It is to that end I plan to devote a large part of this communication. I shall, as well, make a few forays into the empirical realm, not so much as to make a convincing case about the facts as to illustrate and test the usefulness of some of the conceptual distinctions I feel it important to introduce.

A Set of Basic Concepts and A Historical Excursus

If we are moving toward a new condition, it will be helpful to have some sense of what that condition may be. Otherwise, it is logically impossible to tell whether or not we are indeed more closely approximating it. Some reflection on the matter makes it immediately apparent that there is not only one end state toward which we may be moving, but rather that there are several. Moreover, we should also recognize that we *start* not from one position, but in fact from several, depending on the unit of action from whose perspective we view the situation. Some brief excursions into definition and a clarification of basic concepts are therefore indispensable to further discourse on the matter.

What is most distinctive about the problem before us is that it moves us beyond even the largest customary unit of social analysis, namely the nation-state, to focus on the entire human population of the globe. Of that population, and the social units in which it is organized, we are asking: what kind of sociocultural system did it constitute in the past, what character does it have in the last quarter of the twentieth century, what are its current emergent properties, and what will be its probable future characteristics?

Given this perspective, we might well have framed our investigation in the terms common to the analysis of social systems as large and complex as the nation-state. Thus, we might inquire into the structure of stratification among the units; the nature, if any, of the overarching legal system; the social consequences of the economic subsystem; and the extent of shared values, norms, and behaviorial dispositions. Although this approach would be legitimate, and no doubt revealing, I have chosen instead to rely on a different set of concepts which I feel is better suited for dealing with the distinctiveness of the problem at hand. This set of categories seems less to presume that the world does indeed share what can meaningfully be described as "*a* system of social action." At the same time, it does not exclude consideration of the important themes such as stratification and the sharing of norms.

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AUTARKY

Autarky exists when a set of people share a more or less completely self-contained and self-sustaining sociocultural system. The condition does not necessarily assume physical isolation, although such isolation is often associated with autarky. Rather, to meet the test of autarky, a system should be such that if all other forms of human and social life were suddenly to disappear, the remaining system would have a high probability of continuing to propagate itself in much the same form it had before the cataclysm overtook everyone else. This condition is most easily met by small and isolated communities—for example, tribes living on isolated Pacific atolls or high mountains. Mere isolation, however, is not enough to guarantee the condition of autarky. A particular type of social structure and economy is essential. A group which depended on other tribes for a basic commodity of life such as salt, or an indispensable and unsubstitutable instrument for gathering food such as a trap, or which was obliged regularly to come together with others to permit exogamous marriages, would to that degree be less able to satisfy the requirement of autarky. Thus, an Eskimo family wandering in a full isolation for months across the arctic wastes in search of food is not an autarky, since functions critical to maintaining the long-term system of action of the group require that its members periodically come together with other similar physically isolated families to exchange brides and perform certain religious and communal services essential to the continuation of the sociocultural system of the tribe. An Eskimo tribe as a whole, however, might well qualify as an autarkic social system.

Although small and isolated groups with simple social systems and primitive economies may predominate among autarkies, such systems are also found at the other end of the scale of size. Units at the level of the nation-state may achieve a high degree of autarky. Thus, Japan, Soviet Russia, and Communist China, at various periods in their history, more or less totally sealed their borders and strove to achieve complex goals of social reorganization while relying almost exclusively on resources and ideas internal to their respective sociopolitical systems.

INTERCONNECTEDNESS, DEPENDENCE, AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Moving away from autarky, we encounter various degrees of interconnectedness and dependence. The terms refer to similar but not identical conditions. *Interconnectedness* refers to the volume or frequency of communication, interaction, or exchange between two sociocultural

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systems. It is most often expressed in the exchange of goods and services, i.e., in trade, as when tribes living in the hills may grow tea which they exchange in regular markets for rice grown by culturally distinct tribes living in the lowland valleys.

Substantial interconnectedness suggests, and may lead to, but is not a sufficient condition for *dependence*. Dependence refers to reliance on an item of exchange which is more or less indispensable to the survival of the system or systems engaging in the exchange. A system experiencing such dependence would to that degree be unable to achieve or maintain autarky.[1]

In a system of exchange, however, the implications of the exchange are not the same for all the units participating. The salt given by system *A* in exchange for the jade beads of system *B* may be vital to the physical continuity of *B*, whereas the beads may easily be replaced in *A* by some other means of ornamenting the dress used in tribal dances. *A* and *B* are therefore interconnected, but not interdependent. *B* is dependent on *A*, but *A* is not dependent on *B*. To illustrate from the contemporary world, Japan and the United States each manifest an extremely complex pattern of interconnectedness with other countries. In the case of the United States, however, the means are available for continuing the current American system basically intact without relying on these ties. Japan, not possessed of domestic sources of coal and iron ore, to say nothing of oil, could not possibly continue as a major industrial producer without its external trade. Japanese interconnectedness is therefore also extreme dependency, whereas American interconnected-

[1] There is another related and currently very popular use of the term dependence, which gives prime emphasis to the ability of a nation-state to make decisions about its internal development relatively free of the dominant and/or domineering pressure of more powerful states or economic systems. Thus, contemporary radical political-economists make a great deal of the "dependence" of the Latin American and other less developed countries on the greater political and economic power of the U.S. Government, on "international capital," and on multinational corporations. The concept is also used to describe cultural phenomena, epitomized by the dominance of products like *Coca-Cola*, which displace indigenous beverages, or systems of American empirical social research, which are charged with inhibiting the development of distinctive national systems of social analysis. See Suzanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Underdevelopment in Latin America," in K. T. Fann and Donald D. Hodges, *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston: Porter Sargent 1971); James D. Cockcroft, André G. Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy* (New York: Anchor 1972); Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1972); John D. Esseks, "Economic Dependence and Political Development in the New African States," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIII (November 1971); Irving L. Horowitz, *The Three Worlds of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press 1966); and Henry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1966).

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ness, while extensive, is manifested by a system which is, overall, so far autonomous as to have high potential for attaining a condition of autarky.[2]

INTEGRATION AND HEGEMONY

Integration is a step beyond interdependence. It represents a condition in which formerly autonomous units have more or less permanently surrendered vital functions to another, more extended unit while still retaining a substantial number of other vital functions. Integration may therefore apply to only a given institution, to a subset of institutions such as the economic or political, or to a series of major institutional complexes. Thus, two neighboring states may adopt a joint customs arrangement with regard to third parties and suspend such formalities for all goods passing between the two states, while each yet maintains a separate parliament, executive, police force, tax system, and the like. For example, the princely states of India after independence were largely, although not totally, integrated into the new national state while retaining some degree of distinctness. In time we may expect this integration to become complete, and these units of the system will become indistinguishable from all the other subdivisions of the Indian state.

Integration may, of course, be either voluntary or imposed. Thus, the total integration of the colonies in the former British Empire was, with few exceptions, a result of the imposition of force, whereas the participation of most of the ex-colonies in the Commonwealth was largely voluntary, perhaps because it involved a lesser degree of integration. Integration imposed by force may be treated as a special case, designated as *hegemony*. It was the predominant mode of integration in the past, and its history has not yet run its course, although we may hope that voluntary integration will be the predominant mode in the future.

CONVERGENCE

Integration sometimes presupposes and often leads to similarities in political form, in social organization, or in cultural patterns, but such similarities are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for integra-

[2] The diversity of basic materials to be found within the boundaries of the United States is well known. It is helpful, however, also to see the contrast expressed in statistical terms. For the U.S., foreign trade (in 1965) was only 7.3% of GNP, whereas for Japan it was 20% and for Singapore 238%. See Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (2d ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press 1972), 372-77.

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tion. Where social units start from diverse positions on some scale of organization, sociopolitical structure, or culture, and then move toward some more common form on the given dimension, the process is labelled *convergence*. Just as integration may occur without convergence as in the relations of an imperial center and its colonies, so convergence may occur without any substantial degree of integration. Thus, the Soviet Union and the United States may become more alike in their urbanization, dependence on scientific research and technological innovation, and development of a delinquent subculture among the *jeunesse dorée*, without any substantial movement toward greater integration of the two political systems.

A HISTORICAL EXCURSUS

Having elaborated our basic set of concepts, at least in preliminary form, we should now test their serviceability. Ideally, this test would require application to a number of historical periods. Indeed, it would have been preferable to make this test by applying the concepts to at least four periods: prehistory, the era of Greco-Roman dominance, the medieval period, and the premodern world scene. The limits on the space allotted for this particular communication, however, oblige us to restrict ourselves to a single application, in this case the earliest relevant period, namely prehistory.

Before undertaking this exploration, however, it seems appropriate to pause long enough for one general note of caution concerning the severe limits on our ability to generalize, which constrain us the moment we move from the nation-state or the culture region to the global level of analysis. Throughout much of recorded history, different areas of the world were at quite different stages of development, especially so far as the level of technology and of political integration are concerned. The earth was divided into a series of different worlds, each with its own character as a subworld. Moreover, for much of human history some of these subworlds were mutually in total ignorance of the existence of each other. Great Incan and Mayan empires rose and fell without having any awareness of Europe, just as Europe was totally unaware of those empires. Of course, it is precisely the fact that such complete isolation and insulation is no longer possible which distinguishes the modern era. Knowing that, however, does not settle for us the question as to whether, in dealing with such periods, it is really appropriate to treat the world as one unit, or whether it should be treated as a series of discrete subworlds, for each of which we need to test, separately, the extent to which the elements within it enjoyed

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autarky, were independent, converged on a common model, and so on. It seems both more consistent with the theoretical orientation of this particular presentation and more consonant with practical constraints, to maintain here a focus on the world as a single system. Applying our concepts to the prehistorical period, approximately between 10,000 and 5,000 B.C., we may say the following of the world at that time:

Autarky was extremely high, which is to say of course that dependence was very low. Hunting and gathering, herding, and limited agriculture permitted relatively self-contained, self-supporting communities.

Interconnectedness was minimal. Most groups had contact only with immediately adjacent groups; exchange was limited to a small number of less than vital commodities; interchange of persons, customs, ideas, and technology was extremely selective. Although pottery, animal husbandry, and some cultivated plants gradually diffused, the norm seemed to be total avoidance where possible, and sporadic, brief, and limited engagement where unavoidable.

Integration was rarely the outcome of such connections as were established. Populations were often nomadic or in other ways in motion, which reduced the length of contact between groups below the term optimal for integration. In addition, the groups coming into juxtaposition were often extremely disparate, as illustrated in a later historical period by the relations between the settled, cliff-dwelling, almost "urban" Hopi, and nomadic herders such as the Navajo. The barriers to the integration of such groups were very great. Moreover, limits on the technical capacity of rulers, above all with regard to communication, minimized the prospect of establishing political *hegemony*, and hence further reduced the attainment of other forms of integration.

Convergence. It is a curious feature of the prehistorical period that despite maximal autarky and minimal interconnectedness and integration, convergence was quite substantial. Probably the most important manifestation of the similarity which most societies displayed in that period was in their level of technology. That technology, in turn, evidently established constraints which influenced institutional patterns, thus insuring the existence of certain very broad similarities in the social organization of late stone-age and early bronze-age societies.

Our image of the standing of the prehistorical period on the seven dimensions of our analytic scheme, reducing our characterization of each to a key word or phrase, may be summarized as follows:

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Autarky	High
Interconnectedness	Minimal
Dependence	Extremely limited
Interdependence	Virtually none
Integration	Virtually none
Hegemony	Minimal and sporadic
Convergence	Considerable similarity in technology; modest in other forms of culture

Once we move into the historical era, we quickly discover how difficult it is to avoid being ethnocentric. For example, if we elect to represent early history by the period from 200 B.C. to A.D. 200, the temptation for an individual in the European historical tradition is to treat it automatically as the era dominated by Greek culture and the Roman Empire. From the perspective of an Asian, however, it might more appropriately be seen as the period of the flourishing of the great Han Dynasties. Going either back or forward, the specific actors would change, but the pattern would remain the same. The tendency for vast parts of the global population to become organized in great territorial hegemonies marks a sharp break dividing the historical period from prehistory. These hegemonies were generally concentrated in, although not absolutely limited to distinct, even if broad, culture areas, and were generally organized and dominated by a particular dynamic subgroup within the area. They were possible only after widely diffused, settled agriculture made available large surpluses of grain and labor. But they depended at least as much on technological advances such as irrigation, improved navigation at sea, systems of imperial roads such as those built by Darius for the Achaemenid Empire, and the development of cavalry and a reliable iron sword. Equally critical was the development of new forms of political and military organization, including the means for collecting and allocating the surplus food and human services which became available.

Within the limits of each of these subworlds, and notably within the area of Roman dominance, *autarky* was greatly reduced, *interconnectedness* and *interdependence* became much more extensive, and, despite a high degree of cultural diversity in the hinterlands, a *convergence* toward a common metropolitan culture was strongly manifested.

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In the global system as a whole, however, the tendencies were different. The characteristic of the world system was that it was multicentered. Each of the major subworlds, such as Rome and China, manifested a high degree of *autarky*. *Interconnectedness* between the major subworlds was relatively minor, limited to a few trade routes carrying mainly specialized commodities, particularly luxury goods not at all vital to the economy or social structure of either party to the exchange. In brief, neither dependence nor interdependence was manifested between these subworlds. Finally, *divergence* rather than congruence was the norm in the elaboration of social and cultural forms. In this era, each of the subworlds greatly elaborated forms of stratification, of architecture and art, and of religion, starting from different points and following principles of internal coherence which moved them in ever more divergent directions. The phrase "a typical resident of the world" is a much less meaningful concept when applied to this period than it was when applied to the prehistorical era.

We have come forward partway through history, although by great leaps and bounds, with at least some basis for concluding that our small repertoire of concepts provides a reasonably serviceable instrument for characterizing the global social system at any one time. Thus assured, we may turn to our analysis of the current modern period, which is to be the main object of our analysis.

The Recent Modern Era

At some point after the medieval period in Europe, the world entered upon a new and unprecedented era of interconnectedness. No precise moment or event can claim unambiguous priority in defining the start of this era; appropriate candidates might be Marco Polo's visit to Asia in the last quarter of the thirteenth century or Columbus's discovery of the New World. In any event, after a slow beginning lasting several hundred years, the rate of interchange among individuals, institutions, and societies began to grow at an exceedingly rapid rate.

In characterizing the modern era, one is greatly tempted to see a relatively sharp break with much of what had gone before in human history. To the Western imagination, this temptation is reinforced by the image of the Dark Ages, exaggerated perhaps, but on the whole correctly perceived as one of stagnation and even retrogression on many dimensions of human endeavor. But even if we use as our standard the centuries which witnessed the remarkable burgeoning of the Roman Empire, we must be struck by how little that was fundamentally new

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was added to knowledge or to mankind's stock of basic resources. The Romans may have been great innovators, but they were mediocre inventors. And of this small set of inventions they sometimes took but little advantage, as in the case of the waterwheel.[3] By contrast, what is archetypical of the modern era, and in particular of the industrial system, is the great flood of new materials, technique, knowledge, and institutions, coupled with an explosive growth in the production and diffusion of people, goods, services, ideas, and relationships. In many respects the facts are staggering.

Probably the most dramatic changes have come about through the growth of population. Thus, the modern era, although representing less than one-tenth of one per cent of the time man has been on the earth, has produced about one-quarter of all the human beings who ever lived on this globe.[4] Not only are the numbers vastly larger, but per capita consumption has increased enormously. As a result, the world's supply of nonreplenishable resources is being consumed at an incredible rate. We may fault Meadows and The Club of Rome on one or another of their projections, but it is difficult to disprove their contention that in many respects the modern era has become the era of exponential growth.[5] Such growth is one of the most fundamental facts of our time. To deny it is ridiculous, even though embracing it uncritically is foolish. Social reality is much too complicated to permit one to summarize it in a single statistic, or to represent it adequately by a single concept. That becomes fully apparent when one examines some of the evidence bearing on the issue of the interconnectedness of the modern world.

[3] The water mill was one of the few, and certainly one of the most important, mechanical inventions introduced in Hellenic times. Yet Childe reports that a century after Christ such mills were hardly more common than a century before. See Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History* (Baltimore: Penguin Books 1942), 235, 251-53. I am indebted to Keith Hopkins for the distinction between Roman invention and Roman innovation, i.e., the adoption and adaptation of the inventions of others.

[4] Nathan Keyfitz of Harvard University estimates that 69 billion people have lived on earth since the beginning of the human race. Of this total, roughly 18 billion, or 26%, have lived on earth during the past 300 years; 3 billion, or 4%, are living on earth now. See Keyfitz, "How Many People Have Lived on the Earth," *Demography*, III, No. 2 (1966), 581-82. We estimated the span of human habitation on earth to be 300,000 years, which yields our calculation that the modern era, covering some 300 years, equals .1% of the span of human occupancy of the globe. Keyfitz took the period of human habitation to cover one million years. Using that base would, of course, make the modern era an even smaller fragment of the span of human habitation on earth.

[5] Donella H. Meadows and others, *The Limits of Growth* (New York: Universe Books 1972).

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INTERCONNECTEDNESS

A very large number of indicators may be drawn on to prove that the national institutions and populations which comprise world society have been very rapidly increasing the degree of their interconnectedness over the last half-century. Among many indicators of this trend, we may point to the following:[6]

University-level students abroad: The number of students studying outside their own country approximately doubled in number between 1960 and 1969, rising from 239,000 to 477,000. This continued a pattern which had been in evidence at least since 1950. Over that longer period of time, the annual increase in the number of students studying abroad was in excess of 7 per cent a year.[7]

Foreign mail: Between 1938 and 1970 the volume of foreign mail sent and received by 40 reporting countries increased almost seven times. The annual rate of increase was some 6 per cent per year.[8]

[6] The figures for percentage of annual increase given in this paper were almost all computed by us from relatively crude time series, and should therefore be considered only approximate. In most cases only summary figures for two points in time were available to us, sometimes thirty or more years apart. Obviously within so great a span the actual annual rate could have varied greatly from year to year and decade to decade. In cases where we could obtain more detailed time series, we checked to verify that the rates of increase had been more or less uniform over the longer span before computing a per annum rate of increase. Thus, we did not compute such a rate-of-increase figure for direct U.S. investment abroad for the *total period* from 1946 to 1971, because the years from 1946 to 1952 were relatively stable, whereas there was a sharp upturn from 1963 to 1971.

The formula used to calculate annual rates of increase takes beginning year and ending year figures and derives the yearly rate of growth in the following manner:

$$r = \frac{1}{T} \log_e \frac{f(t)}{f(o)}$$

T = Total time elapsed
$f(t)$ = figure at ending year
$f(o)$ = figure at beginning year

This formula has been checked by use after the fact where appropriate, and in most cases has proven to be quite accurate. In fact, if anything, there is a slight conservative bias in our growth rate statistics. Discrepancies probably do arise because (1) the table we have been using gives natural logarithms ($\log_e$) to five significant figures only and thus contains a certain amount of statistical error; (2) the assumption behind the use of the natural log is that "interest" is compounded constantly, i.e., that the number of times a year that the interest is compounded is taken to the mathematical limit; (3) there is an assumption that the value of the variable increases at a constant rate over the time period.

[7] *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1971* (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations 1972), 78; UNESCO, *Statistics of Students Abroad 1962–1968* (Paris: UNESCO 1972), 19-21.

[8] Figures are from 40 countries listed in the *United Nations Statistical Yearbooks* for 1955 and 1971 for which there were data for years 1938 and 1970.

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International telephonic and telegraphic communication: Closely paralleling the pattern manifested by the mails, a marked increase is shown in the frequency of electronic communication across national boundaries. The number of telegrams sent abroad in 1970 was more than two and a half times that for 1938, indicating an annual increase rate of 3 per cent per year.[9] Moreover, there was a much higher rate of increase in the frequency of international telephone calls, conservatively estimated at 15 per cent per year in the decade of the sixties.[10] Putting all the evidence together, we may safely assume that the total of international wired and wireless exchanges combined has increased at a rate sufficient to ensure at least a doubling every decade.

International tourist travel: From 1954 to 1970, the 26 main "tourist-receiving" countries experienced a surge from 26 to 106 million visits, indicating an increase of about 8.7 per cent per year. This did not come about merely because the affluent were flooding the more exotic corners of the globe. For example, in this same period the interchange between Europe and the United States, accounting for a large part of all tourism, also increased at a rate in excess of 7 per cent per year.[11]

World trade: Commerce between nation-states increased tenfold between 1938 and 1969. In each of the three decades it approximately doubled, indicating an annual increase of approximately 7 per cent.[12] Increases expressed in value terms, as these are, should perhaps be discounted to allow for inflation. But even expressing the value of world trade in constant 1963 prices, the three-decade period still yields an annual rate of increase of about 5 per cent.[13]

Direct capital investment abroad: United States data, the most readily available, show a change in the rate of investment, from about 1 or 2

[9] Figures computed on the basis of data found in *United Nations Statistical Yearbooks* for 1955 and 1971.

[10] Between 1963 and 1970 the number of overseas telephone calls from the United States increased by about 25% per year. (*World's Telephones* [New York: American Telephone and Telegraph, January 1970.]) Data for other countries are not at hand, but it seems reasonable to assume that, at least for the other developed countries, rates of increase have not been much lower. Moreover, the U.S. alone accounts for a very large share of all the world's telephonic communication. To assume a worldwide increase in international telephonic communication of 15% therefore seems conservative.

[11] Figures computed on the basis of data found in *United Nations Statistical Yearbooks* for 1955 and 1971. Annual increase of tourists used in these calculations include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as countries of origin. The omission of some European countries results in an underestimation of absolute numbers of tourists going from Europe to the United States. This omission, however, is not likely to affect the percentages of change reported.

[12] *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1970*, 402.

[13] Calculated from data in *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972*, Table 12, p. 43, for the years 1938–1971.

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billion dollars from 1946–52 to 3 billion by 1963, and then to 8 billion by 1971. Even allowing for inflation, the amount of such investment clearly at least doubled within the last decade.[14] Data on the rest of the world, still being studied, are expected to show comparable patterns.

International nongovernmental organizations (INGO's): From around 1850, when some 5 or 10 INGO's were founded in each quinquenniad, the number founded rose to over 300 per quinquenniad by 1950. From 1954 to 1968, the rate of increase in the total number of such organizations was about 5 per cent per year.[15] Moreover, a study of the congresses and conferences sponsored by these organizations would presumably show an equal and more likely a higher rate of participation by groups and individuals than is indicated when participation is measured on the basis of the number of "organizations" involved.

International governmental organizations (IGO's): In general, membership in such organizations increased substantially after World War II. In the United Nations, for example, the rate of membership increase from 1945 to 1970 was 3.6 per cent per annum; for UNESCO it was 6.4 per cent. Some of the specialized organizations, such as GATT, experienced an annual membership increase of over 10 per cent.[16]

The pattern manifested in these figures is unmistakable and indeed rather remarkable in its consistency. Over a wide range of systems of exchange we find evidence for rapid acceleration in the development of ties linking nations, their institutional components, and the individuals who populate them. The abundance and complexity of the networks which interconnect the world's population are, and have been for some time, growing at a phenomenal rate. With some variation according to the specific indicator used, recent decades reveal a general tendency for many forms of human interconnectedness across national boundaries to be doubling every ten years.[17]

[14] Figures taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C. 1973).

[15] Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization*, XXV (Summer 1971), 420-43.

[16] Percentages computed on the basis of data reported in Moshe Y. Sachs, ed., *World Encyclopedia of the Nations* (New York: Harper and Row 1960 and 1971).

[17] The measures of increasing interconnectedness presented here are almost all absolute rather than relative or proportional. They indicate the number of ties extant, rather than the proportion of all countries, institutions, or individuals having such ties. Since world population is increasing substantially, even holding constant the average degree of connectivity would obviously yield a significant increase in the absolute *number* of connections to be observed year by year. Therefore, some downward ad-

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Obviously, there are many quite serious defects in the available data, which it will take us a long time to correct. There are also some anomalous findings which may be hard to explain. In addition, summary figures on average rates such as those given obviously must conceal a great deal of variation in the degree to which different nations and people are participating in this increased connectivity. The variation is by no means obvious; indeed, there are some marked surprises in store for anyone who will carefully examine the detailed statistics.

For example, not wealth but the size of the population best predicts the dependence of countries on foreign trade. The proportion of GNP represented by trade rises from a mere 10 per cent in countries of more than 100 million to almost 80 per cent in countries of less than 1 million.[18] In the utilization of telegraphic communication directed abroad, the less developed countries have actually been gaining markedly on the more developed, since their rate of increase of the use of such means of communication was 4.3 per cent, against 2 per cent for the advanced countries, between 1938 and 1970.[19] There is also a contrast between tourists, who mainly stem from the wealthier countries, and students, who are mainly sent abroad to study by poorer countries. Only a relatively small proportion of the student body of the wealthier countries studies abroad.[20]

All these anomalies, if such they be, surely have sensible explanations, and could be discussed at length.[21] Some of these issues will, in

justment of our figures on connectivity should be made on a systematic basis. Nevertheless, the adjustment would not lead to a dramatic reinterpretation of the facts since world population has grown at a rate of only some 2% per annum, whereas most of the interconnections we noted increased at a rate of better than 7% per annum.

[18] Based on figures reported on Taylor and Hudson (fn. 2), 372-77. By our calculation, the percentage of GNP represented by trade falls regularly as the population of a country increases. Median percentages are as follows: less than 1 million population, 78%; 1 to 10 million, 43%; 10 to 50 million, 33%; 50 to 100 million, 26%; more than 100 million, 10% of GNP.

[19] Based on figures from *United Nations Statistical Yearbooks* for 1955 and 1971. Developed countries in these calculations included most European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Less developed countries included the following few for which complete data were available: Angola, Morocco, Mozambique, Tunisia, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Argentina, and Paraguay.

[20] All data on student exchanges are from United Nations sources, especially UNESCO (fn. 7).

[21] For example, the reason less developed countries are gaining on the more developed ones in the use of the telegraph can probably be explained by the fact that the more advanced are switching to the long-distance telephone, a more modern, rapid, and flexible form of communication. That would certainly seem to be indicated by the fact that the number of foreign telegrams sent out from the United States remained more or less the same in most years between 1963 and 1970, whereas the number of telephone calls abroad placed from the United States increased at better than 25% per year. (See *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972*, and *The World's Telephones* (fn. 10).

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fact, be further dealt with below. At this point, however, I must limit myself to calling attention to the complexities. That, however, does not gainsay the main thrust of the data.

Faced, then, with the evident facts of such rapid growth of interconnectedness, one must inevitably wonder what the long-term implications of this process will be. Can and will the expansion of connectedness go on indefinitely? If not, what are the limits on further expansion? And, whether the expansion continues or must come to a halt at some more or less definable point, what will the resultant world system be like?

First, we should acknowledge the obvious fact that worldwide connectivity cannot continue to grow indefinitely. Indeed, for some forms of interchange we can specify absolute ceilings and practical limits on further expansion. For example, the increase in membership in the United Nations from 1950 to 1970 was clearly determined by a set of unique historical circumstances. Even if a number of the currently less well-integrated nations were to break up into several separate sovereign states where only one existed before, the earlier rate of increase in UN membership would not be sustained. On the other hand, there is no obvious limit on the rate of participation by individuals and subgroups in international nongovernmental organizations. Since there are billions of people who do not yet participate in any way, and much more involvement is possible on the part of those already active, we could well have a doubling of participation every decade for a very long period indeed. Overall, the situation is evidently complex, with objectively defined limits balanced against forces making for probable long-term increases.

The case of university students studying abroad illustrates the complexity of the issue. First, we must acknowledge that there is obviously a theoretical point beyond which it would become impossible to maintain the high rate of increase in study abroad which the world experienced in recent decades. It is, however, equally obvious that, with only 2 per cent of all university students studying abroad, we are very far from reaching that theoretical limit.[22] We may well wonder, therefore,

[22] See UNESCO (fn. 7), 30. If we assume a condition in which *all* young people went as far as the university, and make the further unlikely assumption that all university students would customarily be sent outside the country for advanced training, we have designed a situation such that in time no further increase in the number of students studying abroad could be attained unless the population of young people could be expanded by a rapid rise in births. Moreover, such expansion of the supply of young people could hardly occur at a rate of more than 2 or 3% per year, whereas the current and recent past rate of expansion in foreign study has run at 7 or 8% per year. Thus, with a stable rate of population growth, the *rate of increase* in students studying

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if more practical considerations do not hold some promise of stemming the tide.

We can, indeed, identify certain forces which should act, over time, to reduce the number of students studying abroad. As we shall see below in the discussion of dependence, the tendency to send university students abroad to study is related to the availability of domestic training facilities. In very small countries, such facilities will most likely always be limited to a few important fields. In the larger national communities, however, a greater number of places over a wider range of subjects is likely to become available within the country as each increases its wealth and develops a fuller array of domestic institutions for advanced training. Indeed, it is precisely because the wealth and the institutional resources of almost all countries are increasing, however much less rapidly and less equitably than we might hope, that we can expect most countries to find it possible, in time, to train their students at home.

The attainment of this stage of development by most of the currently less developed countries could lead the *proportion* of students studying abroad, and in time perhaps even their *absolute* number, to become stabilized, and the numbers and proportions might even begin to decline absolutely. Such trends can actually already be observed in specified fields, such as engineering and medicine, which with each passing year, account for a smaller percentage of the students studying abroad.[23]

On the other hand, the issue is complicated by the prospect that, as countries increase in wealth, the students who now go abroad out of necessity may increasingly be replaced by those who go to foreign countries because it is presumed to be "broadening." That has been the chief reason for study abroad by the more affluent, and there are no

abroad could be brought as low as zero even though the frequency of interchange of students was at 100%, i.e., saturation, with all students studying outside their home country.

This hypothetical example may give some satisfaction to our need to find some way of showing that exponential growth has clearly definable limits; we must nevertheless acknowledge that it is improbable that the conditions specified will be reached in the near, or even the distant, future.

23

Per cent of All Foreign Students Enrolled in Medicine and Engineering, 1962–1968

	1962	*1966*	*1968*
Medicine	16.2	13.5	12.7
Engineering	19.5	18.1	17.8

Excerpted from UNESCO (fn. 7), Table 21, p. 47, which gives the field of study of all students studying abroad from 117 countries.

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grounds for assuming that the idea will not also appeal to those whose higher income is of more recent vintage. In other words, if the supply of discretionary income keeps up with or surpasses the diminution in the pressures of practical necessity, a decline in the proportion of students studying abroad may be quite long in coming.

Having now acknowledged the observed, the practical, and the theoretical limits on indefinite exponential growth, we must nevertheless report our impression that many indicators of interconnectivity have no obvious saturation point. In any event, most indicators are very far from having reached the point where growth must stop. On the contrary, the fact that on many indicators the less developed countries show a tendency toward acceleration in the rate at which they become connected to the outside world gives reason to assume that the trends we noted still have much momentum.[24] Most of the indicators we have identified respond to the growth in wealth. And wealth, however unevenly distributed, is increasing in *most countries*, and in some *segments* of all countries. We may therefore confidently expect the next thirty, and perhaps the next fifty, years to be characterized by the increasing connectivity of the world population.

INTERDEPENDENCE

Interconnectedness may suggest, but does not necessarily define, interdependence. Dependence exists where a service, commodity, or resource obtained from abroad is relatively vital and not easily substitutable. Interdependence exists where there is a relatively equal or balanced exchange of such goods. If country *A* has good coking coal while country *B* has ore, and each makes its own steel, they are interdependent in the steel-making process. If capital is in surplus and can find no profitable investment in *C*, whereas *D* has rich and potentially profitable resources and no capital, an exchange between them may also indicate a basic interdependence.

How much of the observed interconnectedness reported above also represents some approximation of this type of interdependence cannot be stated with precision. Indeed, one may easily be misled into assuming that all increases in interconnectedness also mean increased interdependence, when they actually represent nothing of the kind. Take,

[24] For example, UN statistics show the following: In foreign mail received, 20 less developed countries show an average annual gain of 7.3% from 1938 to 1970. In comparison, 20 developed countries show an average annual gain of only 3.7%. In foreign telegrams sent, 12 less developed countries show an average annual increase of 4.3% from 1938 to 1970, while 22 developed countries averaged only 2.0%. These statistics are complemented by telephone use data. Between 1967 and 1971, telephones in use increased 61.4% in Asia as compared to only 37% in Europe.

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for example, the exchange of students among countries. As noted above, the *number* of students studying abroad has been rising by over 7 per cent per year. The absolute number of interconnections will therefore double every decade. To assert *interdependence*, however, we should be able to show that such exchanges serve functions not permitting ready or efficient substitution. Alas, that assertion cannot be made since, of the world's university student body, less than 2 per cent study abroad. It is clear, therefore, that despite steeply rising *interconnectivity* in absolute numbers, most countries are *not* linked with others in a system of interdependence so far as the education of university students in concerned.[25]

There are probably many other forms of exchange and interconnectedness which also do not involve a substantial element of interdependence. Take, for example, the tourist flow between the more developed countries. For many years Japan was the favorite goal for American tourists to Asia, even though few Japanese came to the United States. Then, in a short span of time, the number of tourists coming from Japan to the U.S., and particularly to Hawaii, rose from about 15,000 to over 300,000.[26] This counterflow perhaps was some slight help in adjusting the balance of trade between the United States and Japan. Beyond that, however, the exchange of several million tourists between these two countries can hardly be assumed to have been terribly important to the life of either. We had interconnectedness without interdependence.

Nevertheless, the world does offer a number of examples of true interdependence, which provide some basis for asserting that there has in recent decades been a real increase in that phenomenon. Probably the best example—certainly the best-documented case—is that of world trade.

Nations, especially nation-states, are driven to trade by the limits on autarky and by the demands of efficiency. It is the rare nation indeed which can find within its boundaries all the material it needs, and it is the exceptional producer who can find a large enough market within one state's population to permit an efficient scale of production. The

[25] This is, of course, not to gainsay the fact that some countries are relatively heavily dependent on foreign universities to train their specialists in certain fields. For some evidence, see the section on *dependence*, below.

[26] The *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* for 1972 shows that in 1953 tourists from Japan to the United States numbered about 17,000. By 1971 the figure was 313,000. The 1953 figure included tourists from Korea, which, if omitted, would probably leave us a figure closer to the 15,000 mentioned in the text. The press reports an enormous surge of additional Japanese tourists to Hawaii in 1973. Some estimates place that flow at an increase of over a 100,000 in a single year.

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contrast with the task of educating students is striking. Belgium can educate virtually all of its university students at home, but within the confines of its limited territory it can find but the smallest part of the material necessary to operate a modern industrial civilization, and only a tiny market for its industrial output. Hence, Belgium must trade so extensively that such trade equals three-fourths of its GNP. That is of course, a rather high proportion, but not unusual. Of 79 countries tabulated by Taylor and Hudson for 1965, the median proportion of GNP represented by trade was 34 per cent.[27] In sharp contrast, students studying abroad represented only 4 per cent of all university enrollees in the median case for 119 countries.[28]

But what of the future? Will this particular kind of interdependence in trade increase? Since small nations are more forced to trade, and since more and more of the new nations are in the category of "mini-states," one might expect the importance of trade relative to GNP to rise. One would be led to the same conclusion on the basis of the increasing industrialization of the world, since industralization seems to be a great stimulus to trade.[29] There are, of course, countervailing trends which might work against the success of this reasonable predic-

[27] This subset of 79 countries was selected from the full set of 124 presented by Taylor and Hudson (fn. 2), in order to facilitate a comparison with figures for 1959 which had been presented by Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964). Results of the comparison will appear below. The full set of 124 countries presented by Taylor and Hudson shows the median proportion of trade to GNP to be 39%. The figures on trade as a percentage of GNP, cited above, are not meant to reflect total world trade as a proportion of total world GNP. Since many small countries which enter our set have high ratios of trade to GNP and relatively *small* GNP's, the median percentage figure we give is bound to be considerably greater than the ratio of total world trade to world GNP. This is especially true when one considers that the countries with the highest GNP's (U.S., U.S.S.R.) show figures for the proportion of trade to GNP which are below 10%. World trade as a proportion of world GNP can be roughly estimated from UN statistics. Considering market economies only, the proportion of worldwide imports to worldwide GNP in 1963 was roughly 10%. By 1970 this figure had risen to nearly 12%. Figures based on *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972*, Tables 146 and 188.

[28] *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1971*, 460-63.

[29] One basis for this conclusion is the fact that trade *within* the set of industrialized countries is much more intense than is trade either *between* industrialized and non-industrialized sets or *within* the subset of the nonindustrialized. A more direct test of the hypothesis presented required that we compare the increases in trade with the increase in industrialization for specific countries. We selected eleven countries on the basis of availability of data, geographic spread, and variation in the degree to which their industrialization increased between 1948 and 1970. For those eleven we then compared the increase in industrialization with the increase in the value of exports over the same period. The rank-order correlation of the two sets of figures was .67, indicating a close correspondence between the two types of growth. At the top of the list, Japan's industrialization index increased 25.8 times (1963 = 100), and her trade increased by 20% per year; at the bottom of the list, Algeria's industrialization index increased only 1.1 times, and her exports by only 4% per year.

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tion. For example, national economic policies increasingly apply pressure for import substitution, fostering the manufacture of products within the country in which they are to be sold. In one way, that means less international trade. However, this practice may reduce one type of import only to require another—the assembled auto, previously imported whole, now being replaced by imports of steel, rubber, copper, chrome, and the like.

It turns out, somewhat to our surprise, that the available data for 79 countries show very little recent change in the median proportion which trade represents of GNP—the figures being 37 per cent in 1959 and 34 per cent in 1965.[30] This reflects a very high degree of interdependence.[31] By contrast, consider the situation in earlier times. Certainly the Roman era was impressive for the bulk and variety of commodities exchanged, yet how sobering it is to realize that in the first century B.C. the number of caravans annually crossing from China to Europe via Russia was perhaps one dozen each year.[32] Even allowing for more extensive commerce by sea, external trade must have represented a negligible proportion of GNP in these systems.

Beyond trade, it is likely that the national science establishment of all countries would be seriously hampered, and might indeed be rendered relatively sterile in all but the largest nations, were it not for the continuous interchange of ideas and personnel among the several countries important for scientific productivity. Some great literature would probably continue to be produced by authors, and some vital new paintings by painters, if we cut off all international contacts among creative artists around the world, but a substantial case can be made for the critical role which such exchange plays in stimulating and sustaining innovation and vitality in aesthetic creation.

In science, as in trade and capital flows, the giants, such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., are probably least interdependent with the world system; curiously enough, though, it is precisely these two giants which seem most consistently and forcefully to impinge on the development of all the rest of the world.[33]

[30] Figures for countries found in Russett (fn. 27), as well as in Taylor and Hudson (fn. 2).

[31] Again we call attention to the fact that thus approaching the association of trade to GNP by country gives an impression of greater interdependence than one would derive by contemplating only the fact that the value of worldwide exports as a proportion of worldwide GNP is in the much more modest range of 10-12%.

[32] Childe (fn. 3), 239.

[33] It is fascinating to apply this notion of potential autarky in trade and science to the realm of art. Some critics would assert that all the important sources of real creativity in art are found outside these giants, and that if they were not interconnected with the rest of the world, they would soon become artistic wastelands.

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DEPENDENCE

If the earlier example of tourist exchanges between the United States and Japan had involved Jamaica, Mexico, or Spain rather than Japan, the matter would have appeared in quite a different light. Not because the tourism would mean more for the United States, obviously, but rather because it would be so much more vital for the countries receiving the tourists.[34] Exchanges vital to one partner but of relatively casual significance for a second define situations of dependency for the former.

In the nature of the case, the poorer or so-called less developed countries most often find themselves in the position of such dependency. Curiously, the situation most commonly cited to illustrate such dependency—that in which these countries seem limited to selling raw materials in exchange for finished industrial products from the advanced countries—is more nearly a situation of interdependence than of strict dependence.[35] Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence of the pervasive dependence of the overwhelming majority of the less developed countries. They are dependent on the more advanced countries for all manner of more sophisticated machinery including complex machines of war; for scientific knowledge of all sorts and the related training of specialists in a host of fields; for the technical and organizational know-how vital to large-scale, complex productive enterprises; and for the investment capital essential to purchase, borrow, rent, or otherwise employ those resources.

Again, the situation may be vividly illustrated by the statistics on students sent abroad to study. In 1968, less than a thousand students from North America went to study full time in South America, but more than ten thousand went in the opposite direction. For Asia, the contrast was even more dramatic, since 63,000 students came from Asia to North America, compared to only about a thousand North Americans studying in Asia.[36] These exchanges are wildly disproportionate not only in absolute numbers, but also in terms of the ratio which students studying abroad represent of all university students enrolled at home. Less than 1 per cent of North American students study abroad,

[34] These assertions are confirmed by the fact that in 1970 tourism accounted for 8.1%, 5.6%, and 4.5% of the national income in Jamaica, Spain, and Mexico, respectively. By comparison, in the same year foreign tourist receipts accounted for a mere .3% of the national income of the U.S. and .1% of that of Japan. (Based on Tables 157 and 187, *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972*.)

[35] If the point was not obvious when this sentence was first written in August 1973, it must surely have become obvious since then as a result of the Arab oil embargo and the resultant worldwide energy crisis.

[36] UNESCO (fn. 7), 33.

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as do slightly more than 1 per cent of European students. By contrast, Africa and the Arab states were, as late as 1968, obliged to send 15 and 19 per cent, respectively, of their students abroad for university-level education.[37] It is evident then, that many of the smaller and poorer nations are heavily dependent in this respect.

The dependency is all the more obvious if we examine particular fields, especially the scientific and technical. For most of the youths from the advantaged countries the act of going abroad is an indulgence; they usually could do as well at home. For comparable students from the less developed countries going abroad may be an absolute necessity—the only way to obtain the desired training. This is reflected in the distribution of specialities chosen by students studying abroad. In 1966 almost two-thirds of all North Americans studying abroad took "arts" subjects, whereas some 55 per cent of students from the developing countries were studying the more applied and critical fields of science, engineering, medicine, and agriculture.[38] The dependence is even more evident when we consider the contribution which study abroad makes to the supply of critically needed specialists in the composition of their respective professions in certain countries. Thus, in 1966 some 28 per cent of Africa's science students were obtaining their training abroad, as against a mere .3 per cent of North American students of science seeking *their* training abroad.[39]

INTEGRATION

Progressively increasing interconnectedness and high levels of interdependence might well be expected to serve as preconditions, even as stimulants, for increasing integration. In actual fact, the extraordinary increases in interconnectedness and interdependence which humankind has experienced since World War II have not been reflected in any really substantial increase in the integration of national states into a united world political system. While the growth curve for interconnectedness has been exponential, the curve for integration has been at best linear, and many more conservative observers would insist that it be shown as more or less flat, with a few small peaks to reflect events such as the creation of the European Economic Community or other regional agencies.

Even these organizations are, of course, extremely limited in their powers. Meantime, most of the agencies of the United Nations and of UNESCO, while serving extremely valuable functions in setting standards, gathering statistics, and channelling aid, have in fact not suc-

[37] *Ibid.*, 30. [38] *Ibid.*, 55. [39] *Ibid.*, 57.

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ceeded in securing the surrender of virtually any important function or other element of sovereignty from the individual nation-states. Indeed, the multiplication of nation-states, including island ministates, emerging as new sovereignties out of the elements of dissolving colonial empires, had by 1970 brought us to a condition such that the degree of integration of the world system was probably substantially less, on balance, than it had been in 1900. There is therefore not much basis for challenging the assessment of Phillipe de Seynes, the UN Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, who asserted that as late as 1972 we still lived in "an almost anarchical world community with a mosaic of states as yet bound together only by the most general notion of solidarity and with an international system in which the area of clearly recognized common interests is still small [and] the possibility of central planning immediately conjures up new uncertainties, specifically the fear of manipulation by the powerful."[40]

CONVERGENCE

We now come to the consideration of convergence, an issue which seems to be particularly vexing to social scientists. Much of the difficulty of dealing with this problem stems from the failure to distinguish with sufficient precision the different elements of a very complex situation. A minimum list of such elements should include the following:

1. Modes of production and patterns of resource utilization.
2. Institutional arrays and institutional forms.
3. Structures or patterns of social relationships.
4. Systems of popular attitudes, values, and behavior.
5. Systems of political and economic control.

Since these elements may not only change at different speeds, but may actually move in opposite directions, the prospects for seemingly contradictory conclusions are substantial.

The following summary position on the issues may be offered:

1. *Modes of production and patterns of resource allocation.* In this respect the general movement is unmistakable and often seems almost inexorable. Indeed, the key to all other issues in the convergence debate may lie precisely here. Marion Levy proposes that we judge modernization by the propensity to utilize inanimate sources of power. By that standard all nations are certainly converging toward a common

[40] De Seynes, "Prospects for a Future Whole World," *International Organization*, XXVI (Winter 1972), 6.

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model, albeit at enormously different rates. The uses of power may, however, be only a crude indicator of a more fundamental process—that of increasing dependence on science and the resultant technology. This conception permits us to appreciate the importance of objects utilizing little power, such as transistors and desk computers, as well as the significance of the chemical-biological revolution symbolized by inoculation and "the pill" in human biology, and by miracle rice, insecticides, and fertilizers in agriculture.

Different societies may play quite different roles as producers of new knowledge of this sort, and they may differ greatly in the speed with which they more or less fully adopt and utilize the products of new technology. Nevertheless, the increasing dependence of all societies on that technology and its products, and the incorporation of all peoples into the network of their influence, is unmistakable. Electronic communication, scientific medicine, rapid transit, and computerized record keeping are a few of the outstanding examples of this wide diffusion.

2. *Institutional arrays, forms, and processes.* One of the hallmarks of modern or developed societies is the presence of a fairly standard array of institutional structures and the wide diffusion of the forms and processes characteristic of their operation. The key element in the transformation so many societies are experiencing consists in increasing differentiation and specialization, arising as a response to steady technological change and growing human interconnectedness. This process of differentiation leads to the burgeoning of new institutions. Within these new institutions, in turn, rational-technical bureaucratic forms of administration tend to diffuse and come to predominate.

Medieval society could reasonably be encompassed by reference to the state, the church, the military, the town and its special classes, the manor, and the peasant villages. In modern society we confront, by contrast, a vast array of institutions previously unknown or existing in only very rudimentary form, but each now fully elaborated with its own character and special forms. The king's chancellery becomes a host of government ministries; the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge moves from being a subordinate concern of the church to being the specialized responsibility of a vast array of academies of science, research institutes, universities, and schools; and so on, across many other realms encompassing medicine, law, insurance, trade, production, recreation, and leisure. Furthermore, within all these newly elaborated institutions there is a strong tendency to establish rational bureaucratic modes of organization.

The process is, of course, full of vicissitudes, and in many cases what

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is actually achieved by way of developing an efficient organization is very far from the Weberian model or the canons set by the Harvard School of Business Administration. Neither should one ignore countermovements designed to increase decentralization and to minimize bureaucratization, tendencies which we cannot pause to discuss. Nevertheless, the main thrust toward bureaucratization and the rationalization of administration is not to be denied. In substantial degree the world *is* being cast in the Weberian mold.

3. *Structure and patterns of social relationships.* We have in mind here such cultural and structural subsystems as the kinship system, the class structure, and the patterning of leisure-time activity. The basic issue for convergence theory is to assess how far the increasing similarity in modes of production and their associated institutional forms and processes encourages the development of concomitant similarities in sociocultural subsystems. Substantial and rather convincing documentation is available indicating that worldwide family patterns are converging on a norm common to urban-industrial societies.[41] There is equally extensive evidence to sustain the argument that the stratification systems of all large-scale complex societies have come to resemble each other in many essential respects.[42] Although the facts are less well documented, a case can probably also be made for convergence in the use of leisure within comparable segments of urban-industrial societies.[43]

Of course, all of the facts and alleged facts need to be critically assessed. In addition, the same mode of analysis should be extended to other features of the cultural subsystem, such as religion, to ascertain how far, if at all, comparable tendencies may be discerned there. Certainly we must anticipate that there will be some aspects of the cultural systems shared by particular national and subnational populations which will be completely, and others which will be at least relatively, immune to standardization, despite strong pressure exerted by other elements of the social system. On balance, however, I see no way to deny that some elements of the cultural system of national populations are manifesting a considerable tendency toward convergence as the nations move along the continuum leading them to the status of advanced industrial societies.

[41] See William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press 1963).

[42] Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, *Class, Status, and Power* (2d. ed., New York: Free Press 1966); see especially in this volume Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman, and Peter H. Rossi, "A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige."

[43] See Alexander Szalai, *The Use of Time: Daily Activity of Urban and Suburban Population in Twelve Countries* (The Hague: Mouton 1973).

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4. *Systems of popular attitudes, values, and behavior.* In 1960, in a paper called "Industrial Man," I demonstrated that in a variety of realms there was a similar *structure* of attitudes and values manifested by the population of a diverse set of developed and developing countries.[44] It is important to stress that the similarity was not in the *average* opinion, but rather in the *distribution* of opinion across the stratification system. The populations were alike only in that the structure of opinion in all cases was similar, with certain views and orientations becoming either more or less frequent as one went up or down the scale of education, occupational prestige, and the like. The theoretical explanation for these patterns was that the differentiated life experience of people in different strata of large-scale complex societies generated a standardized differentiation of response. This idea was subsequently tested more systematically in my cross-national research on individual modernization. There I was able to demonstrate, quite unambiguously I believe, that in six quite diverse developing nations each increment of increasing contact with modern institutions moved men a corresponding degree along a composite scale of modern attitudes and values.[45]

I read this evidence as arguing strongly that, as human life experience becomes more alike, attitudes, values, and basic dispositions will also become more alike. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that *all* men will become psychically alike. Clearly, if the theory I enunciated is correct, all people will not become alike so long as there are patterns of social differentiation *within* national populations. Moreover, the fact that men may become more alike should not obscure the fact that their having started from quite different initial positions may still leave them quite dissimilar even after they have moved a substantial distance toward some common norm.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that I posit movement toward a common norm only on certain aspects of modern industrial and organizational experience, as identified by the syndrome of individual modernity. There are clearly many other realms of attitude and value which are independent of the industrial organizational complex common to advanced nations. The influence of cultural traditions or national history may more strongly affect attitudes concerning democracy, social distance, and stratification. Thus, the attitudes of the citizens of Australia and England on these issues may be widely divergent despite the fact that the two nations share the same broad cultural tradition and that both

[44] Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (July 1960).

[45] Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974).

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qualify as modern complex societies. The features held in common by the two societies are evidently less effective in influencing the attitudes in question that are the facts of the pioneering tradition in Australia and the low status origins of the original settlers there.

5. *Systems of political and economic control.* We have in mind here the nature of the state, and the organization and distribution of power, along with the mode of its exercise. It is over this dimension that the greatest disagreement, and perhaps the greatest misunderstanding, has been manifested in the course of the debate about convergence. The evident durability of the Soviet system after more than fifty years has surely confounded the prediction of those who, some thirty years ago, asserted that the Soviet and the American systems were going to converge on some common position.[46] Indeed, the increasing divergence of China from the Soviet Union, so far as concerns the sharing of a common socioeconomic system, must give pause to those who assumed that, at least within the so-called Socialist half of the world, a common social order would surely be emerging. Outside the Socialist world the situation is comparable. Despite an extraordinary degree of *decentralization*, the United States continues to display most of the standard attainments of modernity that are also manifested by an equally *centralized* France, with the system of each in fact having had its origin in pre-modern times.

Therefore, anyone who insists that the emergence of a common standard of economic and political organization for modern nation states is inevitable must be prepared to acknowledge that this outcome can only be expected to arrive after a span to be calculated in centuries rather than decades. And, I fear, he must be prepared to face a very difficult task in specifying whether the common system which will presumably emerge will be more like that of the United States or that of the Soviet Union, or some variant altogether distinct from these.

Some will argue that all these models focussed on the nation-state are obsolete, and urge us to recognize the multinational corporation as having transcendent significance in its impact on the existing modes of political and economic organization of the world system. They see this new form of social organization as exercising economic power on a scale of magnitude and coordination so great as to make its heads more powerful than any set of national rulers—indeed, to make them the cadre of a new form of world government. Against this image,

[46] Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1968); see especially chap. 20, "Russia and the United States: A Problem in Comparative Sociology."

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however, one must balance the evidence of continuing and effective exercise of the ultimate power of the state in forcing such entities to adapt their policy to national interests or else suffer a set of consequences ranging up to exclusion from the territory of a given state, and, ultimately, to total confiscation.

All this is not to say there is no process truly common to all the states of the modern world. I believe there is. That common feature is the growing power of the state to control the lives of its citizens. That process is, of course, most dramatic in those parts of the world where a central state apparatus was previously either weak or nonexistent. I believe, however, that the same tendency is also manifest in countries such as the United States, which have a long history of organized government, but in which we are experiencing a new tendency in the progressive penetration of systems of central control into more and more aspects of individual life.[47] Whether this is a long-term trend toward which all humankind is converging, or whether the process is reversible in countries which attain a sufficiently high degree of development, I find very difficult to decide.

To sum up my position on the convergence issue, there is evidence of a strong tendency for all nations to move toward increasing utilization of modes of production based on inanimate power, resting in turn on modern technology and applied science. Managing this type of system, as well as coping with the new demands that populations impose for special goods and services, encourages the elaboration everywhere of new institutional structures that are highly specialized as to function and characterized by standardized modes of nominally rational technical bureaucratic procedure. These new productive arrangements, and the patterning of institutional forms intended to deal with them, rather consistently foster the incorporation of the population into new roles and patterns of role relationship; in turn, the latter directly or indirectly shape the structure of human relations in matters of class, kinship, leisure, and the like. This new structure of relations is in part produced

[47] It may be argued that increasing affluence has actually had the effect of greatly increasing freedom of choice for the average individual in the United States. The issue is certainly debatable, but it is not the one to which the text is addressed. Rather, the text refers to the ever-widening regulation by the state of matters previously left to individual resolution. For example, we started with each person obliged to look to his retirement as best he can, but in time we have arrived at government social security payments obligatory for most people and increasing government regulation of previously private retirement plans worked out by corporations, unions, and other organizations. Under these new conditions, individuals may be more secure financially, but they also operate within a wider and more penetrating network of regulation and control.

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by, and in part induces, new attitudes and values, forming the complex or syndrome we may identify as modern and post-modern.[48] This, in turn, brings the individuals occupying similar statuses in different societies much closer than was commonly the case in earlier times.

All of these processes are, however, subject to countervailing and contradictory trends which greatly mute the force of the tendency toward the emergence of a uniform world culture. One of the most important of these brakes on the process of homogenization lies in the distinctive cultural traditions which different national populations bring to the contemporary situation, and in the array of historically determined institutional arrangements with which they enter the contemporary era. These traditions and forms seem remarkably adaptable, and a high degree of variability in economic and political arrangements seems compatible with the management of a modern industrial society. Finally, despite the uniformity of the pressures and the consistency of the trends we observe, we should not lose sight of the enormous range over which the world's nation-states are spread on the various dimensions of development. Unless some unforeseen event causes the advanced nations to halt their further development while the others catch up, we can count on a very large amount of diversity throughout the world for at least another century.

[48] The nature of the "post-modern" man is a challenging subject which I must unfortunately bypass here. It is a topic to which I will return in a later and fuller exposition of the ideas presented in this paper.

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DOMESTIC POLITICS AND REGIONAL HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

By DONALD J. PUCHALA*

ONE comment constantly repeated by officials involved in the affairs of the European Communities is that political scientists, in their zeal to model "integrating systems," are working at levels of theoretical abstraction too far removed from day-to-day political behavior. The problem in this is that integration theorists, as often as not, paint elaborate and sophisticated pictures of phenomena that are simply not occurring. Or, as one *Chef de Cabinet* in Brussels phrased it, "when I read your American work you tell me that I am working to cause spillover, or that I am making a new nationality from old ones, or that I am challenging national sovereignty. This is nonsense. I and my colleagues are working to harmonize economic, social, and legal practices in several countries so that a Common Market can function effectively for the benefit of all. If you really want to study European integration, try to learn more about the conditions under which such harmonization succeeds or fails."[1]

The purpose of this article is to take a small step toward exploring such conditions. Narrowly conceived, the study reports the results of research into episodes of noncompliance in the EEC system. Basically, it is a discussion of when, how, and why regional-level rulings are evaded by EEC member-states or by subnational groups within them. In addition, I will seek to determine the degree or pervasiveness of such rule-thwarting behavior and its implications for the functioning of the Common Market. Perhaps more frequently than we have been led to believe, governments balk at executing EEC programs to which they have committed themselves; Eurocrats hesitate to enforce directives; industries circumvent regional regulations; or sectors of national populations openly or quietly strike in protest. Most directly then, this is a study of the conditions under which various kinds of "monkey wrenches" tend to get tossed into the "European" works. It also ex-

* Research reported in this article was funded by grants from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Ford Foundation.

[1] Private conversation at the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, September 17, 1971.

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amines the "whos," "whoms," "whats," and "hows" involved in extracting such monkey wrenches.

More broadly conceived, and somewhat beyond its direct substantive focus, this paper is really about a phenomenon that I shall call "post-decisional politics" in the European Communities. Aside from abstract considerations about international integration in general, most work on the politics of the European Communities to date has focused upon decision making in Brussels. Analysts have sought to explain how and why regional policies and programs are formulated, or, more simply, who influences whom to do what, when, how, and why, with regard to EEC legislation. In my estimation, these analysts have succeeded rather well.[2] Yet, despite noteworthy accomplishments on the decision-making side, very little is yet known about the processes and especially about the politics involved in bringing about compliance with regional rulings.[3] In short, we do not know very much about what happens after EEC decisions are reached, and we do not clearly understand who influences whom to do what, when, how, and why with regard to the execution (or non-execution) of EEC programs. The transmission downward and outward of regional directives from Brussels to the national peripheries, and the problems, pitfalls, and impacts involved,

[2] The literature on decision making in the European Communities is vast. Any inventory of this work would include Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1958); Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1963); Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970); Pierre Gerbet and Daniel Pepy, eds., *La décision dans les Communautés Européennes* (Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles 1969); David Coombes, *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community* (London: Allen and Unwin 1970); W. Hartley Clark, *The Politics of the Common Market* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1967); Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau, *Beyond the European Community* (Brussels: Heule Publishers 1968); James Caporaso, *European Integration* (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear 1974); Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1966); Emile Noël, *Comment fontionnent les institutions de la Communauté Européenne* (Paris: Bureau d'information des Communautés Européennes 1968); John Newhouse, *Collision in Brussels* (New York: Norton 1967); Miriam Camps, *Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964); Miriam Camps, *European Unification in the Sixties* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1966); Roy Pryce, *The Politics of the European Community* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield 1973); Walter Hallstein, *Europe in the Making* (New York: Norton 1972); Gerhard Mally, *The European Community in Perspective* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1973); Helen Wallace, *National Governments and the European Communities* (London: Chatham House/PEP 1973); Glenda Rosenthal, *The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European Policy-Making* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1975).

[3] For an introduction to technical aspects of rule enforcement in the European Communities, see Benoit Aubenas, "Quelques considerations sur les infractions contre les traités de Paris et de Rome," *Revue du Marché Commun*, No. 127 (October 1969), 458-64.

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constitute postdecisional politics in the European Community. The theoretical goal of the present study is to move toward illuminating this phenomenon.

A Comparative Case-Study Approach

The conclusions of this study follow from observations made in the context of several episodes in EEC affairs, four of which are outlined in some detail below. Each episode had to do with an attempt by the European Commission to enforce a policy or program decided upon in typical "Brussels decision-making" fashion.[4] Each of the episodes was initiated by commitments made by all of the EEC member-governments to execute (or allow the Eurocracy to execute) an agreed-upon policy at the regional level. The policies in question all had to do with transnational harmonization—in other words, with pushing forward toward economic union. However, after an initial commitment, one or more of the national governments balked at complying, usually for very clear political reasons having to do with domestic affairs. Then, in each case, rather fascinating and highly complex patterns of multi-level bargaining emerged, ultimately followed either by compliance or at least by renewed commitments to comply. Much of the case-study research, both documentary and interview, concerned the examination of the problems which led to noncompliance and to the ways and means chosen to solve these problems.

To satisfy rather obvious sampling criteria, the enforcement episodes selected for analysis were arrayed in time between 1963 and 1973. Different cases involved different countries—Belgium, France, West Germany, and Italy—as central actors (or as central offenders where noncompliance was the issue). The episodes included a diversity of substantive matters: regional policy, transnational investment policy, standardizing pharmaceutical products, and bringing about fiscal harmonization. Some of the cases selected were ultimately resolved by compliance; others continue into the present as unresolved incidents of noncompliance. Most important, in each case the politics of the situation—the pushing, pulling, promising, threatening, log-rolling, and compromising—were manifest. Issues were clearly drawn, participants were readily identifiable, stakes were easily assessable, and strategies and tactics were apparent.

Interviewing in connection with this study took place during the autumn of 1971 in Brussels, Bonn, Paris, The Hague, and intermittently, through 1972–73, in Brussels, Paris, and Rome. Respondents were

[4] Cf. Rosenthal (fn. 2), chap. 1 and passim.

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chosen according to a "situation-structure" design, wherein those roles and individuals specifically involved in the various episodes were identified and every effort was made to contact and interview every key actor in every case. No set questionnaire was administered, since each respondent had to be asked a set of questions particularly relevant to his role in the given episode. The goal was to obtain rich and complete information rather than statistical recounting. In all, more than one hundred Europeans in the Communities, in national governments, and in private organizations were ultimately interviewed.[5]

I. BELGIAN SUBSIDIES FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

When the original "Six" signed the Rome Treaty, they committed themselves in Articles 92 and 93 to europeanizing systems of economic aid to poorer regions and faltering industries.[6] Europeanization was to come about through the harmonization of national programs for regional aid. Criteria for the identification and classification of underdeveloped regions were to be established at the Community level: varieties and amounts of subsidies were to be standardized for the Six. Centrally important in this scheme were prohibitions against national programs which distorted competition in the Common Market through subsidies to selected industries and regions.[7] That is, subsidies were not to be granted with the intent or effect of lending unfair advantage to the industries of one country over another. Between 1958 and 1967, the Commission of the European Communities worked to establish standard criteria for regional subsidy programs; from 1967 onward, it has been moving to actually bring about transnational harmonization in regional aids.

To date, the Belgian Government has been unable to join its EEC partners in the movement toward the europeanization of subsidy programs. Successive Belgian "economic expansion" laws enacted in 1959, 1966, and 1970 created regional aid programs which in one way or another fell afoul of Community prohibitions against lending unfair advantage to national industries. Consequently, in October 1970 the EEC Commission began acting to bring the Belgian Government into compliance with Articles 92 and 93 of the Rome Treaty, to which, of course, the Belgians had committed themselves by signing the treaty

[5] A partial list of interviewees is attached as Appendix III to Puchala, "A Report to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Concerning Research Supported by a Travel and Maintenance Grant in 1971."

[6] *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957 (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 38-39.

[7] *Ibid.*, 38.

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in 1957. Prolonged and complex negotiations between the Belgian Government and the Commission, between the Commission and other EEC governments, and between the Belgian Government and domestic constituent groups ensued between 1970 and 1972.[8] These resulted, very gradually, in revisions of the Belgian subsidy programs: by late 1972, a formula was under discussion that approached the Community's requirements.[9] But in December 1972 the Belgian Government fell, and as of the summer of 1973 (when my research terminated) no new regional subsidy program had been executed.

In a narrow sense this Belgian subsidies case is one of simple noncompliance with the Treaty of Rome, followed by gradual movement toward compliance. But in a broader sense it is a case of obstruction and delay in movement toward international integration in Western Europe. Practically speaking, integration in Western Europe means the transnational harmonization of policies and programs. This has been notably slowed by Belgium's inability to comply with treaty commitments. The research problem in this case, as in the others, was why. Why did the Belgian Government find itself unable to honor its commitments to regional harmonization? What kinds of pressures was it under? How did the Commission extract progressive revisions in the Belgian policies? What kinds of pressures did the Commission apply? What role did the Eurocrats play? What role did other governments play? What role did Belgian domestic elites play? Broadly, under what conditions is international harmonization thwarted? Answers to these questions emerged from interviews conducted and documents consulted in pursuing the Belgian subsidies case.

2. THE NON-COMMON MARKET IN PHARMACEUTICALS

Under the Treaty of Rome, member-states of the EEC committed themselves to freeing commodity trade, thereby creating a common market. Yet, fifteen years after the establishment of the EEC, the free circulation of pharmaceutical products has not been realized.[10] In theory, the market in this area is open and common; but in actuality it remains closed and fragmented. To take a homely example, it is un-

[8] Paul Romus, "L'Évolution économique régionale en Belgique depuis la creation du Marché Commun (1958-1968)," *Revue du Marché Commun*, No. 119 (January 1969), 19-40. Cf. also *Agence Europe*, No. 597, June 24, 1970, and *Agence Europe*, No. 849, July 14, 1971.

[9] "Belgium to Modify Regional Aids," *European Community*, No. 167 (June 1972), 6-7.

[10] Pierre Collet, "Qu'est-ce qui entrave le marché commun des médicaments?" *Communauté Européenne*, No. 127 (February 1969), 25-27. Cf. also "Commission Urges Common Market in Pharmaceuticals," *European Community*, No. 145 (May 1971), 6.

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likely that a headache sufferer would find German aspirin on French shop shelves. The reason for the initial trade blockage was clear: freeing the market for pharmaceuticals was not simply a case of removing national tariff barriers. Accommodating a common market meant harmonizing and standardizing diverse national laws and practices having to do with testing medicines, controlling their manufacture, authorizing them for release on open markets, and licensing pharmacists to distribute them.[11] To the end of accomplishing this harmonization of national practices, the European Commission drafted a series of directives instructing member-governments to make various adaptations. The first pharmaceutical directive (65/65) called for acceptance of an agreed definition of a "pharmaceutical product." The directive specified government authorization prior to marketing and instructed governments to remove from their markets products that either have proven harmful effects or no proven therapeutic effects. This directive was approved by the Council of Ministers in January 1965.[12] To date, it has not been executed by most of the EEC member-states. Moreover, the fourteen succeeding directives, which would incrementally pave the way to the free circulation of pharmaceutical commodities, have not even been approved by the Council of Ministers. Despite the Commission's best and most varied efforts, as well as myriad pressures from pharmaceutical manufacturers, national governments refused to honor general treaty commitments and to comply with specific EEC directives. In the spring of 1973 decisions were taken to abandon, for the moment at least, steps toward the harmonization of national pharmaceutical legislation and to turn to less formal procedures for gaining member-states' acceptance of each others' products.[13] In the summer of 1973, even these procedures were floundering.

The pharmaceuticals case is similar to the Belgian subsidies episode in that noncompliance with EEC commitments and rulings stymied progress toward full economic integration. Yet, in several ways the pharmaceuticals case is much more complex. For one thing, here it was not a case of only one country being in noncompliance: no member-state adhered even to the first directive. The Belgian Government tried for a short while and then abandoned its efforts; the others refused even to make the initial attempt.[14] Furthermore, where the subsidies case pitted a government against the EEC, the pharmaceuticals case saw the Brussels institutions—the Commission and Council—

[11] Collet (fn. 10), 25-27.
[12] *Agence Europe*, No. 309, April 8, 1969.
[13] *Agence Europe*, No. 30, January 30, 1973.
[14] *Agence Europe*, No. 309, April 8, 1969.

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confronting each other, and each government divided against itself. In capitals such as Bonn, for example, the Ministry of Finance pushed for the Common Market, while the Ministry of Health stood by closed frontiers. Further inspection would show a much greater variety in maneuvering and posturing among the concerned interests in the pharmaceuticals case. But, despite the greater complexity, the research problem posed by this second case was similar to that posed by the first. Why were the national governments unable to comply with European-level policies and programs? What was holding integration back? Moreover, were the conditions under which noncompliance occurred similar in this case to those in the first case? Finally, were the conditions that prompted the very late swing toward compromise and ultimate compliance in this case similar to the conditions that moved the Belgian Government toward compliance in the first case? Again, interviews in community capitals were designed to answer these questions, and answers emerged in the course of the research.

3. FRENCH CONTROLS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Freeing intra-European capital flows was one of the central objectives of economic integration built into the Treaty of Rome. Article 67 of the treaty commits member-states to the abolition of restrictions on capital movement among them; Articles 52-58 offer the right of establishment and clear the way for unrestricted direct investment within the communities; Article 221 requires the end of discrimination in intra-EEC capital flows by 1961. Yet in December 1966, the French Government enacted Law 66-1008 which instituted official controls over foreign investment flowing into France.[15] This piece of legislation alloted the French Minister of the Economy a "right of adjournment" with regard to proposals from foreign investors. In effect, the Minister was empowered to cancel direct investment flowing into France.[16] Such action, of course, contravened the Rome Treaty.

In late spring of 1967 the European Commission notified the French Government about the discrepancy between its practices with regard to foreign investment and its commitments under the Rome Treaty.[17] The French replied that they were not committing treaty infractions since they had no intention of exercising the right of adjournment

[15] *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, January 29, 1966, p. 11621.

[16] Peter G. Van der Spek, "The Outlook for Foreign Investment in the EEC," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, VI (November-December 1971), 76-78; Rainer Hellman, *The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation* (New York: Dunnelon Publishing Co. 1970), 133.

[17] *Agence Europe*, No. 2890, October 31, 1967.

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against investments from within the EEC. Their concerns, they indicated, were with investments from "third countries"—that is, the United States.[18] There ensued a prolonged dialogue between the Commission and the French Government over whether American subsidiaries in EEC countries were or were not "European firms." As exchanges between Brussels and Paris became more heated, other member-states, in particular the Netherlands, entered the fray and pushed for firmer measures against France.[19] By November 1969, the Commission had exhausted its administrative powers for dealing with infractions under Article 169 of the Rome Treaty, and the case was taken to the European Court of Justice.[20] In the interim the Hallstein Commission had been succeeded by the Rey Commission, and then the de Gaulle government was superseded by the Pompidou government. The case was about to come to adjudication in the late fall of 1970. But in September of that year the French Government requested a postponement and indicated that it was again looking into the matter of Law 66-1008. In rapid sequence, Paris revised the law and eliminated investment controls, and Brussels reviewed and approved the revision. Paris then enacted the revised provision and formally removed the controls in February 1971.[21] In March 1971, the case was dropped by the Court and closed by the Commission.

The French investments case had several notable aspects. As in the other cases, progress toward the europeanization of an economic practice was impeded by a member-state's inability to honor treaty commitments. Integration was set back. Yet, in contrast to the two other episodes, in this case full compliance was ultimately achieved—or at least so it seemed.[22] Still, as in the other cases, the central research questions here concerned the reasons for noncompliance. Why was the French Government unable to comply with the provisions of the Rome Treaty between 1966 and 1971? What forces or pressures drove French national policy to contradict EEC policy? But, in addition, why did the French Government alter its deviant behavior after several years of adamancy? What forces or pressures brought about compliance? Interviewing in Brussels and Paris and inspection of documents answered most of these questions.

[18] *Agence Europe*, No. 159, August 28, 1968.
[19] Substantiated during interviews in Brussels, December 1972.
[20] "Commission Takes France to Court," *European Community*, No. 129 (December 1969), 26.
[21] *Agence Europe*, No. 753, February 24, 1971.
[22] In actuality, France continued to closely oversee foreign investment through the device of exchange controls. Cf. Van der Spek (fn. 16), 77.

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4. THE ITALIAN TAX ON VALUE ADDED

Fiscal harmonization is an integral component of economic integration. A market remains less than a common market to the extent that varieties and rates of taxation differ from region to region, or, in the case of the EEC, from country to country. Simple logic shows that differential forms and amounts of taxation from country to country lend economic advantages to some and penalize others in international competition. Therefore, as a first step toward ultimate fiscal harmonization throughout the European Common Market, the Council of Ministers, acting under Article 99 of the Treaty of Rome, issued a directive in April 1967 instructing member-states to adopt a common procedure for levying turnover taxes.[23] In effect, the directive called for community-wide adoption of a value-added tax (VAT), modelled after the French tax then in operation. Above and beyond starting the Community toward fiscal harmonization, the VAT was also to be a source of self-financing for EEC programs, and it was consequently viewed by the Commission as an important step toward supranationality. The VAT was to become effective on January 1, 1970.

In October 1968, the Italian Government hinted that it was encountering difficulties with regard to instituting the VAT, and that for "technical and economic reasons" the deadline of January 1, 1970, was unlikely to be met.[24] A formal request for a two-year postponement in the application of the VAT was forwarded by Italy to the Commission in August 1969. The gist of the complicated flow of correspondence between Brussels and Rome in the fall of 1969 amounted to the fact that Italy was unable to take the first step toward fiscal harmonization in the EEC System.

Between September and December 1969, extremely complex three-way bargaining took place between Italy, the EEC Commission, and other member-states of the Community.[25] Italy wanted an unconditional grant of postponement for two years; the Commission sought not to halt fiscal harmonization for more than one year and asked that Italy's delayed VAT be in advanced form when finally implemented; other member-states pushed for sanctions against Italy that would

[23] European Communities, "The Value-Added Tax in the European Community," *Community Topics*, No. 36 (London: European Communities Information Service 1970).

[24] Gianni Pasquarelli, "Perché L'I.G.E. Sarà Sostituita Dall' I.V.A.," *Comunità Europee* (August/September 1967), 13-16. Cf. also *Agence Europe*, No. 194, October 16, 1968.

[25] *Agence Europe*, No. 409, September 18, 1969; No. 414, September 25, 1969; No. 416, September 29, 1969; No. 418, October 1, 1969; No. 430, October 17-18, 1969; No. 442, November 4, 1969.

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balance any advantage Italian industries gained through the absence of the VAT. Specifically, the EEC partners asked that Italy be forced to eliminate subsidies to export industries and discriminations against imports which were purportedly built into the *Imposta Generale Sull'Entrata* (IGE), the Italian turnover tax existing in 1969. The three-cornered debate grew rather heated during October, November, and December of 1969:

—In answer to Italy's request for postponement, EEC Commissioner van der Groeben expressed anxieties about "a policy of facility which would have the result of slowly turning the Community into a sort of OECD in which only those recommendations which are in the interest of member-states are formulated."[26]

—In response to the Commission's listing of conditions for granting postponement, the Milan daily *Corriere Della Sera*, reflecting government views, editorialized that "the formalistic rigor with which such questions are being considered in Brussels is indeed surprising and could even justify some suspicion. It seems that they want to hinder the expansion of Italian exports, not only in the Community but also and above all to third countries. This would be a rather odd way to assure, as the EEC must, the play of competition among the producers of the Common Market."[27]

—Reflecting pressures from member-states which called for sanctioning Italy in return for postponement, *Agence Europe* reports that, "in view of the repeated concern expressed in various member-states about the dynamics of Italian industry in some sectors, it is to be expected that most of the delegations will insist that Italy abandon all tax practices considered questionable."[28]

On October 1, 1969, the Commission sent to the Council a draft directive granting Italy postponement of the VAT, but only under rigorous conditions including the time limit of one year, the call for advanced form upon implementation, and the request for adjustments in existing Italian taxes. Successive meetings of the Council of Ministers between October 17 and December 9, interspersed with high-level exchanges between Rome and Brussels, yielded a compromise directive whereby Italy exchanged downward adjustments in its export subsidies and import taxes for a two-year postponement of the VAT.

But this was not the end of the VAT episode. By November 1970, the Italian Government was again hinting that implementation might

[26] *Agence Europe*, No. 409, September 18, 1969.
[27] *Corriere Della Sera*, "Tensione per l'IVA fra il MEC e l'Italia," October 14, 1969, p. 6.
[28] *Agence Europe*, No. 326, May 5, 1969.

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be impossible by the deadline of January 1, 1972.[29] A second formal request for postponement was submitted to the Commission in October 1971. Another three-cornered debate ensued, though less heated than before. Another compromise was reached; another postponement (this one for six months, to July 1, 1972) was granted. Still the case did not end. By March 1972, yet another Italian high-level delegation was in Brussels.[30] The Italian Government wanted six additional months. Bargaining resulted in a new directive in April 1972; January 1, 1973, became the new due date. The VAT finally came into force in Italy on New Year's day 1973, and the drive toward fiscal harmonization in the EEC was again alive.[31]

Though by far the most colorful case considered, the Italian value-added tax episode was similar in its dynamics to the French investments case. An initial commitment to comply was not honored; complex interaction ensued with the aim of bringing about compliance; ultimately, compliance resulted. More generally speaking, noncompliance brought international integration to a halt in a policy area; and bargaining and pressuring succeeded, after a time, in setting the wheels of regional harmonization turning again. The research questions raised by the Italian case were similar to those posed by other cases. Above all, why was the Italian Government unable to enact its VAT legislation at the time it was supposed to be enacted? Then, why could the Italians not meet either the second or the third deadlines? What kinds of forces or pressures were at work in Italy to countervail against the strong desires of the Commission and the other EEC partners? Or were Commission pressures perhaps not as intense as they appeared? On the other hand, why were the Italians able to bring the VAT into being in 1973 after they had been unable to get it going earlier? What prompted compliance? More generally, were the conditions under which noncompliance and compliance occurred in this case similar to or different from the conditions of the other cases? Documentary analysis enriched by interviewing in Brussels and Rome led to answers to most of these questions.

The Domestic Politics of Regional Harmonization

The brief narratives presented here hardly do justice to the complexities of the cases. Nor, for that matter, do the four episodes de-

[29] *Agence Europe*, No. 682, November 9, 1970.
[30] *Agence Europe*, No. 1007, March 16, 1972.
[31] American Chamber of Commerce in Italy, "Introduction and Regulation of the Value Added Tax" (Rome: United States Embassy, March 1973). This publication presents an English translation of the full text of Delegated Decree No. 633 which formally instituted the VAT in Italy on January 1, 1973.

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scribed come anywhere near to exhausting the inventory of major noncompliance cases encountered in the EEC's experience.[32] Major cases, where member-governments have thwarted Community rules, number in dozens; minor cases, where industries, firms, or subnational groups have fallen into infraction, number in hundreds (or even thousands if we are to count anti-trust cases).[33] Nonetheless, the cases presented here and the questions raised focus our attention upon a number of important aspects of the political dynamics of the EEC.

It is apparent from the episodes described that political processes in the European Communities do not terminate with the making of decisions at the Community level. In other words, understanding decision making in Brussels, which has preoccupied students of European integration, is not the end of understanding the politics of the European Communities. Perhaps it is only the beginning. There is clearly as much politicking involved in getting Community programs enforced as there is in getting them formulated.

Since the execution of Community programs falls for the most part under the auspices of national governments and their legislative and administrative agencies, implementation depends largely upon national political and administrative capabilities. Political capabilities at the national level are reflected in the governments' abilities to ride out and overcome the resistance to Community programs which invariably emerges from domestic polities and societies. Conversely, lack of political capability at the national level is reflected in the governments' stalling on Community programs in the face of contrary domestic pressures. Not infrequently, local resistance has the effect of sapping national political will, which often means that governments come to perceive the costs to themselves—in terms of tenure in office, support among elites, and impediments to accomplishing higher priority goals —as outweighing any benefits that might accrue from implementing Community programs or otherwise pushing toward European unity. The cases under analysis contain numerous such instances. As for administrative capabilities, EEC programs cannot be executed at the national level when and where requisite national bureaucratic machinery either functions badly or does not exist at all. For instance, the German Federal Government could not implement a Community pro-

[32] For a partial tabulation of infraction cases, see "Commission Reports on Violations," *European Community*, No. 153 (February 1972), 5; Aubenas (fn. 3), 458 ff; and Nicola Fuiano, "L'execution des directives de la CEE en Italie," *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, No. 6 (1971), 662-74.

[33] William M. Vaughn, "Transnational Policy Programme Networks in the European Community: The Example of European Competition Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, XI (1972), 36-60.

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gram calling for the official testing and authorization of pharmaceuticals when that government had no federal agency to do the testing, as was the case during the first several years of the pharmaceuticals episode.[34] Nor could the Italian Government implement a new fiscal regime when bureaucratic machinery for special tax collection did not exist, and when parliamentary authorization to establish such machinery failed to come forth.[35]

Elaborating in terms of a simple model, we may think of the process of postdecisional politics in the EEC as beginning at the time national governments commit themselves to implementing a new program handed down at Brussels. Commitment takes the form of assent to a new directive or regulation within the Council of Ministers (that is, a commitment to enforce is the end of the EEC decision-making process). Honoring commitments—i.e., attempting enforcement—brings pressures to bear upon groups and interests within countries: if harmonization at the European level is to succeed, any number of constituencies within different countries have to alter their patterns of behavior. By a time-honored logic, pressure for change breeds resistance to change, and pressure met by resistance means politics. Therefore, one of the very first phenomena the analyst observes as he traces Community programs from formulation to execution is the emergence of resistance to Community programs at national and local levels. This is followed by bargaining, persuading, cajoling, threatening, bribing, and various other conflict-resolving tactics as each national government tries either to calm domestic resistance or to turn the Commission back from its insistence upon enforcement. Typically, a national government finds itself rather unenviably situated between the Commission on the one hand and domestic interests on the other, with the former pushing for compliance and the latter calling for defiance. That was indeed the situation in almost every one of the cases considered in this study. The Belgian Government, in the subsidies case, found itself between the Commission pushing for an economically rationalized regional aid policy and strong linguistic group interests calling for aid disseminated according to the "political arithmetic" of ethnicity; the pharmaceuticals episode found the German Government caught between the Commission and the interests of the domestic "health fraternity"; the VAT case wedged the Italian Government between the

[34] "Free Circulation of Pharmaceutical Products Within the EEC," *Common Market*, No. 2 (1970), 29-30.

[35] *Agence Europe*, No. 926, November 19, 1971; substantiated during interviews in the Italian Ministry of Finance and the Italian Foreign Ministry. Cf. also *Times* (London), October 21, 1971, p. 24.

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Commission and a rather startling array of domestic forces ranging from Left to Right, from small business to major enterprise, from elite factions to men-in-the-street. Although such pressures did not develop in the French investments case, they could have, if the French Government had moved closer to the Commission any sooner than it did. In more complex situations, questions concerning compliance with Community rules also tend to fragment national governments, national polities, and even the Brussels institutions. Factions divide into those favoring compliance for various reasons and those opposing it. The French investment case, for example, saw opinions in the Commission ranging from the Internal Market General Directorate which favored foot-dragging, to the Executive Secretariat which favored enforcement by administrative means, to the Judicial Service which wanted to open litigation against France. Moreover, the Council of Ministers was divided into the French delegation which chose to circumvent the issue, the Dutch delegation which demanded French compliance, and the other member-states who preferred trading off infractions to coming down hard on France. Similarly, in the pharmaceuticals case, attempts at enforcement also produced complex cleavage patterns. Here the Commission took a generally united stand, but the Council was divided into states willing to comply (notably Belgium), states advocating compliance so long as it was clear that compliance was not going to come about (notably France), and states absolutely unwilling to comply (notably Holland). At the same time, the Government of the German Federal Republic was split between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which advocated compliance for "European" reasons, and the Ministry of Health which was jealous of infringements upon its prerogatives and wanted no "European" interference. Similarly, the German polity was divided into interests led by the chemical industry (which pushed hard for an open market in pharmaceuticals), and interests led by pharmacists (who rejected changes in testing and authorization procedures).[36] Other cases were even more complex. But the point is made: attempts to enforce EEC regulations open political cleavages up and down the supranational-to-local continuum and spark intense politicking along the cleavage lines.

EEC Political Realities as Obstacles to Compliance

The simplest and most immediate answer to "why" questions concerning noncompliance in the EEC has to do with the domestic re-

[36] Substantiated in interviews at the West German Delegation to the European Communities and with the Groupement Pharmaceutique de la Communauté Européenne.

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sistances that enforcement generates. But any number of factors have to be taken into account in order to explain why the forces of resistance are so often able to succeed in their obstructive activities:

1. *The European Communities are not as supranationally authoritative as our textbooks would have us believe.* In fact, when one begins to explore the enforcement and compliance side of EEC affairs, it becomes clear that the national governments definitely have the final say in the operations of the Common Market. Putting it more bluntly, national governments will enforce Community regulations—and hence promote transnational standardization and harmonization—when they perceive their interests to be served by so doing. They will balk, delay, circumvent, or ignore Community regulations when they perceive compliance as being contrary to their interests, even when they are formally committed to compliance.

As one interview respondent put it: "Nothing will move a national government that does not want to be moved." This very simple lesson about the locus of authority in the European Communities is driven home in every case studied. The Belgian Government stood firmly against the Commission in the subsidies case; the German Government would not be moved in the pharmaceuticals case; France defied the Commission in the investments case; and the Italian Government stood adamant in the VAT case. Despite the fact that in each case Community law and formal enforcement authority clearly rested with the Commission, nothing happened by way of compliance until the national government in question decided to alter its contrary stance. If one wished to generalize from these simple observations, one might say that European integration is progressing only as fast as the member-governments of the European Community find it convenient to let it progress. Every government holds a double veto in EEC affairs—one during the process by which programs are formulated, and another in the process by which programs are executed.

2. *Noncompliance in the EEC system is the consequence of political dilemmas rather than of malevolence.* It is seldom the case that national governments resist Community programs out of spite toward these programs, toward the Commission, toward "Europeanism," or anything of the sort. On the contrary, interviewing in national capitals and in the national delegations to the EEC revealed widespread support for and commitment to the eventual uniting of Europe. Therefore, I have tried to emphasize throughout this presentation that noncompliance happens because governments *cannot* comply, not because they *will not.* Conditions that prompt noncompliance (those that favor

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obstructionist forces) are those under which domestic forces and factions are powerful enough to cause extreme difficulties or actual crises for regimes that attempt to execute certain EEC programs. A government facing the alternatives of cooperation in the EEC on the one hand and domestic crisis on the other most naturally and most often bows to domestic pressures. This, for example, was precisely the circumstance in the Belgian subsidies case, where no Belgian regime could remain viable if it insisted upon allocating regional subsidies in any other way than in accordance with the size of linguistic communities in Belgium. For EEC purposes, aid had to be assigned according to economic need; for internal political reasons in Belgium, aid had to be assigned according to the percentage of Flemish and Walloon districts in the country.[37] Any other formula would have prompted a government crisis. In the same way, Italian procrastination in instituting the VAT had little to do with Italian misgivings about European integration. But it had a great deal to do with fears about yet another crisis for the faltering Rome regime. The extreme Left was violently opposed to the VAT because of its regressive form; the moderate Left was opposed for similar reasons; small business spoke out against the VAT because it favored large, vertically integrated enterprises (small businessmen also dreaded the new fiscal regime because of difficulties it posed for tax evasion, a revered Italian practice); big business accepted the VAT but smarted at losing export subsidies hidden in taxes that the VAT was to replace; revenue officials were uncertain about the yield of the new tax; municipalities saw their revenue base being challenged; general public opinion and organized consumers' interests condemned the VAT out of fear of price increases in its wake. There is little question but that any Italian Government that applied the VAT in 1970 would have come down.[38] Pressures which were present in the French investments episode, rather than prompting the de Gaulle government to resist the EEC, simply reinforced official resolve already pointed in that direction. Gaullist factions caught up in the pursuit of national autonomy and stimulated by the *défi Américain* campaign pressed hard

[37] Paul Romus (fn. 8), passim. Romus here presents a statistical breakdown of Belgian regional aid granted between 1959 and 1967. The near 55%-45% division in almost every category as between Flemish and Walloon districts hints rather strongly at the "political arithmetic" involved in regional aid decisions. Cf. also Romus, *La Wallonie dans la Communauté Européenne* (Brussels: L'Université Libre de Bruxelles, L'Institut d'Études Européennes 1968).

[38] All of these points were substantiated and elaborated during interviews in Rome and Brussels. Additional documentation is to be found in *Corriere Della Sera*, September 2, 1969; October 2, 1969; November 15, 1969; *La Stampa*, March 6, 1970; *Times* (London), April 16, 1971; October 21, 1971; Raphael Zariski, *Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press 1972), 120.

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for controls over foreign investment. The French Left at the same time took strong ideological exception to the perceived "colonization of France," and strong practical exception to well-publicized layoffs and other employment cutbacks at certain U.S. subsidiaries already in France. Important and also highly publicized acquisitions, especially the takeover of Simca by Chrysler, served to inflame French public opinion against foreign investment in general. All of this was underpinned by traditional protectionism in French industry, most notably the chemical industry. Of course French government officials had no intention of resisting these pressures for controls of foreign investment, but had they tried, they clearly would have run into major difficulties.[39] In similar but somewhat less dramatic ways, attempts to implement EEC regulations may provoke intrabureaucratic crises within member-governments, and reluctance to permit these to happen may drive these governments into noncompliance. Such was certainly the case in Germany, for example. Creating organizations for pharmaceutical testing would have involved so much shifting of authority and prerogative within ministries such as Health and Education that Bonn was dissuaded from the idea of pharmaceutical authorizations on the federal level.

In a general way, much of what has just been said about government inabilities to conform to EEC regulations underlines a simple, yet revealing, lesson in international integration. International integration experiments are only as strong as the weakest governments involved in them. Progress toward international harmonization moves only as fast as the slowest government can act. In contrast to notions about how regional systems should supersede enfeebled nation-states, the European experience demonstrates that successful integration demands strong national governments for purposes of carrying regional programs into effect. Whenever strong domestic interests can immobilize a national government, they can also immobilize an integrating region.

3. *The weakness of the formal enforcement procedures built into the Rome Treaty is a third factor favoring obstructionist forces in the European system.* Even if national governments were not able to defy the EEC when cast into dilemmas such as noted above, there would

[39] Hellman presents a reliable inventory of forces ranged against bowing to the EEC on the investment issue. Cf. Hellman (fn. 16), 126-31. The French press provides further documentation: *Le Monde*, February 18, 1966; May 25, 1966; June 3, 1966; November 25, 1966; December 25/26, 1966.

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still be nothing in the Commission's bundle of procedures that would permit supranational authorities to move swiftly and effectively toward enforcing compliance. (Incidentally, this is not surprising, given the concerns for national sovereignty carried into the drafting of the Rome Treaty.) Formal enforcement procedures are written into Article 169 of the treaty. Stated simply, when a government is found to be committing infractions, the Commission is empowered to bring that government into compliance—first by administratively requesting compliance, then by formally demanding compliance, and finally by initiating judicial procedures against the errant government in the European Court of Justice. All of this looks rather impressive as written. But in practice, Article 169 favors national governments because it forces the Commission into procedures which involve almost interminable delays. For example, it is not unusual for formal enforcement action to last five or six years and to involve dozens of communications, dozens of consultations, and dozens of meetings with months between them. As far as one can estimate from unrestricted sources, the French investment episode involved upwards of thirty-five exchanges between the Commission and the French Government after procedures under Article 169 were initiated—and this case never got as far as the Court. Moreover, these exchanges were stretched out over five years! Upon sober and realistic evaluation one almost has to say that in a political sense there actually is no enforcement authority allotted to the Commission in the EEC system. Compliance has to rest upon the goodwill of member-governments, and noncompliance leaves the Commission with little more than moral powers of persuasion.

4. *The Commission is frequently highly reluctant to push infracting governments into line.* Interviews in many of the Commission's directorates substantiated that EEC officials are well aware of, and extremely sensitive to, political pressures and developments within member-states. It was also apparent that there is an unwritten policy within the Commission that reads: "Don't push too hard on governments that are in trouble at home." Time and again it was explained that forceful measures against noncompliant governments are self-defeating in that (1) they do not bring about compliance, and (2) they arouse hostilities among national officials which feed back into national positions on other issues, both in EEC decision making and enforcement. Therefore, despite strong and frequent declarations to the contrary, the Commission is rather a pussycat when it comes to enforcement. Specifically, this emerged in the Belgian subsidies episode, where the Commission

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proved to be attentive to linguistic politics in Belgium, where they were warned against provoking a crisis in that country,[40] and where they rather systematically overlooked infractions for a number of years and then pressed ever so softly when they finally began enforcement procedures. The same was true in the VAT case, though here the Commission found itself in a dilemma because other member-states were pressing to bring Italy into line. Consequently, in this case we find the Commission's rather adamant public statements demanding compliance to have been quietly counteracted by assurances of goodwill and understanding passed to Italian officials in private meetings. In another instance, the French investment case was a rather extraordinary episode in pussycattishness on the part of the Commission: supersoft treatment here was the order of the day, given the fact that during this period the de Gaulle government was intimidating the Commission rather forcefully. Between 1966 and 1969, "don't push too hard" could be translated "don't push on France at all." It must be underlined that the cautiousness with which the Commission handles national governments who commit infractions is less an indication of administrative laxity than of a policy of good political sense. When a government chooses to circumvent EEC regulations, there are usually good political reasons, and no amount of pushing from Brussels is likely to bring compliance until national political difficulties have been overcome. Hence, the Commission preserves political capital by refraining from creating incidents for their own sake.

5. *The Commission gets relatively little help from other member-governments when their partners step out of line.* In this regard, the VAT case was probably the exception that proved the general rule. Here, as noted, member-governments pressured the Commission to pressure Italy to bring about compliance. Most generally, though, member-governments tend to turn blind eyes toward partners who fail in EEC commitments. The reason is that all governments are guilty of infractions at one time or another, and no government wants to create added difficulties for itself at "time 2" by critcizing a partner in difficulty at "time 1." There is therefore a general reluctance on the part of member-states to pass judgment upon another's deviations from EEC programs. As a Dutchman expressed it with regard to Belgium's infractions in the subsidy case: "Why should we criticize? Who knows when we may have to face the same kinds of problems."

[40] Apparently by way of a direct telephone call from the Prime Minister of Belgium to the Commission Secretariat.

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Compliance: Politics, Payoffs, and Time

In the simplest sense, conditions conducive to compliance in the European Community are the reverse of those conducive to obstructionism. That is, compliance follows most readily in cases where EEC programs *solve* problems for national governments rather than raise them. Cases of this kind, incidentally, constitute the majority of enforcement episodes in the EEC system. Obvious examples would include the Common Agricultural Policy and the solutions it offered to France and other member-states in their problems with farm incomes and overproduction, and the labor migration regime with the solution it offered to Italy in its overpopulation and unemployment dilemmas. But to go very deeply into discussing the Common Market as a national problem-solving device would be to move beyond the scope of this paper. Let it suffice, then, to say that one of the goals—and a frequent outcome—of the EEC decision-making process is to create regional-level policies and programs that help to extricate national governments from domestic political and economic difficulties. Naturally, obstructionism does not occur when EEC programs reward domestic elites; compliance follows smoothly.

It should be pointed out that compliance also comes forth in instances where national governments perceive rewards from EEC programs as outweighing costs, even though there may be some costs. Imperfections in the EEC decision-making process, and the limits of ministerial imaginations with regard to anticipating consequences of enforcement, often create domestic problems for national governments even when EEC programs are on the whole compatible with national interests and needs. In such instances, national governments will work to quell or circumvent sources of resistance by offering side payments to dissidents or by riding roughshod over them (especially when resistors occupy marginal roles in national politics and carry little political clout). Thus the classic cases of noncompliance emerge only when enforcement aggravates important domestic political cleavages and incites major national political problems.

But even the major episodes of noncompliance generally evolve toward "European" solutions. That is, noncompliance is by and large a temporary phenomenon (although "temporary" may mean five or six years, and sometimes even longer). This follows from the fact that national governments generally see themselves as working toward integration: they *want* to cooperate regionally when it becomes possible

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for them to do so. Hence, we find that the politics of noncompliance take the general form of a bargaining game played mainly to gain *time*. For their part, deviating national governments do not categorically reject EEC programs, nor do they disavow their commitments to the Common Market. Rather, they seek either extensions of deadlines or intermittent respites in compliance, so that domestic pressures can be reduced and domestic problems sorted out. In most cases compliance occurs as soon as national governments can manage to meet and pacify resistance—but this sometimes takes several years, especially when resistance stems from prevailing national and world economic conditions and subsides only after such conditions change.

Examples drawn from the cases under analysis are many and clear. Italian compliance in the VAT case followed after most sources of domestic resistance had been pacified—after the rates of the VAT were adjusted to meet the demands of the Left, after export subsidies hidden in the old IGE system were also hidden in the VAT system to satisfy big business, after guarantees were offered to small business to the effect that records maintained for VAT purposes would not be inspected for income tax purposes, after municipalities were assured that the VAT would not wipe out sources of local revenues, after the Ministry of Finance was convinced that revenues from the VAT would be at least as great as revenues from the IGE, and after public opinion was lulled into accepting that price increases would not necessarily follow from the imposition of the VAT. Obviously, all of this took time. In the French investments case, compliance followed after the campaign of the Left against "foreign imperialism" had run its course, after French industry accepted that it would not be out-sold by competing foreign industries on its own ground, after statistics showed that "key" economic sectors were not coming under foreign control and that national autonomy was not being circumscribed, after the *défi Américain* campaign had lost some of its steam, after the disruptions of 1968 had been withstood, *and after de Gaulle had resigned*. Again, all of this took time. To document this point with contrasts, it can be shown that the reasons why the Belgian subsidies case and the pharmaceuticals case have not yet been resolved lie in the fact that the conditions which initially prompted national balking have not changed, and the bargaining for time continues. Certainly the Fleming-Walloon situation has not altered in Belgium, and no economic rationalization of regional subsidies in that country is likely until this situation does alter. In similar but much more complex fashion, the stalemate in contradictory stances among chemical industry interests, national health interests,

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pharmacists' fraternal interests, German bureaucratic interests, and various protectionist interests that has blocked the common market in pharmaceuticals for so many years, continues—and so does noncompliance. If the pattern holds, however, this logjam will also break, given sufficient time.

Tactics in this game of bargaining for time are many and varied. Most of them fall under the general rubric of "smoke screening." National governments seldom approach the Commission directly to appeal for time. They seem to see something demeaning in this; perhaps to come "hat in hand" in this manner would symbolize a deference to the Commission that national governments have no interest in nurturing. Instead, the governments raise issues about the meaning and interpretation of the regulations from which they are deviating.[41] Or they may raise issues about conditions that the Commission may request in exchange for permitting delays.[42] Sometimes they "pass the buck" by expressing willingness to comply if and when everybody else does. Frequently, they simply "forget" to respond to the Commission's letters calling attention to infractions or to the Commission's appeals for compliance. Any number of Commission departments reported that "Italy never answers the first letter, and often not even the second."

The fascinating aspect of this game of bargaining for time lies in the fact that all players, the governments and the Commission alike, recognize its nature, and all play along with full awareness of the problems which are causing delay. Yet no one raises the real issues. The Commission knows that the infracting national government is stalling for time because of domestic problems. The national government knows that the Commission knows that it is stalling for time. Smoke screens thrown up by national governments to cover their stalling for time are recognized as smoke screens by the Commission. Furthermore, the national governments know that the Commission knows that delaying gestures are usually concocted. Neither party raises the point that all that is going on is merely a play for time. The reason for the evasion of pointed exchange is of course that it would not accomplish anything, since the deviant government simply cannot comply, and the Commission knows that it cannot. Confrontation would raise tensions, evoke hostility, and not contribute one iota to

[41] See, for example, the French attempt to change the question of infraction into a debate over the definition of a "European company." Cf. *Agence Europe*, No. 159, August 28, 1968.

[42] See, for example, Italy, with regard to the conditions that the Commission asked in exchange for granting postponement of the VAT. Cf. *Agence Europe*, No. 416, September 29, 1969.

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furthering regional-level harmonization, and everybody involved knows it. Hence, what one observes in effect is a subtle dynamic of mutual accommodation, wherein the Commission in fact permits delay *but appears not to*, and the deviating government balks at commitments *but also appears not to*. All emerge from the pantomime with face saved. European integration is probably the beneficiary.

Conclusions

Several noteworthy conclusions follow from this look into the politics of rule enforcement and compliance in the European Communities.

1. *Substantively speaking, there is a rather lively politics of rule enforcement in the European Communities.* There has been virtually no writing on postdecisional aspects of EEC affairs to date. Yet, almost everything presented here concerning noncompliance and compliance suggests that, in order to understand European integration, we must devote at least as much analytical attention to postdecisional politics as we have been devoting to decision making. The questions of who complies with EEC decisions, or fails to comply—when, where, how, and why—are centrally important questions because their answers illuminate crucial aspects of the political dynamics of European integration. The research underlying this report only scratched the surface in this area. Much more needs to be done.

2. *The impact of postdecisional politics upon European integration is essentially a delaying impact.* Very simply put, the politics of compliance and noncompliance slow down the rate at which transnational harmonization and standardization can be accomplished. To be sure, this is not very surprising, especially in light of the discussions in this report. Yet it has almost never been taken into account in writings on the EEC. Hence, many predictions of rapid progress in certain Community issue-areas have turned out to be inaccurate as a result of delays caused by postdecisional politics. In the same way, many expectations on the part of practitioners in the Communities have been frustrated as a result of failures to take account of postdecisional political happenings.

3. *Looking into the politics of enforcement in the European Communities raises crucial questions about theories and myths of supranationality as elements of European integration.* The politics of compliance tend to cast the national governments in central and pivotal roles within the EEC scheme of things. Clearly, ultimate power and authority continue to rest with these governments because they continue to

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decide when and to what degree regional harmonization and standardization shall obtain. The Common Market is only *common* to the extent that member-states permit. Far from validating the image of the European Community as a snowball rolling toward regional federation, or of EEC institutions as motors driving toward greater unity, research shows this system and these institutions to be instruments essentially used by national governments for purposes of domestic problem solving. National governments tend to cooperate with the EEC when they believe that it will help them solve their domestic political or economic problems; they defy the EEC when regional commitments cause domestic problems. If this image of the EEC as an instrument is even partly accurate, then notions about European integration driving beyond the nation-state are at least questionable.

4. *European integration is essentially a process of transnational harmonization.* Looking at it as such seems to be theoretically more satisfactory than looking at it as federalism, functionalism, nationalism, or any other of the phenomena specified by integration theorists over the past several years. As suggested in the introduction to this study, one problem with existing theory in the integration field is that concepts and categories are developed at levels of abstraction too far removed from the actual behavior of those who are participating in the integration venture in Europe. A productive theory of European integration should be cast in a conceptual vocabulary that at least describes what people are actually doing in the Communities. What they are doing, in fact, is working to harmonize and standardize programs, policies, norms, and laws across national borders. Integration theory should therefore account for the success or failure of attempts at harmonization and standardization; any deductions from this theory should indicate how and why various actions and events affect harmonization and standardization. To gauge European integration is to assess the range and intensity of regional programs that are actually operating; to explain European integration is to determine the origins of these programs and to account for their execution (or non-execution).

5. *Above all else, this study points up the necessity of taking domestic politics into account in any discussion of the dynamics of European integration.* The EEC is a multileveled system arranged in political layers from the local to the supranational. Complex organizational and elite network linkages bind the national peripheries to the Brussels center; transmissions—upwards and downwards, inwards and outwards, through these organizations and networks, with political bar-

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gaining at different interchanges—ultimately underpin both decison making and compliance in the EEC.[43] While most analyses of the EEC to date have focused either at the top (or policy-making) level, or on particular levels immediately below the top (such as the national bureaucratic level), little work has been done at the local, domestic, political levels, and almost nothing is known about linkages between and among levels. How, in fact, are domestic affairs in member-states linked to regional affairs in Brussels, and how are regional outcomes linked back to domestic affairs? A key to explaining the operations of the EEC lies in the better understanding of these intersystemic linkages. It is to be hoped that studies of European integration will move in this direction during the next several years.

[43] For an elaboration of this model of the EEC as a multileveled system, see Peter Busch and Donald Puchala, "Interests, Influence, and Integration: Political Structure in the European Communities," mimeo (forthcoming in published form, 1976).

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SOCIAL RULES AND THE STATE AS A SOCIAL ACTOR

By BRUCE ANDREWS

THE analysis of foreign policy has yet to satisfy the ambitions of its theorists. Side by side with elaborate chronologies, typologies, and correlations, a variety of competing approaches still stands. This "open" —or unsettled—quality has had at least one advantage: it has made room for occasional new concerns. One of the more recent of these has been with the domestic sources of foreign policy, and in particular, of national security policy. The idea that the state is like an opaque billiard ball which reacts to the pressures of the international environment has proven unsatisfactory. It is now a commonplace that foreign policy is a domestic or political "product." Unfortunately, this new emphasis has left unanswered as many questions about the nature of state action as it has resolved. The problem of how we should *conceive* of the relationship between the state and the domestic social structure in a particular instance remains virtually innocent of any serious discussion. The authors of most case studies, studding their accounts offhandedly with domestic "factors," domestic "determinants," and domestic "causation," have instead proceeded in a loose, improvisatory fashion. Empirically, valuable evidence is generated; conceptually, the old confusion reigns.

In this essay, I will attempt to clarify some of these relationships and to elaborate a perspective which might be used in the explanation of foreign policy in social terms. Such a perspective is badly needed. Merely to ask these questions is to signal the practical impossibility of answering them successfully from the present literature. Though a term like "the national interest" provides a comforting familiarity, it can rarely be understood as only a reflection of the international "sources" of policy, a calculation of self-evident security needs, or a deduction from a strategic calculus. Something more is required. I hope that this analysis will at least partially fill the gap by beginning to sketch out a conceptual model for the political sociology of state action.

Contexts and Conventions

If the behavior of states could be reduced to the status of physical events, and if unintended consequences appeared to overshadow the importance of purposiveness, we could fashion our explanation from

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the concepts of observers alone. But following the canons of the natural sciences so far as to dispense with the aims and self-understandings of the actors has little to recommend it. If, as seems more appropriate, we regard foreign policy as a series of largely purposive actions and not simply as physical happenings, we assume that the actions can be interpreted in terms of a shared set of reasons and intentions, rather than merely explained causally in terms of the antecedents which necessitated them. But even where we accept the value of a purposive understanding, it will usually fall short: actions are simply not the unique project of the policymakers. In state action, even where the consequences are intended, both purposive and "conventional" elements are generally involved, and the purposive element will frequently require its own explanation in terms of underlying domestic conventions.[1]

Too often, however, the domestic underpinnings of a state's frame of reference are neglected. In a narrow, decision-making approach to foreign policy, the meticulous descriptions and encyclopedic typologies tend toward self-enclosure, as does a strict emphasis on the point of view of the actors involved. Exclusive reliance on a purposive vocabulary can prove disabling, insofar as the frame of reference of the actors remains unintelligible in social terms. The entire labyrinthine structure is left hanging in mid-air, for a list cannot by itself provide a social context and is not an explanation.

A similar shallowness has characterized the new analytic stress on bureaucratic factors. When outcomes are treated as resultants rather than as purposive actions, the policies underlying them are not always understood through reference to a shared outlook or a more basic set of values. The larger informing policy, and indeed the state apparatus itself, begins to take on an arbitrary or asocial existence.

This neglect can be avoided. As a first approximation, we might *redescribe* the purposive aspects of state action which are assumed to be important. Usually, state actors will articulate their aims in international terms; for example, American policymakers may speak of in-

[1] For an extended treatment, see Andrews, "Foreign Policy: Explaining and Understanding State Action," mimeo (1975), and John G. Gunnell, "Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation," *Social Research*, xxxv (Spring 1968). "An action is *first* made intelligible as the outcome of [or, actually, as the expression of] motives, reasons, and decisions; and is then made *further* intelligible by those motives, reasons and decisions being set in the context of the rules of a given form of social life. These rules logically determine the range of reasons and motives open to a given set of agents and hence also the range of decisions open to them." Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Idea of a Social Science," in Bryan R. Wilson, ed., *Rationality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1970), 115-16.

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tervening in order to prevent the overthrow of anti-communist regimes or the collapse of a regional status quo. Especially when the use of force must be justified, the actors tend to cast their reasons in the language of national security or international considerations. Yet, except in the rare instances where a nation's survival is unambiguously at stake, these considerations cannot be understood satisfactorily as a strategic deduction or reaction, and must be interpreted at another level. The purposes of states are not autonomous phenomena. Quite the contrary, they rely on a network of domestic conventions, boundaries, and meanings that provide a framework for both the goals and considerations of the actors.

The redescription I would suggest is as follows. In most cases, even considerations of national security are not intelligible apart from a specific conception of the domestic order which is to be protected or advanced. The international aims of a government, in other words, are very rarely either self-explanatory or ends in themselves (leading to actions performed for their own sake). For a complete account, they must eventually be redefined as *means* toward a more inclusive set of *social purposes*. Through this "second-order" purposive relationship, a government policy can be understood in an instrumental or contextual way. As a result, what might have been considered a mere idiosyncrasy or a purely international project is transformed into a conventional and social action. It also allows for the state's policies to be monitored by society, while specifying a measure of reciprocity between the social and the political world.

Most of a state's significant (or signifying, meaningful) foreign policies can be thought of in this way—guided and constrained by an array of domestic expectations which are considered legitimate, and by social conventions which both define and delimit those broader social purposes. If "meaning is use," then these social rules are rules of usage —for domestic society. They are both defining and constitutive (in that they suggest which ends the government must aim at if a particular domestic "act" or purpose is to be effected) as well as constraining (in that they regulate conduct by ruling out certain international ends which would jeopardize those social purposes). A kind of social entitlement or warrantableness enters in, because the state becomes in some way responsible to the interests of the domestic society, or representative of them. When these expectations are brought to bear on the actors in a restrictive fashion, they give them a reason to act in certain ways and not in others; they give a domestic bearing to their international aims and values and specify some of the conditions for their domestic suc-

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cess. Any historical course (or matrix, or lowest common denominator of actions, such as that old sawhorse, the national interest) is not therefore simply *followed*. Rather, the state actors make it up as they go along, as they pursue certain policies in accord with, or as delimited by, the domestic rules. Their goals reveal the rules, and to a certain extent, the rules constitute their reasons for acting. "Every convention or rule that I accept is an intention that I declare."[2] International actions thus become domestic acts—regularized, socialized, and conformative. Foreign policy, in this conception, is a domestic social policy.

THE ROLE OF RULES: STATE AIMS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES

As a first approximation, we could say that the rules suggest a pattern of prescribed or proscribed behavior, resembling a canon of appropriateness or *social paradigm*. Metaphorically, we might speak of the way in which a society maintains its conception of itself, and of the attributions and roles which it forces upon the governmental actors. In doing so, the outer boundaries of both international choices and "non-decisions" are set and legitimated. Rather than determining a specific choice, the rules tend to narrow the range of possibility to a realm in which state policies appear "pre-shrunk" or pre-interpreted.[3] By helping to structure the policymakers' hierarchy of preferences and values, these norms and expectations will in turn come to structure their presuppositions about the international setting—foreshortening the range of perception, desired objectives, and alternative paths of action. Agendas are shaped, universes are delimited, and actors are provided with a rough explanatory framework within which their own international actions can be understood.

This way of looking at state action leads us to other unfamiliar issues—in particular, those of reference, meaning, and semantics. For some writers, norms and meanings appear to be so tightly interwoven in the realm of action that "rule-guided" becomes synonymous with

[2] Stuart Hampshire, *Thought and Action* (New York: Viking 1959), 99.

[3] If, for example, we find a domestic rationale for an international action that opens with an untested assumption such as "It goes without saying that . . . ," the presence of such constraining rules should be suspected. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan 1958), #231: " 'But surely you can see . . . ?' That is just the characteristic expression of someone who is under the compulsion of a rule." A similar theme is nicely treated by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57 (September 1963). "Indeed, the more important the rule, the greater is the likelihood that knowledge [of the nature of rule-guided activities and the consequences of breaching the rules] is based on avoided tests." Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1967), 70.

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"meaningful" (i.e., full of meaning). Actions, like language, form a surface layer beneath which a pattern of social rules and expectations can usually be discerned—an underlying content or "deep structure" which both guides the actions *and* gives them their social significance. If we extend this argument to the level of states, a similar proposition may be advanced: without these rule-guided elements, state behavior would be socially unintelligible, even where it might be causally predictable. Unlike the more "horizontal" procedures of correlation and deduction, a social explanation would then resemble a process of *excavation* by means of which purposive actions can be understood as social practices.[4]

Domestic norms make up one of the *referential dimensions* of a state policy. They are patterns (outside the regularities provided by the actions themselves) which those actions both point to and implicate—in a symbolic or representative guise, for example. They take on their importance not as causal antecedents or background conditions in a deductive generalization, but as a setting of constraint and guidance for both the aims and the reasons of the actors. Instead of the bare "syntax" of state behavior which a naturalistic account can provide, we would look for an interrelated network of social as well as political processes in which to locate an action—a network which will reveal this semantic or referential dimension.

If a domestic rule "stands there like a signpost,"[5] then a rule-guided action will stand there like a signpost as well. It refers back not only to the rules but to the domestic social purposes which underly them. In this respect, state actions resemble language. The significance (or "motivation") of words, for example, is not intrinsic. It derives from their place within a framework of governing rules and expectations. Like counters in a game, they are emblems or signs that express (and reveal) the deeper patterns. Actions and the commitments which inform them can just as easily be regarded as such a form of communicative behavior, rather than merely the mute physical objects with which the natural sciences have dealt. To understand them, we would there-

[4] For a discussion of the synchronic nature of such an analysis in other fields of inquiry, see Frederic Jameson's important work, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), and *Marxism and Form* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971). Compare Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1958); Alan F. Blum and Peter McHugh, "The Social Ascription of Motives," *American Sociological Review*, XXXVI (February 1971), 98-109; R. Harré and P. F. Secord, *The Explanation of Social Behavior* (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams 1973); and Gerard Radnitzsky, *Contemporary Schools of Metascience* (Chicago: Henry Regnery 1973).

[5] Wittgenstein (fn. 3), #85.

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fore refer back to the canons (of definition, logical connection, permissiveness, etc.) which are present behind them. In other words, no realm of discourse can be understood apart from its underlying conventions. For foreign policy, these conventions are domestic ones, not merely those of the international system.

DECIPHERMENT

This will be our next task, and a particularly difficult one. At times, the purposes and reasons of state actors can be understood only vaguely. On the surface they may remain opaque; they may make no sense to us in the strictly international-strategic terms in which they are articulated. Yet even in those cases, what the international goals embody may be clear: the informing social purposes, or the distortive picture of the nation and the interests whose "security" is being protected. They can often be discerned through historical research and through a reconstruction of the policy frame of reference, enabling us to grasp the limits of choice which the rules have enforced and, in a sense, to comprehend the international claims by "translating" them into a domestic language. Unlike an additional element which is somehow tacked on, these international aims may at times be nothing more than a political channeling or articulation of a domestic expectation. We encounter this phenomenon on a national level just as we do on a personal or psychological one—whenever the conscious goals of an actor are simply forms devised for the expression of an underlying trait or an internal demand or aspiration.

The social conventions must still be explicable, however, for they form the linkage between governmental "means" and domestic "ends" in the second-order purposive relationship between state and society. They cannot simply be extrapolated from a foreign policy, for that policy embraces the very actions which the rules would help us interpret. The circularity is obvious. Too often the study of operational codes or "decision rules" falls into just such a trap, revealing regularities which are merely descriptive, and whose normative and explanatory status in relation to the actors' purposes is in grave doubt. Daniel Ellsberg's rules for generating predictions of American escalations in Vietnam could serve as an example: their achievement lies in a controversial reconstruction of a frame of reference, not in explaining it in substantive social terms.[6] Such accounts have a tendency to degenerate into a list of subsuming typologies.

Though regularities often alert us to the existence of rules, the two

[6] See Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1972).

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phenomena are logically distinct. There is some confusion on this point, because many assume that if a rule or law "for" action is adhered to, it will become a law "of" action from which predictions can be made. A regularity, however, can exist even where there are no domestic rules with the power of sanctions behind them; and a rule can remain in place even in cases of deviance, or where there is little regularity to illustrate it. A "rule" account simply responds to a different kind of question than a deductive or predictive one. The connections involved are often conceptual rather than causal ones—more like the relation of a part to a whole than of "exogenous variables" to a separate or literal happening. At times, they resemble the connection between a word and its use or referent, or even the connection between statements in an argument. Naturally, a substantial gap divides norms and actions. With state actions, we can nevertheless say that where rules are revealed, the regularities should be better understood, and when regularities present themselves, we would do well to look for the guiding rules. Otherwise, even predictable behavior may remain opaque.

Statements about a state elite's commitment to social rules and guiding domestic purposes do lend a different sort of intelligibility to its actions—a normative expectedness that differs from a causal retrodiction. Behavior may fit into predicted patterns of causal regularity. On the other hand, actors may do what we expect "of" them by following their articulated goals along the lines of domestic conventions, or by substantiating our account of the international aims of a state as a choice of means toward a more inclusive domestic end. Unexpectedness will also come in these two varieties. State behavior may diverge from (and become an exception to) causal laws of behavior, or state actors may deviate from normative or customary rules of conduct and engage in socially unintelligible actions. The two varieties should not be confused, nor should we attempt to assimilate them to an inappropriate style of explanation. In discussions of the domestic sources of foreign policy, this is too often forgotten.

One vital distinction still separates an explanatory rule from one which is merely descriptive. Someone can *intentionally violate* an explanatory rule. Correct and incorrect ways of acting in the light of rules must therefore be distinguishable, even if the actors cannot put them eloquently into words. The reason is simple. Rules cannot be applied (and are not explanatory) if the notion of misapplying them makes no sense. If there is no chance of intentional deviation on the part of state actors, a meaningful pattern of rule-guidance cannot be ascribed. As Wittgenstein's discussion of "private language" suggests, a bundle

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of purely idiosyncratic rules, or rules that are not *external* to the actions themselves, cannot be violated. Because they provide no stable constraint or guidance to the actor (or to his reasons and goals), they are of little explanatory use. As in the case of the use of "misperception" as an answer to "why-questions" in regard to an action, we cannot get beyond the actors' frame of reference with them. Unlike an observer's descriptive generalization (which can brook only exceptions but not contraventions), explanatory rules are not simply made up after the fact as a way of subsuming all that has happened. Instead, we must be able to conceive of the government going against the social rule, of failing to follow it, of choosing an alternative, of violating the network of expectations or showing them to be unwarranted. Rules are made to be broken.

Perhaps in more normal circumstances, whenever state actors step beyond social conventions, their scope and outer limits will be highlighted. We need not rely totally on these boundary conditions in order to locate them, however, for a mixture of other evidence can back up our attributions. This evidence would include the domestic bearing of the actors' conduct, plans, beliefs, and perceptions, the regularity with which (and the ways in which) conformative acts are undertaken, the parade of admissions and denials on the part of state leaders, and a more detailed analysis of whether the constraints on particular kinds of action are real or imagined. It would also take into account how the supposed norms are supported and reinforced within the social system, apart from simple inertia or long-term socialization—whether by sanctions for deviance or rewards for conformity. Once the content of the rules is specified, the range of permissible interpretations can be sketched out.

Without the presence of sanctions and reinforcements, we can easily be misled. What may at first glance look like an important convention may turn out to be simply an ingrained "decision rule" without the weight of social expectation behind it, or it may be a self-serving bit of deception. Such a difference is not trivial, for it has important political implications. One example would be the various prescriptive claims embedded in the literature on imperialism. If imperial policies, for example, rest only upon historical habits or misperceptions that are no longer anchored in present-day social relations and institutions, they may be far more open to change than before. The pressure of influential elites or groups would not stand as squarely behind them. Also, in the absence of potential sanctions, the so-called rules might be indistinguishable from the sorts of national ideals which modern governments are so adept at ignoring when it suits their needs. The idiosyncratic

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intentions of the actors might overshadow the apparent conventions, and the latter would then be of little help in interpreting the former.

STRENGTH OF RULES: ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

We find out very little by merely positing explanatory conventions in regard to a particular policy. Do they resemble statutes which rigorously constrain the aims of states, or are they more like permissive "stylistic canons" which only guide the way or offer a kind of legitimation? This question will parallel another important concern: the *degree* to which the policies of a government can be said to be socially-grounded and referential, or rule-guided and conventional.

There are two conceptions in sociology—a "normative" and an "interpretative" model[7]—whose contrast might give some outline to this discussion and allow us to group the alternatives around two opposing poles. We might, as I have said, assert that the foreign-policy behavior of the state actors is largely governed by a set of domestic rules as well as by the requirements of a pre-established role. Or at least this is what a normative model would imply, if we transferred its insights into social behavior onto the realm of state action. Or we could say (following the contrasting interpretative model), that the state elite is given a free hand in devising its role in relation to domestic society. In that case, when specific roles are hammered out by the actors rather than simply embraced or negotiated, the social rules which underly them can define the state's action only tentatively. There will be less constraint, as well as added space for improvisation.

At this second pole we would have a conception of state behavior which disregards the domestic social context while in turn emphasizing the importance of international interactions and of the autonomy of the government. Here the most illuminating setting for a state's deeper purposes and constraints would be located in the actions of other, comparable states. The state, according to this contrasting model, moves in and out of roles which are freely developed through its interactions in the world environment rather than through contact with a pre-

[7] See Thomas P. Wilson, "Concepts of Interaction and Forms of Sociological Explanation," *American Sociological Review*, XXXV (August 1970). See also Ralph Turner, "Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity," in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Process: An Interactionist Approach* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1962), 23, cited in Wilson, p. 700: "The idea of role-taking shifts emphasis away from the simple process of enacting a prescribed role to devising a performance on the basis of an imputed other role. The actor is not the occupant of a status for which there is a neat set of rules—a culture or set of norms—but a person who must act in the perspective supplied in part by his relationships to others whose actions reflect roles he must identify." The literature on the "level-of-analysis" problem in international relations is also relevant.

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established and powerful social field—the domestic social context. Aside from these international interactions, the domestic order seems to provide little of the content of foreign policy, and knowledge of domestic processes does not make the policy significantly more intelligible. Not only would the international setting provide a referent for the objectives of the state in such a case, but it would largely supply their meaning and explanation as well. In the justificatory arguments about contemporary American policy, for example, we find these assumptions at work—where "national security" becomes a literalism, without reference to the particularities or divisions of domestic society. The actions of other states demand an obvious *reaction*, and very little else is thought to inflect the frame of reference of the government or its conception of the national interest. Instead of international leeway, we might find international compulsion. Instead of a kind of domestic embeddedness, a free-floating or anomic sphere for state behavior would prevail.

Both of these conceptions may be partially relevant, of course: elements of domestic rule-guidance do exist side by side with the creation of more specific roles during the interactions among states. But the distinctions are not devoid of value. In the purest, most extreme case for an interpretative conception, where they could shape the domestic purposes (or ignore them) in accord with the self-evident demands of the global environment, state actors might be making up or changing "the rules" as they go along, relying on improvisation rather than attempting to follow a set of pre-existing norms explicitly. The avowals of diplomats, perhaps nostalgically, have often been oriented toward such an ideal, where domestic constraints or deeper purposes lose their force and the international "game" can be played for its own sake. An "emergent situation" could be defined in this way. One could try out new roles for a foreign policy in relation to domestic society, or visibly violate the old ones. It is an artist's situation in regard to aesthetic canons[8]—where norms are far from being unchanging, unified, obvious, or automatically applied. For the artist in an aesthetic setting (unlike the political actor standing in a less authoritative relation to a domestic order), actions may need *less* "contextualizing" of a social

[8] See, for example, Morris Peckham, *Man's Rage for Chaos: Biology, Behavior, and the Arts* (New York: Schocken 1965), 76ff, 80: "The artist's role is to violate the rules, though he may fail to violate the rules enough to interest a particular perceiver." Or compare Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972), 50-53, for a discussion of common law, where the rules are somewhat refashioned with each case, and are derivative of particular cases or are abridgements of the activity itself, not something completely prior to it.

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sort to make them intelligible. Their significance is often more intrinsic, more autonomous, more self-enclosed.

The tentativeness of the roles, along with the actors' ability to improvise or manipulate the rules, may evaporate much more quickly in the political sphere. Here the demands and the reciprocal as well as warranted expectations of society are usually registered more sharply, thus giving state actions a distinctiveness not always found among the moves and gestures of individuals. Whenever the guiding rules of policy are social and not exclusively technical in nature, and whenever the goals of the state can be interpreted as domestic practices, the original normative paradigm will be illuminating. In these cases, the state is no longer allowed to act as independently, or to devise its own role—occupying it tentatively or even improvising one new role after another. Its aims cannot be as oblivious to the underlying domestic interests which they will advance or inhibit. The perspective of this normative model, in other words, will roughly parallel the conception of state behavior as rule-guided or socially-grounded purposive action which I have suggested.

A scale of relative strength might be constructed. At one end of the scale would be the state policies which are *totally dominated by domestic norms* and are close adaptations to very explicit domestic ends or pressures. Here we might find instances of domestic "necessity" expressed in a variety of ways: in political terms (as electoral opinion might necessitate a role—for example, the defense of long-term allies whose plight evokes nationwide sympathy and identification); in social-structural terms (insofar as an international course undermines important class interests—for example, a governing elite may not tolerate it); or, articulated more vaguely (for example, a refusal to accept an international loss, which is seen as a grave threat to domestic stability or national self-esteem, even though it would have little impact on the prospects for national survival—such as France's resistance to colonial devolution in the postwar years). These norms may come in the form of demands and requirements, as well as of prohibitions, negative choices, or nondecisions. In the foregoing instances, the social rules stand there self-evidently like a set of orders to be obeyed, so that deviant actions appear unthinkable and governments may follow the dictum: "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule *blindly*."[9]

[9] Wittgenstein (fn. 3), #219, #206-7. Domestic rules and expectations about state aims are rarely this explicit or unproblematical. They will therefore diverge somewhat from an analogy with linguistic rules, which "are much more often than not applied correctly without their correct application being an issue at all." Hector-Neri Castañeda, "The Private-Language Argument," in E. D. Klemke, ed., *Essays on Wittgenstein*

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A second point on the scale might be the state policies that are only *rule-guided* (or rule-nourished, or rule-dependent). The international aims would be given more flexibility by the rules that articulate the deeper domestic interests and purposes. There would be more leeway, and more chance for the government to engage in conscious manipulation or willful neglect. For instance, in the relationship between recent American policy and the public, there might have been no significant danger of a mobilized mass backlash if the crusade against Third-World revolution had been rejected, but some risk of retaliation might still exist—especially from corporate elites or a conservative "attentive public." The "reasons of state" might be more asocial, the domestic expectations might be weaker, or the government might feel that the expectations are less warranted. Concerning these social rules, this intercrossing of the scales of strength and entitlement is worth noting.

Third on the scale are those actions or goals which are simply *permissible* under the rules, but not at all constituted by them. At this point, the policies are referential simply by their circumscription; only at their outer limits do they implicate the rules. The state elite, as one example, might have a virtually free hand in its dealings with the public. It would be at liberty to neglect the overall domestic bearing of its aims, to respond to narrow social pressures or even exclusively to its own (institutional or personal) fantasies, values, and inclinations—up to a point. Yet even here, state actors take notice of the broad limits of valuation, perception, and behavior provided by the norms, for the domestic society is never entirely "put to sleep." Its interests and felt needs continue to serve as both an audience and a gauge.

As long as these limits and meanings are reflected, the domestic norms should figure in our interpretation of the actors' frame of reference and in our explanation of state action. The instance in which they matter in a largely negative way represents the other end of the scale—a case of social deviance, where the linkage between governmental aims and the legitimated social norms and purposes breaks down. Here the government disregards whatever pre-existing domestic rules may stand in its way. By going beyond their province, it pays the price, which may be disruptive social change, or a visible and dangerous loss of public support for the nation's foreign policy. In many cases, the desire to put off paying such a price accounts for the government's

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1971), 228. In addition, see A. R. Louch's list of increasing departures from a game model in his *Explanation and Human Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1966), 212.

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hesitancy to deviate. Adherence to the norms may preserve its legitimacy or its tenure.

Even so, the passage between conventions and actors is not a one-way street. Only in rare cases do norms specify their own interpretations or provide an endlessly specified role for the state to occupy, any more than they do on another level for the most conformist individuals. Because most social norms (and domestic needs) can be interpreted with a certain degree of freedom, state actors will frequently try to take advantage of these ambiguities as they adjust to the changing international realities. The degree of rule-guidance or "requiredness" is therefore never a constant. It differs among periods, among issue areas, among issues, among situations, and among the perceptions of different actors.

Because of the way political power is distributed within a society, and because social norms are related to material processes and not merely to idealizations of a nation's experience, these norms take on a considerably greater force than that associated with vague moral admonitions. Invasions may be launched, diplomatic provocations staged, and opportunities bypassed, but rarely at the price of destroying domestic welfare or of utterly alienating the most prominent social forces and conceptions. State actions are not merely locatable within a set of cultural norms, for there is often some apparatus of enforcement that has attached itself to these rules. In a more direct way, they *count.*

The social settings are more often assigned than suggested, and the expectations of the policymakers (at least according to democratic theory) are perennially influenced by the threat of sanctions or domestic setbacks. In cases of contravention, the consequences on an overtly *political* level might include electoral punishment, disastrous declines in public acquiescence, or a growing intransigence of countervailing political forces. It has been asserted, for example, that American presidents in the postwar era incorporated such fears very prominently into their foreign policy choices, particularly in regard to a visible loss of South Vietnam to the communists. A closer examination of the literature on public opinion and electoral behavior,[10] however, suggests that this danger was consistently exaggerated, and that some other form of domestic "embeddedness" will have to be found if we are to interpret the international apprehensions of these policymakers in substantive social terms.

[10] For a fuller treatment, see Andrews, "Of the People, By the People, For the People: Public Constraint and American Policy in Vietnam" (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, forthcoming).

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As this example suggests, however, we may find a cluttered array of rules, several of which are relevant to the situation—where "for every convention in the hand, there are two in the bush."[11] Shifting balances of conflict and harmony can occur among them, just as they do among the differing domestic interests affected by an international policy in the absence of a national consensus. In consequence, state actors may find it difficult at times to integrate their bearings and sustain a set of international aims which can thread its way through their definitions and prescriptions. At other times, when the linkages in this relationship are much looser, state actors may be able to pick and choose among them, to make elaborate compromises, or find backing for their own autonomous objectives. As bureaucratic conceptions of foreign policy have intimated, what appears as a departure from one social norm may express something entirely different. It may be strategy in a narrower, organizational game, as in Seymour Melman's suggested explanation of the Vietnamese war as an attempt on the part of America's "state-management" to enlarge its "decision-power."[12] An elite will occasionally split—some parts of it trying to steer policy in accordance with one rule or one aspect of a rule, and other parts with another or with none at all. Some aspects of the rules may also be inconsistent or have contradictory or even "double-bind" implications, as for example Ellsberg's treatment of the "Indochina Bind," where U.S. policy was supposedly caught between public prohibitions against loss on one hand and certain kinds of escalating methods on the other. The international role or broad policy may thus represent a negotiated coherence within domestic expectations. But while this variety will complicate any analysis or "decoding," the complications should not prove insurmountable. The unity, strength, and limits of the relevant norms cannot be uncovered through a yearning for premature generality, but through a close and contextual examination of the particular cases. An explanation of a state's actions, and an interpretation of its policies in social terms, will usually depend upon such an understanding.

*

Unless we can "see through" the rules,
we only see through them.[13]

*

[11] Louch (fn. 9), 164.
[12] Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1970), chaps. 6 and 7.
[13] R. D. Laing, *The Politics of the Family* (New York: Pantheon 1969), 105.

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Social Rules and Social Structure

Rather than tracing a few parsimonious premises under which many divergent actions could be subsumed and shown to be causally necessitated, we need to reveal a network of rules that is large enough to show the relationship of government actions to the purposes and constitutive meanings of domestic society and to make actions intelligible in social terms. At this point we might employ another metaphor: *a series of concentric circles*, the smallest of which represents the policy to be understood, and the outer circles expressing the various contexts in which that action can usefully be located for an explanation. Our problem becomes one of how far outward to proceed with the explanation. A purposive account which considers the intentional side of the action from the actors' perspective would take us outward a certain distance. For example, a puzzling state action can often be roughly understood by reference to the actors' prior plans. These plans may be placed in the trajectory of the longer-term international goals of the state; these, in turn, could be illuminated by the frame of reference shared by the principal actors, which is likely to concentrate on the *international* reasons and considerations behind a choice. A purely purposive or phenomenological account will most likely come to rest here, in a sort of court history, giving the impression that international "determinants" or international "motives" are all that is behind a policy, or that they are sufficient for our understanding.

But there are outer "circles" which surround these intentional elements and help us interpret the international actions which they inform. The international values and aims of the state elite are often "givens" for the actors, presupposing a whole series of assumptions about the nature of the domestic society and its needs, but they need not be "givens" for the analyst. Such presuppositions must be examined. The international environment offers barriers and opportunities to a state and excludes certain choices. But a knowledge of its processes often provides us with only the shallowest of interpretive accounts. Rather than giving rise to warrants for legitimate mutual expectations, its rules are more *ad hoc*, fragile, transient, and pragmatic. Domestic society, on the other hand, can often be said to provide the interests and values to which the international considerations are geared and in whose terms they can be redescribed.

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THE STATE AS A SOCIAL ACTOR

This discussion suggests at least one approach to the political sociology of state action: a Social Actor Model. This starting point stands in contradistinction to the rather disembodied "Rational Actor Model" that Graham Allison has reconstructed, and should help us interpret even the technically rational policies which the latter leaves essentially unexplained.[14] The baseline, from which various lapses could be charted, would be formed by the broad policies of a state which are guided by and appropriate in the light of the domestic society's consensual norms and expectations—the policies that can be successfully redescribed as means toward more inclusive social ends. No single "literal" notion of rationality would be sustained; all such definitions would be importantly contextual.

Once we identify the relevant social norms and can locate the policies and international role and outlook of a state within them, we can advance a deeper contextual account of the kind I have suggested. At this stage, the temptation to take these social norms for granted is understandable. But, it cannot be maintained too strongly, an explanation should not and need not stop when someone can interpret an instance of behavior as being rule-abiding. *The rules are themselves referential.* They point beyond the level of technical rationality with which earlier theorists have dealt (i.e., the relation between the ends and means of government policy itself), and extend into the underlying social context. Their restraints, attributions, and warranted expectations resemble what Habermas has called the realm of symbolic interaction. And, as he has said, "Symbolic interaction is as much a form of *representation* as is linguistic communication."[15] By locating a relevant rule or custom, we need not halt the excavatory process of explanation, the "expansion" of an act into a succession of concentric circles.

A *breach* of custom naturally presents us with a puzzle. But on

[14] In spite of its reluctance or disinterest in extending its analysis to the deeper domestic levels and linkages which I suggest are essential to any completely adequate account, Allison's work remains one of the few sophisticated treatments of the problem of explanation in the study of foreign policy. *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

[15] Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press 1971), 165; emphasis added. Compare his impressive "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" in *Toward a Rational Society* (London: Heineman 1971). As David Braybrooke warns, "action investigations easily degenerate into complacent and self-limiting recitations of cultural peculiarities: they readily impute to the fabric of the world the concepts and norms associated with contingent social arrangements; and in spite of the lessons to be found in history and anthropology find it difficult to envisage any basic variations on these arrangements." Braybrooke, ed., *Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan 1965), 16.

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many occasions so does the custom itself: a particular action may illuminate the custom just as the custom may illuminate the action. "A deviation is not a sin but a clue."[16] It seems logical that once we are given an intentional action, our first task is to sketch out the rules which give to government action its socially conformative character. But knowing the rules does not necessarily tell us why governments are guided by them, just as the rules of a game do not elucidate the reasons for playing it. We cannot presuppose any particular form of linkage between the rules and the state, or between the rules and the underlying social fabric. There is a variety of possibilities; it is to be hoped that they will reveal themselves as we locate the place of the rules within a social structure, by reference to the values, aspirations, contradictions, constitutive meanings, or historical formation of a particular society.

To understand why government actors follow (and find legitimate) the substantive norms of the domestic social order, we must go to the heart of the national distribution of power.[17] In this connection, it is important to make at least one point: when given a broad international policy (which in and of itself can partially explicate an action), it is necessary to search for social rules that delimit it and provide it with a domestic signification. When given such a rule, we should look for the underlying social interests and ends (and not an artificial "national interest") of which it is an expression or precipitate.

Once this is done, we can investigate those causal mechanisms which generate unintended lapses from the policies that are to a varying degree guided by the social rules—for example, the procedures of large organizations and the personal psychology (or psychopathology) of a country's leaders. Critical analysts, recognizing the almost "anthropological" nature of their task, will not be satisfied with tracking down these causal encumbrances, however. State goals and stated policies should not be seen as self-explanatory, as they often are in a Rational Actor Model. Nor should these elements of error or miscalculation be allowed to assume center stage. In recent years, with the growing popu-

[16] Pitkin (fn. 8), 19.

[17] This is a closely interrelated task which I must unfortunately defer. Compare Wittgenstein (fn. 3), #564: "The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a *point*." For some recent discussions applicable in the case of the United States, see Walter Dean Burnham, "Crisis of American Political Legitimacy," *Society*, x (November/December 1972); Gabriel Kolko, "Power and Capitalism in Twentieth Century America," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, eds., *Radical Sociology* (New York: Basic Books 1971); Milton Mankoff, "Watergate and Sociological Theory," *Theory and Society*, 1 (1974); Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination* (New York: George Braziller 1973), chap. 7.

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larity of examining organizational processes and bureaucratic politics, this problem has too often been disregarded. Great stress has instead been laid upon the departures from a technically "rational" model which bureaucratic or social-psychological deformities may have fostered—for example, in comparisons of the American involvement in Cuba in 1961 with that in the Dominican Republic in 1965. What gradually recedes from view is the stubborn fact that the broad policies and premises, and even the "national interest" itself, may be far more intransigent and at times even pathological—inspired as they often are by their relationship to "irrational" social processes. We should not only be interested in *incompetent* actions that violate *technical* rules (the rules that connect government tactics with government policies); but, more importantly, we should investigate the areas of conformative behavior and social deviance—where the consensual norms of a society are violated or pursued.

Some remaining questions center around what sort of social actor the state can be considered to be. We have to learn to what extent the state and its actions are "socialized" and to what degree they adhere to more than the state's own technical rules for the success of its strategies. We need to know how self-conscious the pattern of rule-guidance is and exactly of what the character of these rules consists. How contradictory are the attendant demands? In what way are the rules transmitted or reinforced or subverted, and in what way are they formed? Also, how fragile are they, or how deeply entrenched? The relationship they bear to the regularities of culture and of socioeconomic organization as well as to the political behavior of the public should also be revealing. Finally, we can probe the ways the rules have been adjusted or accommodated to the changing international realities of an individual period, as the world environment provides a focus for the state, as well as a sometimes conflicting and sometimes reinforcing set of obstacles to its behavior. In some cases international pressures are so great that only the survival of the nation can be assured through foreign policy: there is no room for domestic "deflection" or for expansive conceptions of national needs. In many other cases, however—especially in instances of international insulation, great-power behavior, or hegemony—a purely international or "national security" account of state aims will be hopelessly inadequate.

Once the explicit demands of national survival are interpreted and satisfied, the state is granted a range of possible movement, corresponding to the spectrum of the strength of the social rules. At one end of

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this range would be an autonomous "self-referential" or "non-referential"[18] state actor, capable of virtually unfettered maneuver and planning in relation to domestic society, oblivious to larger social needs, and evolving its own guidelines as it goes along. Consensual norms or rules of domestic "usage" would decline drastically in importance relative to the technical rules of the governmental subsystem of "purposive-rational action."[19] The result may be a further debilitation of domestic needs and a bolstering of traditions of governmental irresponsibility. The behavior of the state would be self-contained, self-motivating, and even self-explanatory, based more on the problems of specific goal attainment defined in terms of an unquestioned ends-means relationship and less on a conformity to social roles, whether internalized or externally sanctioned. That may be the result of willful contravention or of the decline of seemingly shared and warranted expectations stemming from the domestic society. At its extreme, the state's international policies would appear completely anomic and unintelligible in domestic social terms.

At the opposite end of the range would be a completely referential and socialized policy, the "socially instrumental" character of its aims being guided by reciprocally shared expectations that take the form of social norms. Such norms and expectations define a domestic role for foreign policy, and place it in direct contrast to "objectless dispositions" or to actions performed and valued for their own sake. There is then invariably a trade-off, which our style of explanation should reflect, between international policies that can be characterized as ends in themselves (such as Schumpeter's famous definition of imperialism as ex-

[18] Terms adapted from recent art and literary criticism. See, for instance, the related discussions in David Antin, "Some Questions About Modernism," *Occident*, VIII (Spring 1974), 7-38; Michael Fried, "Art and Objecthood," *Artforum*, V (June 1967); Alain Robbe-Grillet, *For a New Novel* (New York: Grove Press 1965); and Andrews, "Surface Explanation," *Ironwood*, III, No. 1 (#5, 1975), and "Index: On Reference, Objects, and Language," in *Open Letter*, Second Series (forthcoming 1975). I will treat this issue more extensively in a future monograph, "The Social Embeddedness of State Action."

[19] Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society* (fn. 15), 91-94, 113-20, and passim. A fragmented social order may parallel the "decline of the referentials" (to borrow Henri Lefebvre's term), so that the government can attempt to *forge* the rules rather than refer (and defer) to them. Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York: Harper & Row 1971), chap. 3. Compare Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill & Wang 1972), 109-59; Jeremy J. Shapiro, "One-Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic of Technological Experience," in Paul Breines, ed., *Critical Interruptions* (New York: Herder and Herder 1972); Sheldon Wolin's discussion of rules and Leviathan in *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1960); and Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in Hans Peter Dreitzel, ed., *Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan 1970).

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pansion which is its own "object"), and those that can be successfully redescribed as rule-guided means toward more inclusive social ends. Between these extremes lies the complex variety of relationships connecting the state and society. They can be usefully understood in terms of the degree of rule-guidance, social meaning, and conventionality which is involved.

The Social Actor Model therefore appears to offer a means of interpreting an individual foreign policy or role by locating it within the array of "concentric contexts" which can be specified by reference to domestic rules and purposes, and which can serve as a framework for our explanations, both of particular state actions and of non-decisions. Primary emphasis would in this way be placed squarely upon both the purposive and the conventional side of state behavior, rather than on the "microchronology" of its bureaucratic planning or the psychohistory of its leaders, or on taking the international aims and outlook of the policymakers at face value. Finally, by penetrating the taken-for-granted domestic world within which policymakers often operate, we can create a kind of emancipatory perspective on the present and future policies of a state. The domestic society's norms and interests, the broader social ends to which even an elite's conception of national security will ultimately refer, might then come to be revealed and better understood.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN STATE IN CHINA: Nationalist and Communist Continuities

By ROBERT E. BEDESKI*

THE eclipse of traditional political concepts such as "citizenship" and "sovereignty" may have been necessary to liberate political inquiry from its excessive focus on the state. Where political science was once "*Staatswissenschaft*," it now encompasses a broad range of phenomena from levels of individual behavior to world systems. Nevertheless, the state is still an indispensable concept that illuminates historic trends and processes of integration in the modern world. China in particular is a polity still seeking the autonomy and power which has come to characterize modern sovereign states. Although the notion of "state" may not be fashionable among contemporary political analysts,[1] students should realize that it is a concept which permeates Chinese political consciousness and influences the ultimate goals of her leaders.

The present essay examines the development of the modern Chinese state and stresses the continuities of state evolution through the Republican, Nationalist, and Communist regimes. Only through the prism of the state can we perceive the evolutionary nature of Chinese politics—evolutionary in the biological sense of adaptation to environment (domestic as well as external) and in the human sense of reflection and conscious response to experiences and experiments that in retrospect appear as a single line of development.

I. The Concept of the State: Theoretical and Historical Aspects

Writers often use the terms "political system" and "state" interchangeably,[2] but there are important differences which influence subsequent assumptions and analyses. Primarily, there is a distinction in the

* This article is an expanded version of a paper presented at the Canadian Society of Asian Studies, University of Toronto, June 2, 1974. The author is grateful to Professors Willard Mullins, Paul Rosen, and William Saywell for critical comments.

[1] On the modern decline of the notion of the state, see Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books 1969); J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, xx (July 1968), 559-92; and Alexander Passerin d'Entreves, *The Notion of the State* (London: Oxford University Press 1967).

[2] "Many but not all . . . identify the political system ultimately with the state in the Weberian sense." Herbert J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York: Free Press 1967), 170.

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level of abstraction: "political system" refers to a broad range of interaction patterns, and may include empires, labor unions, and international alliances, as well as nation-states, in its scope of coverage. In the development of modern political science, the notion of political system has been an appropriate response to Frederick M. Watkins's criticism of the discipline in 1934.[3] His concern was that the near-exclusive focus on "state" phenomena might unnecessarily limit the scope of the discipline and lead to atrophy. The concept of the political system has answered this concern, and since the late 1940's, it has gained currency such that few social phenomena can be considered unrelated to at least one political system.

"Political system" may be considered a political notion analogous in usage to "organism" in biology, in the sense that both encompass the broadest possible range of phenomena which have identifiable common features within their respective areas of inquiry—*public power* in the one case, and *life* in the other.

Compared to Watkins's prewar characterization of political science, the pendulum now appears to have swung to the other extreme. "State" is no longer the master category, but merely one of numerous types of political systems. Nevertheless, it still is an important notion, since it refers to a set of elements that describe both objective phenomena and subjective aspirations in the political world. As the case of China will demonstrate, these aspects make the state a useful analytical tool.

The distinctive feature of the state is its concentration of power—that is, its historical claim to exercise ultimate control of public and legal power within its territorial domain. Traditionally, that claim has been called *sovereignty*. The notion of ultimate and absolute public power may in the past have led theorists into numerous blind alleys when attempts were made to identify its institutional locus. But, as Watkins observed, state sovereignty did not represent an empirically verifiable situation, but rather a limiting condition in the historical evolution of the modern state[4]—a condition which was never completely achieved. Even if Bodin's definition of sovereignty ("absolute and perpetual power") could be achieved *within* a state, it would be impossible to enforce the same degree of subordination in the international as in the physical world. War and human irrationality, even as poten-

[3] "To limit political science to a study of that limited class of social phenomena known as states is therefore to associate it with those sciences which have previously proved least fruitful." Watkins, *The State as a Concept of Political Science* (New York: Harper 1934), 2.

[4] "The importance of the concept of sovereignty really lies in the fact that it represents a limit beyond which the concentration of power cannot go." *Ibid.*, 50.

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tialities, decrease the possibility of power's perpetuity. (Nor does the non-human world remain long in the bondage of human society, as famines and energy crises starkly indicate.)

Here the analogy between the political and life sciences breaks down. Biological categories, the genera and species of organisms, are human artifices developed for the convenience of classification, but they do represent a present stage of evolution and differentiation. They are categories based on the operation of laws and principles external to the organisms. Political categories, on the other hand, evolved not only in response to certain laws of social development, but also as organizations *consciously* created by men and women who sought to achieve certain purposes. Lenin's organization of the Bolsheviks, Mao's Rectification Campaigns, Japan's postwar Constitution, the law establishing the TVA—all are conscious and *willed* actions creating or modifying collective institutions in order to affect human society in specific ways.

At the level of the state, the will to concentrate public power into a single sovereign entity grew into *raison d'état* when statecraft became conscious of itself and when its practitioners subordinated all other considerations to its ends (an imperative which may be the ancestor of present notions of "national security"). But before the state assumed its modern form, and before Machiavelli could dissolve the medieval links between secular statecraft and religious beliefs, an institutional setting had to be prepared which denied the particularities of feudalism and the universality of Christian loyalties. The modern state emerged from late feudal Europe out of the conflicts between national monarchs and the papacy, and among the monarchs themselves. The idea of sovereignty developed as new centralized legal institutions undermined the feudal autonomy of estates, municipalities, and ecclesiastical orders. In military science, the infantry proved its superiority over aristocratic cavalry, while artillery and new techniques of siegecraft doomed the value of walled cities as holdouts against the emerging national monarchies.[5] New technology and military expansion were expensive; a new class of bankers and moneylenders overcame old strictures against usury as the national monarchs relied on their aid in financing their exploits. An urban middle class challenged the dominance of clergy and nobility in the fields of education and politics. Aristocratic advisors were slowly replaced by administrators drawn from the middle classes who had been trained in law at the great universities.

Philosophically, the modern secular state gained its freedom from the

[5] Gerhard Ritter, "Origins of the Modern State," in Heinz Lubasz, ed., *The Development of the Modern State* (New York: Macmillan 1964), 20.

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medieval heritage only after authority was based on considerations of legitimacy which did not require absolution by the Church. The divorce of the secular state from the sacred universe was made final by Machiavelli, who wrote on statecraft from the observation of actual human behavior rather than from the ethical perspective of how rulers *ought* to behave. By the seventeenth century, Hobbes's *Leviathan* defeated all other rivals for supreme power.

The Industrial Revolution further magnified the concentration of power in the Western states. Earlier, theories of mercantilism had recognized trade and overseas expansion as being motivated by the vital interests of the state. Expansion and colonization of non-European areas transformed power rivalries into worldwide competition for trade and territory—a struggle in which primitive societies were pawns and had few defenses. Finally, in the nineteenth century, the phenomenon of nationalism, combined with the Christian impulse to proselytize and the apparently unlimited possibilities offered by industrialism, made the Western nation-state into a force which few societies could resist. The irony of state-sponsored imperialism, however, was that "Wherever the nation-state appeared as conqueror, it aroused national consciousness and the desire for sovereignty among conquered people, thereby defeating all genuine attempts at empire-building."[6] The world expansion of the Western state compelled societies to reconstruct their polities or be swallowed as colonies. The Japanese succeeded while the Indians did not, and the Chinese were saved by international rivalries as well as by their own erratic bursts of reform and revolution.

Two world wars and the rise of efficient dictatorships have contributed to the modern disenchantment. The sovereign state is now widely perceived as a threat to world peace and human freedom. Liberalism has long suspected despotic threats inherent in the state, and has universally sought to restrict state power with constitutional strictures. Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia provide historical examples of the degree of state concentration which the developed countries hope to avoid; it is not clear how the advantages of concentrated power are to be preserved when the institutions that may lead to abuse and tyranny are discarded.

Western suspicion of doctrines of state sovereignty, however, has not been duplicated in the developing countries. While the United States and the other Western democracies have been moving away from the

[6] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1966), 127.

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notion of absolute state sovereignty and toward international cooperation, both economically and politically, China has been highly vocal in guarding state sovereignty against the inroads of destructive doctrines of "internationalism":

> What is to be emphasized [in this article] are the comparatively hidden forms of destroying sovereignty adopted by the American imperialists to extend their neocolonialist policy and to cover the eyes and ears of the people of the world. We not only want to expose these methods by which the American imperialists destroy sovereignty; we must also expose and criticize the 'theories' which their legalists formulate to gloss over those criminal acts. A special characteristic of all these 'theories' is that they are designed to distort the concept of sovereignty and to nullify the principle of sovereignty in international law. It can be said that this attack on the principle of sovereignty has become the main trend in legal studies in America.[7]

More recently, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has taken up the defense of national sovereignty on behalf of Third-World nations on a number of issues, including defense of expanded maritime rights.[8] Faced with the threat posed by the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty within the socialist camp, the PRC's defense of national independence has become even more emphatic since 1968.[9]

In general, it appears that there are two major views of the sovereign state in the world today. The Western countries, which have developed within the framework of the nation-state for centuries, passed through various stages of nationalism, and have experienced the excesses of state apotheosis in two world wars; the non-Western countries, on the other hand, and especially China, are now struggling to achieve what they perceive as the complete autonomy and unity of established states. The condition of sovereignty remains a fragile ideal more than a routine fact of national existence for them.

Building the modern state requires the establishment of a *government* that exercises sovereignty—itself a notion that refers to two desired aspects of a state: autonomy and unity. Autonomy is a relational attribute which represents the separateness and integrity of a state with respect to other states. By "sovereign rights" we mean that

[7] Yang Hsin and Ch'en Chien, "Exposing and Criticizing the Fallacious Reasoning of Imperialists on Questions Concerning National Sovereignty," *Cheng-fa yen-chiu*, 1964, No. 4, 6-11. translated in *Chinese Law and Government*, I (Summer 1968), 12-26.

[8] *Peking Review*, XVII, June 21, 1974, p. 5.

[9] "Theories of 'Limited Sovereignty' and 'International Dictatorship' are Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialist Gangster Theories," *Peking Review*, XII, March 28, 1969, pp. 23-25.

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within a given state, there is a supreme power which cannot be interfered with by other states. (The Chinese therefore consider the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty" to be an untenable infringement on the rights of autonomous states.)[10] According to the other aspect of sovereignty, a domestic one, the supreme power in the state is capable of making and enforcing laws that are binding on all inhabitants within its borders. This internal aspect of sovereignty means that no estate or class or religious association can make laws which contradict the national government or operate outside the laws of the state. It also means that all associations and administrative divisions and institutions are subordinate to the state. Although perfect coordination and subordination are impossible to achieve, the ideal of absolute internal sovereignty provides a vital norm by which centralization can be measured.

II. The Development of the State in China

The development of sovereignty, both external and domestic, has been a primary goal of state-building efforts in modern China. From the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty through the present regime, China retained her formal sovereignty. Yet, until 1949, it was a weak sovereignty—a condition which Sun Yat-sen characterized as "hypo-colonialism" (*tz'u chih min ti*)—descriptive of China's political and economic subordination to not one but several imperialist powers.[11] It was a condition which Mao and others called "semi-colonialism"[12] (*pan chih min ti*)—legal independence, but actual international subordination. There was little dispute between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that complete national sovereignty —the freedom from foreign interference—was a paramount goal of revolution. The dispute was over the means.

Nor was domestic sovereignty of the Chinese state very well developed in the pre-Communist period. The creation of provincial armies during the T'aip'ing Rebellion (1850–64) began a trend toward independent militarism that culminated in the independent warlords of

[10] "It can be seen from these fascist howls of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique that the theories of 'limited sovereignty' and 'international dictatorship' flagrantly trample underfoot the universally acknowledged principle of state sovereignty and entirely serve the criminal aim of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism to dominate the world . . . other countries can only exercise 'limited sovereignty' while Soviet revisionism itself assumes unlimited sovereignty." *Ibid.*, 23.

[11] "Doctrine of Nationalism," in Leonard Shihlien Hsü, *Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California 1933), 185-86.

[12] For example, see "On the New Democracy," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1965), 341.

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the 1920's.[13] Imperial attempts at constitutional reform in the last decade of the Ch'ing dynasty hastened the devolution of Manchu authority by creating provincial assemblies. During the revolt of 1911, these legislatures took the lead in the conflict between the provinces and the central government.[14] Other segments of society also sought to preserve their interests outside the eroding political order. Labor organizations, merchant societies, secret societies, associations of intellectuals—all assumed new importance during the post-imperial period, leading to a fragmented society which became increasingly independent of the state. Formal institutions of the Peking government during the Republican period exercised little power. Centrifugal forces and the decay of government in the late Ch'ing period had destroyed the Confucian state, raising demands for a new polity to reintegrate the societal fragments.

The demand for reintegration was channelled into nationalism. But decades of weakened internal sovereignty now placed their own obstacles in the path of nationalist aspirations. As the KMT grew, it provided an umbrella organization for nearly all sectors of society and, in a sense, became the captive of its own supporters and often the victim of their quarrels. The party had to represent common aspirations of national unity and autonomy, harmonize the diverse interests of an increasingly "prismatic" society, and still create a fully sovereign state in the face of foreign hostility to those aims. It was a monumental task of state building which had to be sustained by more than patriotic sentiments.

Ernst Cassirer, in his *Myth of the State*, projected a bleak vision of the modern state. After Machiavelli, the political world "lost its connection not only with religion or metaphysics but also with all the other forms of man's ethical and cultural life."[15] Machiavelli, of course, had not created this "depraved condition" but merely described it and demonstrated that, by studying the lessons of political history, it was possible to establish a durable political order. In the *Discourses* he laid down two fundamental principles of statecraft: (1) States must be founded or reformed by a powerful individual, and (2) Statecraft is inseparable from the military arts.[16]

From this standpoint, perhaps modern China's Prince Borgia was

[13] See Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China," in Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1964), xxi.

[14] See John Fincher's study, "Political Provincialism and the National Revolution," in Mary C. Wright, ed., *China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), 185-226.

[15] Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1955), 140.

[16] Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (New York: Modern Library 1950), 138.

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Chiang Kai-shek, a man whose statecraft has been obscured by wartime demoralization and the postwar defeat of the Nationalist movement, and overshadowed by subsequent Communist victories and reforms. Chiang's manipulation and control of party, government, and army in the period of 1927–36 may have cleared the way for the rapid consolidation of Communist rule after 1949. Had it not been for Chiang's unifying efforts in loosening the regional power of militarists such as Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yü-hsiang, and Li Tsung-jen, the Communists might have faced an imposing array of entrenched warlords which, in the initial period, could have undercut revolutionary effectiveness and diffused its momentum in a series of civil wars.

Chiang's coup against the Russian advisors in 1926, for example, and his subsequent outmaneuvering of the Communists, may have retarded the Communist revolution for two decades, but it also denied the Russians easy access to power. Chiang's coup against the Shanghai radicals secured the support of the urban capitalists and rural landowners, who had anxiously watched the leftward trend in the revolution.[17] His deals with the militarists alienated democratic support and earned Chiang the title of "New Warlord"; but these accommodations also gave China a breathing space of peace while the new government was established at Nanking. His breaking the alliance with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists facilitated cooperation with the major Treaty Powers, especially Japan and Great Britain, and later made some renegotiation of the "Unequal Treaties" possible.

After consolidating the Nationalist revolution, Chiang and his armies by a series of skirmishes and major battles in 1929–30 reduced the hegemony of Yen and Feng in the north, and isolated Li in the south. Although Chiang's alliance with Chang Hsüeh-liang of Manchuria in late 1930 was seen as a perfidious betrayal of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles, and as an expression of warlord "politics as usual," it was in fact one further step in centralizing the Nanking state by creating a second front on the northeast flank of Yen in Peking, in order to squeeze him back into Shansi.

A true practitioner of *raison d'état*, Chiang did not hesitate to use force against his antagonists—detaining political leaders in the capital despite guarantees of freedom, or suppressing Communist armies to consolidate Nanking's control over the Yangtze valley. Chiang recognized the country's vulnerability to external attack and the need to eliminate regional separatism, and felt compelled to compromise with

[17] See the account in Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1961).

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Japanese militarist expansion in north China in order to postpone the conflict he knew would destroy the Nationalist revolution.[18] While Chiang did not succeed in establishing the unified state he had hoped for, the KMT period did witness the end of the old warlord system and the era of unrestricted imperialist privileges in China, as well as the beginning of the centralized party-state which came to fruition through Chiang's nemesis, the CCP.

The Communist revolution swept the KMT aside and relegated it to the historical role of having presided uneasily over an interlude in which the "real" revolution was germinating and maturing within the Communist movement. Students of modern China are still far from any theoretical consensus. There seems to be wide agreement that the political institutions of the PRC are largely developments that originated within the Communist movement, and that the party-state of the CCP provides the moving force behind much of modern Chinese politics. Tang Tsou, for example, sees the Chinese state as a projection of the Communist model of revolutionary organization writ large:

> During the revolutionary period, the party constituted a small political community tied together by ideological, organizational, and personal bonds. This small and tightly knit political community existed in a disorganized society. It attempted to create a reintegrated political community *in its own image*. Thus, political development in China can be understood as a process in which a small group of men accepted a modern ideology, adapted it to Chinese conditions, perfected a system of organizations, developed a set of practices, and then extended this pattern of ideology, organization, and practices to the whole nation.[19]

Although this perspective appears to explain many factors and phenomena of modern Chinese politics, at least one fundamental modification is necessary to provide a more complete explanation of the modern Chinese state and of the theses that the Chinese Communist party-state was either born and nourished in Yenan or that it is the final stage of state evolution.

The Chinese party-state had its beginnings in Nanking around 1927, when the KMT established its party dictatorship. The model for the KMT was the Soviet party dictatorship—with the important difference that the Chinese counterpart was not a single-class but a multi-class

[18] See Chiang Kai-shek's pessimistic evaluation of Chinese defense capabilities in his speech of July 1934, "Resistance to Aggression and Renaissance of the Nation," in *The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 1937–1945* (New York: Kraus Reprint 1969), 1-20.

[19] "Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework for Analysis," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), I, 285; emphasis added.

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dictatorship. Moreover, the ostensible purpose of the KMT dictatorship was to create conditions which could allow the reintroduction of constitutional government. Before this could be accomplished, however, a number of conditions had to be established: regional military forces had to be neutralized and their threat to civil government eliminated; the people had to be organized and taught democratic practices and values; domestic peace and prosperity, as well as defense against foreign intervention, were also prerequisites to returning to full constitutional (non-dictatorship) government.

The period of party dictatorship, officially designated "political tutelage," lasted nearly twenty years, although it had originally been scheduled to end in four. But the KMT party-state, as an attempt to concentrate political power, failed to overcome the obstacles which weakened domestic and external sovereignty. For one thing, the party was not sufficiently united to carry out its state-organizing tasks which were its *raisons d'être*.[20] Famines, floods, regional revolts, local mutinies, factional disputes, Japanese and Russian aggression, the collapse of the international economy—all eroded the ability and confidence of the KMT to fulfill its revolutionary ideology until, in 1936, the party itself admitted its failure to cope with national problems and reinstated a proto-Confucian ideology. Japan's occupation of large areas of the mainland further demonstrated that the KMT's dictatorial power was not justified by an ability to defend the country's territory and vital interests.

Nevertheless, the KMT idea of party dictatorship as representing not a single class but the broad masses was accepted and adapted by the CCP. At the Seventh CCP Congress in Yenan, Mao berated the KMT for its ineffectiveness and its failure to carry out Sun's programs.[21]

When the Communist Party won control over the Chinese state in 1949, it was a party dictatorship in fact, but a multi-class dictatorship in form—not a radical departure from the KMT structure of political tutelage. From 1949 until 1954 the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) governed as the formal sovereign state institution, and consisted of representatives from the Communist Party as well as from other "democratic parties." When the 1954 Constitution came into force, the National People's Congress became the formal expression

[20] At the Fourth National Congress of the KMT, for example, it was admitted that "while the people continue to have faith in the Three Principles of the People, they have gradually lost their hope in our Party." Party disintegration was cited as the main cause. Quoted in Milton J. T. Shieh, *The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894–1969* (New York: St. John's University Press 1970), 154.

[21] "On Coalition Government," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, III (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1965), 270.

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of the People's Democratic Dictatorship and the CPPCC faded into the background. Yet there was little doubt that supreme political power resided with the CCP as the vanguard of the proletariat. Until at least the Cultural Revolution, the Communist regime appeared to be fairly conservative in continuing the party-state principles inaugurated by the KMT, and only with the 1975 state Constitution was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat formalized.

Thus, there seem to be significant continuities and similarities between the party-state under the KMT and the CCP, although the former was much less successful in consolidating its rule than the latter. In addition, both regimes attached some importance to the evolution of constitutional government. Nanking's Organic Law of 1928 functioned as an instrument of organizing government, but was not considered a full constitution; there was no method of amendment and no internal limitation of government power such as judicial review or a bill of rights. In this respect, it was similar to the Common Programme of the CPPCC in 1949. Domestic pressures and the need to give evidence of progress toward a truly popular government resulted in the Provisional Constitution of 1931. Although the PRC Constitution of 1954 was not a provisional and transitional document as was the 1931 *Yueh Fa*, it too was relegated to a transitional category.

There is yet another area of continuity between KMT and CCP China—the division of power between the party and the army, with a weaker third sector consisting of the government administrative apparatus. In the KMT period, party power and national survival depended upon the army to a great extent, a fact which made Chiang Kai-shek indispensable to the party, and paramount in government and party organizations. Chiang's type of regime, with supremacy of the military over the civilian branches of the state, is a spectre the Communists wish to avoid. In 1954, Kao Kang was accused of spreading the heresy that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had created the party, rather than vice versa—a notion not without a core of truth to it. Later, the purge of P'eng Te-huai underscored the party's determination to maintain its rule over the armed activists. The assertion that Lin Piao attempted to overthrow Mao Tse-tung in 1971, and the reshuffle of regional commanders in late 1973, can be seen as symptoms of the CCP's continuous anxiety over the dilemma of maintaining a strong military force while keeping it from intruding in the decision-making process and subordinating the state to its own priorities.

Thus, it appears that there may be some significant continuities between the Nationalist and Communist regimes. At a minimum, these

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continuities suggest that the modern Chinese state has evolved along lines that reach back to the Nanking dictatorship, as well as to Yenan and the guerrilla bases of the Communist revolution.

The significance of the above findings can be summarized in two propositions:

1) The party-state in modern China began in Nanking around 1927, following the Northern Expedition and the elimination of the Communists from the Nationalist-led United Front. Although the goals of the KMT dictatorship (complete domestic and external sovereignty) were not achieved, the party did establish the parameters of the modern party-state, which were adhered to by the CCP when it came to power:

a) A multi-class dictatorship; no one class in China was strong enough or sufficiently organized to lead the country out of its semi-feudal, semicolonial condition by itself.

b) A professional but highly politicized army which was indispensable to state building and survival, and which might replace the party leadership in a period of extended crisis such as the Japanese military intrusions of the 1930's.

c) A promise of self-liquidating party dictatorship in the future, when full sovereignty was achieved and the masses would be qualified to take over democratic government. A fully democratic government would be inaugurated with the introduction of constitutional government.[22]

2) The CCP has projected its own experiences of revolutionary development onto Chinese society as a whole. Its techniques of organization, mobilization, and control are the result of over two decades of innovation, adaptation, and struggle before capturing the state.

(The implication of Proposition 1 is that the KMT established the *form* of the state, while the CCP, according to Proposition 2, has provided the *means* for consolidating the state.)

If the above propositions are valid, there appears to be a sequence of evolution in China as follows: Weak party-state under KMT leadership; strong party-state with constitutional overtones during the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949 to 1965); diffused party-state (1966 to Tenth Party Congress, August 1973); and full party-state (the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the present period). In the matter of state *form*, it appears that the Communists are now close to achieving what the KMT set out to do—establish complete party domination over the state. The concepts and programs of Chinese Communist state

[22] This promise was far more explicit with the KMT than with the CCP.

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building claim a Marxist-Leninist ancestry; but if we examine the evolution of the modern Chinese state in a continuum including both the Nanking efforts (1927–49) and the Communist experiences, then this evolution demonstrates some theoretical parallels with state development in the West.

III. Force, Power, and Authority: State Evolution

Alexander Passerin d'Entreves, in his *Notion of the State*, identifies three approaches to studying the Western state—force, power, and authority. First, the state is a *force* outside individual will and superior to it. The state not only issues commands, but is capable of enforcing them. In this approach, the state monopolizes psychological and physical coercion; it is the view of political realists like St. Augustine, Machiavelli, and Mosca. Where force is lacking, there is no state—only chaos and anarchy.

The second approach accepts the state as a relation of force between government and citizen, but goes beyond the view of political realism to examine the legal and institutional restrictions on the state's force. The state as force restricted by law is what d'Entreves calls the state as *power*—his second approach. Power, according to this formulation, is force which is exercised according to certain rules and procedures that are known or knowable. A collection of rules and regulations which we call the legal system, specifying limits on public force as well as on private conduct, is the very condition of a state's existence. Force is not banished, but qualified and limited by legal rules. Men guard and administer laws, but they are not the state. Rather, the law establishes and prescribes their roles and powers, specifying what they can and cannot do. Sovereignty is another way of expressing the state as power, for it indicates that although the state is autonomous and supreme, it does operate within a realm of laws.

Third, d'Entreves approaches the state from the perspective of *authority*: he sees the state as a term of reference for the obligation to submit to its rules. There is obligation to obey the commands and laws of the state because it wields an authority which is "recognized, warranted, and justified in practice." In addition, there is a supreme "value" expressed in the laws, and this value makes the state "worthy of respect and obedience." For the state to possess authority, there must be a justification which is not, and cannot be, provided by mere force or solely by the exercise of power.[23] In other words, for the state to be justified

[23] D'Entreves (fn. 1), 6.

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and to exercise an authority that makes for binding obligations on its citizens, there must be obedience based on the recognition that its citizens are not merely submitting to superior force and power, but are simultaneously preserving or attaining a valued end, such as justice, order, equality, liberty, or the "common good."

By viewing the notion of the state from these three standpoints d'Entreves investigates "the long and mysterious ascent that leads from force to authority." His concern is the recurring question, "What can transform force into law, fear into respect, coercion into consent—necessity into liberty?"[24] He is concerned with the evolution of the state from coercive to obligatory acceptance, obedience, and support. Although his own inquiry is concerned with the historical phenomena of the Western state, the suggested questions and approaches may be equally valid for non-Western polities.

In particular, the approaches utilized by d'Entreves appear to have validity in explaining the development of the modern Chinese state—a process which began in the late nineteenth century and continues today. This evolutionary process transcends particular political regimes, and each experiment in national government, whether constitutional monarchy, Republican, Nationalist, or Communist, has made contributions that have affected China's institutional development.

Force, as the primary element in the state, was negated by the devolution of the central government that followed the collapse of the Ch'ing political order. The phenomenon of numerous warlords exercising tenuous hegemony over limited territory expressed the advanced decline presided over by the Peking republic. The constitutions and laws promulgated by the republic between 1912 and 1927 were of minor validity to the country; they indicated the formal existence of a government, but without real state unity.

The KMT organized a nucleus of force which was to become the foundation of the unified state. With its nationalist ideology, quasi-Bolshevist organization, and disciplined, politically conscious army, the Cantonese forces commanded by Chiang Kai-shek penetrated central China in 1926, consolidated their hold in the Yangtze valley in 1927, and formally incorporated Manchuria by the end of 1928. The following decade was a period of challenge by the remnants of regional militarists and by Japanese militarism. Of these two "counter-forces," the first was weakened by its own rivalries and by pressures from Nanking forces, while the second, the product of successful state build-

[24] *Ibid.*, 10.

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ing in Japan, eventually evicted Nanking's forces from their vital core area in the Yangtze valley.

Despite its failure to achieve a monopoly of force within the country, the KMT moved ahead with its program to create the legal-constitutional state—one where military rule would be replaced by party government during the interim of political tutelage, and where the system of coercive force could be superseded by law. Yet there was an anxiety that haunted the KMT. The 1911 revolution against the Manchu dynasty had been betrayed by the Peiyang militarist, Yuan Shih-k'ai, who banned the KMT and sought to create a new dynasty. If the new KMT national revolution again depended on a strong military figure, what was to prevent him from corrupting the state-building force into personal despotism? The dilemma was intensified as events demonstrated the need for continuing a strong military force and the indispensability of the leading military officer, Chiang Kai-shek. Liberals and leftists demanded an end to the party dictatorship, asserting that a concentration of political power would prevent the development of democratic institutions if the party dictatorship lasted too long.[25]

The state-building force created by the Nationalist revolution was transformed into state power (a system of rules and laws) with the establishment of a new national government at Nanking. The 1928 Organic Law formally established and defined the "Five Yuan" structure and preserved the notion of party sovereignty. Government was an instrument of party rather than popular rule until the masses had been properly educated and organized for true constitutional government. The Provisional Constitution of 1931 maintained the party dictatorship,[26] but moved to liberalize some features of the tutelary state.

By creating legal limits on force, the projected development of full constitutional government presented KMT China with a dilemma: how far should legal and constitutional strictures limit coercive force within the state, when it was obvious that the force represented by the

[25] Hu Shih, the liberal educator and scholar, argued for the early termination of political tutelage: "The people . . . cannot be easily deceived by a verbal tutelage which furnishes no respectable example to be followed. They see their great leaders fighting with one another and with the defeated ones exiled. . . . What kind of training can the people derive from such kind of tutelage?" *North China Herald*, September 7, 1929, p. 357.

[26] Article 30 of the Provisional Constitution (June 1, 1931) reads: "During the period of political tutelage, the National Congress of the Nationalist Party shall exercise the governing powers of the Central Government on behalf of the National Assembly. During the adjournment of the National Congress of the Party, the Central Executive Committee shall exercise the said powers." William L. Tung, *The Political Institutions of Modern China* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1964), 346.

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military/party combination was insufficient to defend the emerging Chinese state against domestic and foreign enemies? KMT rule may have been authoritarian, but in fact it was a crippled despotism. Additional legal restrictions on its sphere of action would have further emaciated its available force.

Within these limited parameters of state power, the possibility of completing state authority was also restricted. The successful ascent from force to legitimate power could not take place where the first stage of state building was incomplete. While the valued ends of the KMT state were probably considered legitimate by the majority of patriotic Chinese, institutional performance was rarely at a level high enough to raise the question of whether state force was misdirected or abused. To be sure, there were abuses of personal or factional power, but these were unspectacular aberrations of politics rather than despotic corruption of the unified state. In a word, the transformation of force into power and authority could not take place in the KMT state with its incomplete sovereignty.

Although the KMT failed to complete its state-building program, there were sufficient gains in unification and diplomacy to assure that the CCP did not have to begin from a *tabula rasa* in 1949. Rather, the Communists could continue state development on the foundations laid by their predecessors and major antagonists. Moreover, the CCP had the advantage of professing to be the founders of a completely new and more just political order, and could credibly blame their defeated rivals for all that was oppressive in the pre-Communist system.

As noted earlier, the modern Chinese state was not founded in 1949. Rather, the KMT had inadvertently helped to establish some preliminary institutional foundations for Communist rule by creating rudimentary expressions of a state force. First, with the end of the first United Front in 1927, the KMT had set out to unify the country by military and political means. Chiang played off one militarist against another, and by concentrating his armies in the Yangtze valley, prevented effective coalitions between northern and southern warlords. During their first decade of rule, Nationalist forces neutralized and defeated major regional leaders, so that by 1936 Chiang emerged as the undisputed head of the Chinese state. These prewar developments facilitated Communist rule insofar as competing regional armies were denied access to central power; after the war, only one major group faced the Communists—the ruling KMT. In effect, Chiang's centralizing efforts in the prewar years, although far from completed and often carried out at the expense of national defense, spared the Communists

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the necessity of uniting a balkanized China, which had been the condition of the pre-Nanking republic. Chiang was no Louis XIV determined to weaken the feudal nobility, nor was he a Bismarck uniting hundreds of petty states into a modern state through diplomacy and guile. Instead, he built and led an army, a party, and a government against the contradictory fragments of Republican China, and then aligned those fragments into something resembling a modern state, but without its soul—authority.

Second, the Nationalists pursued a diplomatic course that ended the system of unequal treaties. Through the diplomatic efforts of the KMT, some of the major limitations on Chinese external sovereignty (such as extraterritoriality and foreign control of tariff rates) were removed. In these efforts, the anti-Communist complexion of the KMT served a useful purpose by persuading the capitalist countries to reach an accommodation. (A prewar Communist regime in control of the Chinese state would probably have prolonged this aspect of China's weak sovereignty.)

Third, the idea of party dictatorship to be followed by constitutional government was an intrinsic part of the KMT program. The CCP joined with liberals in criticizing the undemocratic nature of the Nanking regime, and promised to carry out KMT programs even more quickly and effectively than the KMT itself.[27] In other ways as well the KMT programs had created a constituency of support which the CCP sought to attract to itself by pointing to successes in the liberated areas as examples of its ability to carry out what the KMT could only promise.

During and after the war against the Japanese, the Communists had built a state force, chiefly the PLA, that would bring the regime to power. Communist forces in liberated areas absorbed defeated remnant units of KMT supporters, defectors from the cities, and individuals who sensed a shift in the power arrangements of the country. Upon attaining control of the Chinese state, the Communists proceeded to transform their coercive force into the legal state whose major quality d'Entreves characterized as power. They established legal institutional limitations on the revolutionary forces that had seized the state.

Unlike the Nanking regime, the new Communist government was united after decades of struggle, commanded a well-organized and disciplined military force, and proved able to meet challenges by hostile foreign powers. From the perspectives offered by d'Entreves, the regime in China was sufficiently consolidated to transform it into state power by

[27] Mao Tse-tung (fn. 21), 255-56.

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moving from force to placing restrictions on that force. These restrictions, however, were not the legal and constitutional limitations familiar from the evolution of the Western state. Instead, there appeared to be an evolution of institutions in China in which a division of powers among army, party, and government emerged, with a supreme executive group coordinating the state's activities. It was a system not consciously created by any group of "Founding Fathers"; although its origins could be traced to the "Yenan legacy," one can also find rough parallels with the KMT regime, which exhibited a similar rudimentary fusion of power at the top and a functional division below.

In a preliminary way, the following elements of the modern Chinese state appeared under the Communists. Further inquiry may determine that these comprise a mixed state, with a rudimentary potential for mutual checks and balances as it continues to evolve.

1. *Army.* The PLA was a major vehicle in the revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and the KMT. Plans were made for military demobilization as soon as regime consolidation was secure, but the Korean War intervened, and continued cold-war hostilities made it impossible for the Communists to reduce their military forces. The army has been an intrinsic part of the state structure, and remains the indispensable instrument of force for the survival of the sovereign state. Externally it defends the interests and security of China; domestically (as for instance during the Cultural Revolution), the army remains the final fall-back position of a regime whose party and administrative structures may suffer from stress and overload. In this respect, the role of the army is similar to what it was under the Nanking regime.

2. *Charismatic authority.* The emergence of a single charismatic leader is not a new phenomenon to modern Chinese politics, although neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek ever achieved the aura of Mao Tse-tung. In the PRC, Mao has remained the most important leader, despite the summons to "collective leadership" and criticism of the "cult of the individual."[28] Although reportedly shocked by the excesses of the Maoist cult, the supreme leader on several occasions demonstrated his power to intervene in political processes and to change the direction of state development. While no successor of Mao's stature appears at present, the role remains and may perhaps be filled in time, despite promises of collective leadership.

3. *Government.* The legal-administrative apparatus of the Communist state is largely under the control of the party, and is theoretically

[28] See the "Political Report" of Liu Shao-ch'i to the Eighth Party Congress, especially the section on "Party Leadership."

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subject to the legal strictures of the new Constitution.[29] Periodic campaigns against bureaucratism and "commandism" further attenuate any tendencies that might otherwise lead to a more autonomous administrative apparatus.

4. *Party*. Even the ruling group has not been immune to rectification campaigns. The Cultural Revolution purged large numbers of cadres and leading officials, leaving no doubt but that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is also subject to limitations on its powers.

Unquestionably, the force assembled by the CCP in the modern state is far more complete and effective than that of the KMT. On the second layer of the state—power, or force subjected to certain legal and institutional limitations—the PRC appears to be moving away from the emphasis on force which characterized the party dictatorship in the period before the Cultural Revolution. If the Chinese state is moving toward maturity, then the third stratum is being constructed: authority. It is to this final element that we now turn.

IV. Authority in the Modern Chinese State: Toward the Legitimation of Power

How power is legitimated to become authority touches on the core of political life. To explain why political power is legitimate is to maintain that those who are subordinate have an obligation to obey that power. It is to say that justice may be served by that power, and that rebellion or disobedience is not in the interests of justice.

Three types of legitimation can be identified in KMT and CCP statements about their claims to state authority: (A) The regime claims *efficacy* in solving problems confronting the polity. Efficacy here refers to the regime's capacity for force and the extent to which the ruling system has the ability to defend the state from internal and external enemies. (B) There are claims that the regime represents the interests of all Chinese citizens, not merely one segment of the population. Philosophically and operationally, this claim resembles Rousseau's concept of the *general will*.[30] It means that the power of the state must be directed toward the common good to secure legitimacy. (C) There are regime claims based on the universality of its values. The state is

[29] Promulgated on January 17, 1975.

[30] In *The Social Contract*, one can find what amounts to a summary of the modern Chinese amalgam of social solidarity, radical equality, and intense commitment: "If, then, we take from the social pact everything which is not essential to it, we shall find it to be reduced to the following terms: 'each of us contributes to the group his person and the powers which he wields as a person, and we receive into the body politic each individual as forming an indivisible part of the whole.'" (New York: Oxford University Press 1962), 181.

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founded on a transcendent *justice*[31] guiding all actions and determining the correctness of policy direction. Both the KMT and CCP sought to validate their claims to legitimacy by their respective concurrence in what they perceived as supranational values: the former in nationalism, liberal constitutional democracy, and industrial progress; the latter in class struggle, socialism, and egalitarianism. For each of the regimes, there was a comprehensive view of universal justice which was secularized in and projected onto the international system. It was a view of universal justice which had to be accommodated by the domestic revolution.

A. EFFICACY

As an element of legitimacy, efficacy is a relative concept. That is to say, the actual accomplishments of a regime must be considered in light of problems confronting the state. The KMT faced formidable problems, both in number and in intensity, during its period of dominance. Regional militarism, party fragmentation, rural banditry, devastating floods and famines, the impositions of the unequal treaties, rivalries among the great powers within China, direct Japanese intervention, the loss of Sun Yat-sen's leadership, and financial instability were among the pressing problems that faced the KMT state before 1937. There were some significant accomplishments, but too often these were obscured by the recurring crises of national survival. When compared to the rapid consolidation and mobilization of the state after the Communist revolution, the efficacy of the KMT was not very high.

During the 1950's, the CCP restored civil peace to a country torn by internecine conflict since 1912, carried out land reform, socialized agriculture, initiated massive industrialization, defended the country against American threats from South Korea and Taiwan,[32] planned and carried out projects of flood control, and significantly raised the living standard of the people. In objectively comparing the two regimes, one could say that the problems confronting the KMT were greater and accomplishments fewer, and thus efficacy was proportionally lower.

Perhaps the difficulties of the domestic and international environment

[31] According to Carl J. Friedrich, "The *eidos* (idea) of justice is a transcendent reality, something that exists beyond the testimony of the senses. . . . The very transcendency of justice precludes its realization in a constitutional order." *Transcendent Justice* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1964), 5.

[32] The *People's Daily* (November 7, 1950) published a review of Japanese aggressions against China in the past, and depicted the United States as the postwar heir to the aims and practices of Japanese militarism. The American presence and operations in Korea were cited as possible preludes to action against China, in the same way that the prewar Japanese presence in Taiwan and Korea had led to conquest of northern and coastal China.

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were factors that inhibited the KMT by demoralizing its supporters and reducing the confidence of activists in their ability to change events. In addition, the necessity for military solutions to some problems was an important element in the shift from civilian to military leadership in the KMT—a development which led to further splits in the party. It is too often overlooked that some of the major obstacles to full national sovereignty were reaching solution by 1945 without the aid of the Communists: the defeat of Japanese military expansion, elimination of regional militarists, and abrogation of the unequal treaties. But it was too late for the KMT; the CCP had already demonstrated its capacity as a state-building force and had not suffered the demoralization and corruption which the KMT experienced during the war years.

Without detracting from the successes of the CCP, we can recognize that its comparatively high efficacy was partly made possible by the groundwork performed by KMT state-building efforts, and partly by the changed international environment of postwar national liberation and decolonization which was far less hostile to China's national aspirations than the environment of the 1930's had been.

B. GENERAL WILL

D'Entreves characterized the element of power in the state as force delimited by rules and a legal system as well as by institutional arrangements. It is important that, even where formal legal sanctions are weak, force not be wielded on behalf of one particular sector of the polity or for the benefit of a single individual, group, or class. Where an existing political force is subjected to the rule of law, that force acquires a further legitimation in addition to its efficacy. Legalized force carries an assurance that coercive force is directed at the common rather than the particular good (unless one adopts the view that the legal system is itself an ingredient of the coercive repertoire of the state, and not a limiting element on state force). If the state force is regulated by rules, and if it is directed for the common good, then we have one more validation of the obligation to obedience.

In the KMT and the CCP states such formal legal limitations on force have been weak or absent. Appeals to the "rule of law" lacked credibility against a background of successive constitutions, shifting and fragmented centers of power, and decades of war and violence. Legal and institutional restrictions on force—especially in a domestic and external environment where the state force was incomplete (as under the KMT)—were counterproductive and therefore unwelcome. Nevertheless, revolutionaries and their sympathizers demanded that

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their efforts not result in building a new despotism, as had occurred with the abortive regime of Yuan Shih-k'ai after the 1911 revolt. The revolutionaries of the 1920's wanted to guarantee that whatever state-building force was created would not degenerate into a new dynasty. The best assurance was that the goal of revolution be a democratic state.

We have seen how the KMT party dictatorship was based on a program of postponed democracy. Army and government were controlled by the party—an organization that theoretically represented the interests of the masses. During the period of political tutelage, the party was to educate the people and to generate a general will which would then be operationalized in constitutional government.[33] The party claimed to be a multiclass organization; as insurance that it would not become an entrenched dictatorship, the democratic ideological heritage of Sun Yat-sen and the democratic centralism of the party, including periodic congresses, were to prevent entrenchment until constitutional legality and popular sovereignty assumed dominance in the state.

Postponing constitutional government created a major dilemma for the KMT, which had asserted that government actions and policies were carried out for the good of the people, though the masses were excluded from participation in elections and other means of influencing decisions. Only when the people had been trained in democratic ideas and techniques would they be allowed the benefits of full democracy.[34] The KMT envisioned its own role as similar to that of a benevolent colonial regime whose subjects some day would be given the franchise and other democratic rights. It was an arrangement that required the masses to trust the KMT to wield its force for the common good of the nation. Ironically, what may have led to the erosion of that trust was not so much its misuse or illegality, but rather its *incompleteness* and the KMT's inability to protect the state from external invasion.

Nevertheless, the KMT established the ideological principle of the common good as a proper limitation on force. Force was henceforth legitimate only if its holders could substantiate their claims that they were not representatives of merely a small minority. Indeed, the KMT claim to represent the common good of the nation and their failure to substantiate it by achieving complete national sovereignty must have affected the CCP's strategy: while retaining title as the party of the proletariat, the CCP proclaimed that it was far more representative of the Chinese people's interests than was the discredited KMT. Moreover,

[33] On the tutelary duties of KMT members, see the "Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang" (January 30, 1924), in Shieh (fn. 20), 82.

[34] See Sun Yat-sen's "Outline of National Reconstruction," in Hsü (fn. 11), 85-89.

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by 1945 the Communists had demonstrated that party leadership, support of liberal elements, and representation of the common good were a working reality in the liberated areas, and not a future vision to be implemented after a period of party dictatorship.

To defeat the KMT in the competition for state power, the CCP modified its own program to expand the base of its appeal. Mao's "New Democracy" was the Communist answer to KMT programs. Both KMT and CCP programs called for multiclass participation in state power and addressed the need for China's complete sovereignty. In effect, the CCP promised to carry out programs that the KMT had failed to complete.

Thus, the notion of the common good was translated into general will under successive regimes and became a component of state power. Coercive force, whether KMT or Communist, military or political, was subject to certain limitations. It could be used only for the welfare of the people and the state. It could not be used to establish a new dynasty or to forward the interests of a single class. Even the proletariat was subordinated to the common good, despite assertions that it was the most advanced class in society, and the class whose interests were synonymous with all of society.[35] From 1927 on, no regime could effectively claim legitimacy unless it could be identified with the general will.

c. JUSTICE

Legitimacy in the modern Chinese context is thus, first, the ability of the political regime which exercises control over the state to maintain the integrity of the state against both internal and external competing forces and to carry out its programs and policies. Second, a regime, in order to be legitimate, requires the acceptance and support of the whole citizenry. In China this has not been translated into the principle of majority rule; instead, it bears a strong resemblance to Rousseau's general will.

Justice is the third component of legitimacy. Generally, there are two types: internal and external. Internal justice refers to a condition in which there is balance and equity, the fairness that Aristotle called "distributive justice." With external justice, the terms of reference lie outside the system; it is what Carl Friedrich has called "transcendent justice." St. Augustine's "City of Man," for example, could become just

[35] See Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, XII (April 30, 1969), 25.

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only to the degree that it approximated the *Civitas Dei*. The traditional Chinese state was just and possessed the Mandate of Heaven only as long as a dynasty was in harmony with the cosmos.

It would be presumptuous to attempt to formulate a theory of justice here: it is a subject which has occupied leading thinkers for centuries. But for the present we can consider the implications of the proposition that, for the modern Chinese state, the terms of reference for a just regime are to be found, in part, outside the state. That does not necessarily mean that the notion of harmony with nature or similar vestiges of tradition still persist, but rather that justice is related to a perceived mainstream of historical development. More specifically, the standard of external justice for modern Chinese regimes has meant that claims to legitimacy take some theme of world events as an indicator of how China might direct her own course. In the 1920's, for example, liberal democracy and nationalism had the appearance of becoming world historical trends, and gave an added reinforcement to KMT programs.[36] The 1930's, however, saw democracy weaken and military aggression increase in Europe and Asia, causing the KMT leadership to react by withdrawing its faith in Western institutions and restoring selected parts of the Confucian tradition.[37]

One need only contrast the Second KMT Congress with the Fourth and Fifth Congresses to notice the effects of international chaos on official definitions of justice. References to world revolutionary turmoil in 1926, the collapsing forces of imperialism, and mutual rivalries among predatory powers indicated not only that lines were drawn between revolutionary and reactionary forces, but also that the opportunity for national revolution in China was imminent and that the country had to be led by a revolutionary party which understood and could adapt to world trends. The Fourth KMT Congress met two months after the Mukden Incident and could hardly deny the party's disintegration or the unfavorable international situation. By the time of the Fifth KMT Congress in 1935, the international situation had declined even further. In 1933, the national leadership had introduced the New Life Movement, which attempted to restore Confucian rites and other elements of traditional Sinitic civilization. By that time, Chiang's quasi-military dictatorship had been consolidated and the

[36] The Manifesto of the Second KMT National Congress, for example, was notable for its emphasis on world conditions, "the growing awareness of oppressed peoples," and the "shaken foundations of imperialism" as a situation conducive to the Nationalist revolution. See Shieh (fn. 20), 111-19.

[37] The Fifth KMT National Congress, for example, stressed national morality, a system of rituals and national music, and other virtues that attempted to revive the moribund Confucian culture.

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democratic aspirations of the KMT were all but shattered. As justice seemed to disappeared from the international system in the prewar decade, there seemed little possibility for establishing a just political order within China.

At this point, a preliminary hypothesis on justice as an element of legitimacy can be offered: *In modern China, the international system has contributed an important referent for evaluating the appropriateness of political regimes. Regime claims to represent a just political order refer, in part, to themes in world politics which appear beyond the influences of Chinese policy and which reinforce the appropriateness of political orientations.* In other words, there appears to have been a secularization of the traditional Mandate of Heaven, which has now become a "Mandate of History." The institutional implications are that a regime favored by the modern mandate tends to be civilian and optimistic, while the same regime facing an unfavorable or hostile environment may be more cautious and military-oriented.

From 1949 through the early 1960's the party was in command of the state, and the trends of the international system appeared firmly in favor of the Chinese revolution:

> The present international situation is favorable to us. The world front of peace and democracy, headed by the Soviet Union, is more powerful than it was last year. . . . The national liberation movements, aiming at throwing off the yoke of imperialism, have greatly extended. . . .
>
> . . . there is a strong unity in relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. On the one hand, it enables us freely and more rapidly to carry forward the reconstruction work within our country. On the other hand, it is giving an impetus to the great struggle of the peoples throughout the world for peace and democracy in opposition to war and oppression.[38]

The party enjoyed the firm loyalty of the PLA and the solidarity of world socialism during the first decade of the PRC. But the early 1960's witnessed the breakdown of the relatively favorable international system, and perhaps weakened CCP visions of continued progress.[39] India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union were areas of conflict or declining Chinese prestige and influence. Chinese isolation appeared to be growing, and the state was vulnerable to an international system unanticipated by the ideological projections of the first decade in power. Under conditions of increasing international hostility

[38] Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Central Committee of the CCP" (June 6, 1950), in *Current Background*, No. 1, 1-2.

[39] James Townsend, "Intraparty Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One-Party System," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books 1970), 284.

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to China, survival depended upon the army and the diffusion of values conducive to military leadership.[40]

The shift in emphasis from party to army during the Cultural Revolution may have indicated that, for the second time since the New Life Movement of the KMT, the reaction of the Chinese state to international crisis was an attempt to reinforce the military spirit in the nation. In the Socialist Education Movement, military values were similarly stressed. In 1965, Lin Piao, then Minister of Defense, called for a restoration of the virtues and strategies that had brought the Communist revolution to power as the means to preserve the Chinese state.[41] With the transformation of a friendly international environment into one of hostility, the army professed to be a pillar of the proletarian dictatorship.[42]

As the more immediate threats to China's sovereignty subsided, purged party leaders have been rehabilitated and party rebuilding has been emphasized. The Lin Piao leadership has been eliminated and the civilians have reinstated control over the PLA. As for historical trends that might legitimate the PRC, China now stresses its position as a leading member of the Third World.[43] The oil embargo illuminated the vulnerability and dependence of industrial nations on raw materials resources, and that discovery may lead to a new perception of world historical trends.

In effect, the pattern of institutional development linking the KMT and CCP regimes parallels the evolution of states in the West, but it seems to preserve certain cultural and cosmological orientations unique to China. Using the approaches defined by d'Entreves in examining the European State, the following stages of state evolution apply to modern China:

[40] Building the People's Militia, for example, was in part a response to the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. See Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Hold Aloft the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking and Strengthen Militia-Building," *People's Daily*, April 7, 1960, in *Current Background*, No. 624, 6-10.

[41] See Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1965).

[42] Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, XII (April 28, 1969).

[43] "Under the Communist regime, as in the past, morality and authority are inseparable, as if church and state were one. The Communist regime not only dictates laws in the public sector, it also seeks to 'legislate' the private morality of its people. Like the dynasties of imperial China, the Communist regime is not to be criticized or its authority challenged, an exemption it enjoys as long as its performance lives up to the expectations created by the official ideology. If that performance appears to fall short, as in 1957 and in 1966–68, forces within the Party or the society may question the mandate of the regime." James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice* (New York: Praeger 1970), 107.

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1. *The stage of concentrated force.* The KMT appealed to a broad range of social sectors, including capitalists, workers, and intellectuals, and presented a program to unify the country and end foreign privileges. Voluntary support from these groups helped to sustain the regime in the decade before 1937, and gave it a chance to consolidate control. The party in power established an entirely new governmental apparatus in Nanking, organized a new administrative apparatus, and promulgated new laws. Nanking military forces pursued Communist forces and struggled with regional warlords to establish central control. Decades of neglect could not be undone in a few years, and reintegration of the polity was not completed. Only with the Communist conquest was the monopoly force of the sovereign state established.

2. *The stage of regularized power.* After coercive force had established and successfully defended the state, institutional restrictions were placed upon that force. The incompleteness of the KMT precluded this possibility, although ideological specification of government and party roles and limitations had described the power arrangements which were to operate after effective force was established. Party congresses, written constitutions, and popular sovereignty were what the KMT proposed as instruments to transform state force into state power, and these have been more or less accepted by the CCP for the same purpose. But they have proven to be less effective limitations on the monopoly of force than the other institutions mentioned earlier—i.e., the army, a charismatic leader, mass organizations, and the governmental bureaucracy.

3. *The stage of validated authority.* A state force is created, proven effective, placed under conscious or unconscious restrictions, and finally legitimated by its concurrence with the highest values of the social order. While the KMT promised to achieve the common good of the state, its successes were dimmed by its inability to defend the country against Japanese penetrations and by the extended hostility of the international environment to Chinese aspirations. The Communists have had a far better record in this respect. The Peking regime, by linking itself to contemporary historical patterns of worldwide socialism, national liberation movements, and to what may eventually become the "resource diplomacy" of the Third World, has made its quarter century of rule a period of effective service to the common good, and of a fair record of congruence with "world historical trends."

In summary, the decades of revolution, instability, and mass campaigns of the Chinese polity, the ideological rhetoric and apparently erratic changes in foreign policy, may add up to a recapitulation of the

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much slower process of state building in Europe, the historical birthplace of the modern sovereign state. Perhaps centuries of wars, reformulations of ideals, and rearrangements of political institutions are being compressed into a few decades for China. If so, we are witnessing in the space of a generation or two, not so much a crisis of modernization, but rather a self-conscious adaptation to a world organized around sovereign nation-states. If we are discouraged by the violence and apparent unpredictability of this process, we should remind ourselves of the long genesis of the Western state and the tribulations involved in developing the original models.

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ORGANIZING FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN FAMILY PLANNING

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IN response to growing awareness of rising population growth, many Third World governments have chosen to institute family planning programs. These programs represent a major governmental intervention to induce social change. Thus far, they have met with mixed success. It is important to review the major assumptions, as well as the criticisms that have been levelled against family planning programs, in order to suggest new directions for research and action. We argue that most Third World countries neither have the requisite organizational capacity nor the political commitment necessary for the particular family planning strategies they have adopted.

The first initiatives in family planning in the developing countries were based on the assumption that the primary reasons for persistent high birth rates were ignorance and lack of access to contraceptives. Programs built around this preference were oriented toward supplying contraceptive methods and some extension education. In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent that this approach does not yield the results desired. Birth rates are not falling very fast; where they are, socioeconomic change seems to be the main reason. From the ashes of relative failure, two new schools of thought have sprung. The first focuses upon client behavior and strategies for changing that behavior. It stresses the need for a deeper appreciation of the socioeconomic and cultural motivations of fertility. The second focuses on problems in the implementation of the strategies chosen for influencing client behavior. In its most recent and explicit formulation, it asserts that family planning programs have hitherto lacked an adequate managerial framework. In reviewing these two approaches, we will argue that neither is complete in itself. The organization of family planning programs must be designed to fit the socioeconomic conditions in the populations; the strategies developed for dealing with the client must not only be suitable to a given culture, but must also be

* The present paper grows out of the Kanpur Project, a joint research endeavor of the Indian Institute of Technology and the University of Michigan on the organization of family planning in Uttar Pradesh, India. We are grateful to Jason Finkle, Fred Munson, Barbara Crane, Hope Sukin, Rushikesh Maru, Mary Chamie, and Jim Fields for their helpful comments on this paper.

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within the organizational capacity of the institutions that have responsibility for carrying them out.

I. Two Critiques of Existing Family Planning Programs

The client-centered approach. Over the past several years, family planning programs have been subjected to a radical critique by anthropologists and sociologists. They argue that the lifestyles and values, and the ways in which individuals are linked to their society and culture, are ignored or misunderstood by those who have designed family planning programs.[1] The specific dimensions of the problems that are stressed and the level of analysis that is employed vary. Some authors emphasize the degree of motivation or the social context within which fertility decisions are made. Others point to the social and cultural obstacles which prevent social workers from approaching the client. Still others view the problem from an aggregate perspective, and argue that family planning programs are based upon an idea of society which stands in clear opposition to that which derives from social science. The basic implications of these critiques, however, remain: present family planning programs are based upon an incomplete understanding of the socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological context of the populations to whom they are directed; and this incomplete understanding in turn has much to do with their relative lack of success.

Emphasis on the sociocultural context of decisions on fertility and contraception provides an important corrective to what appear, with hindsight, to have been rather naive assumptions about the clients' readiness to adopt family planning. The corrective is client-oriented in that it tells us that the people in underdeveloped countries think, feel, and act quite differently from what program planners have tended to

[1] Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?" *Science*, Vol. 158 (November 1967), 730-39; Edwin Driver, "Social Ideology, Social Organization, and Family Planning," in *Essays on Population Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 1972), 101-25; Phillip Hauser, "Population Policies Affecting Fertility: A Sociological Perspective on Family Planning Programs," in International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, *International Population Conference: Liège 1973*, III (Liège, Belgium: IUSSP 1973), 303-18; John Marshall, "Culture and Contraception: Response Determinants to a Family Planning Program in a North Indian Village," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (University of Hawaii 1972); David G. Mandelbaum, *Human Fertility in India: Social Components and Policy Perspectives* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1974); Joan Mencher, "Family Planning in Chingleput District, Madras, India," in Stephen Polgar, ed., *Culture and Population: A Collection of Current Studies*, Monograph 9 (Chapel Hill: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina 1971), 151-59; Thomas Poffenberger and Shirley Poffenberger, "The Social Psychology of Fertility in a Village in India," in James T. Fawcett, ed., *Psychological Perspectives on Population* (New York: Basic Books 1973), 135-61.

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assume. The majority of the target population of family planning programs in the Third World spend most of their lives in the village. Any effort to influence the villagers' behavior will have to take account of the social and cultural reality which makes up their day-to-day life.

The concern for the psychological and societal context of the client is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful family planning programs. The most insightful strategy for convincing clients to adopt family planning is worth nothing unless it can be put into operation. While we need to understand what "works with the client," we also need to understand what "works with the bureaucracy." Consequently, another emphasis concerns the organizational and administrative context within which family planning programs are implemented.

The organization-centered approach. Faulty implementation has recurrently been cited as one of the major barriers to the success of family planning programs. It is argued that "the more successful programs probably are distinguished less by their content than by the systematic and persistent and thorough implementation of whatever the program is."[2] A similar idea is expressed in the frequently quoted statement that family planning programs or strategies have not failed; rather, they have not been adequately tried or tested. Betty Mathews, a former Ford Foundation consultant in India, reports: "It has been said to me that extension education has failed in the family planning program. The truth is that extension education as yet is not being practiced in the family planning program."[3] These statements emphasize the gap between plan and implementation. Interestingly enough, the solution suggested by many of the authors who voice such complaints is that, since enough is known about how to organize family planning programs, "we need to do what we know needs to be done."[4]

Thus, we are confronted with a paradox. If, in fact, enough is known about how to organize family planning programs, why have there been severe problems of implementation? If enough is known, it would seem possible to avoid these very problems which have plagued programs almost everywhere. What is the basis for the assertion that we know all that needs to be known to organize successfully? In order to answer this question, we have to consider the nature and extent of

[2] Ronald Freedman, "Family Planning Programs Today: Major Themes of the Geneva Conferences," *Studies in Family Planning*, 1 (October 1965), 7.

[3] Mathews, *Training for Family Planning in India—Design for a Breakthrough: A Report to the Commissioner of Family Planning*, New Delhi Ministry of Health and Family Planning; quoted in D. Banerji, *Family Planning in India, A Critique and a Perspective* (Bombay, India: People's Publishing House 1971), 34.

[4] Bernard Berelson, "The Present State of Family Planning Programs," *Studies in Family Planning*, 11 (September 1970), 8.

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the existing knowledge concerning the organizational part of family planning programs.

Much of the literature on organizational issues in family planning is normative in orientation and either nonempirical, or unsystematic in its empirical base. Typically, a whole range of conditions is listed which should improve the implementation of strategies for influencing the contraceptive behavior of clients. Empirical evidence is seldom based on the systematic observation that would be *de rigueur* for studies at the client level. Among the most frequently cited organizational requirements are: program autonomy, freedom from bureaucratic constraints, decentralization, strong leadership, effective supervision, feedback from lower to higher program levels, and extensive coordination among various program levels. These conditions are discussed in varying amounts of detail in the many reports evaluating family planning programs, but they are not integrated into a systematic organizational analysis. Thus, in addition to a weak empirical base and a prescriptive orientation, reports suffer from an inadequate theoretical framework.[5]

Once the normative conditions have been identified, appeals are made to the program administrators and social workers to work harder, to be informed, to exert more control, or to relate better to fellow workers. If these appeals go beyond the covers of the reports in which they are recorded or the conferences in which they are discussed, they usually evoke no more than ritualistic nods. Exhortations for more of whatever organizational ingredients are believed to be necessary for successful action are no more effective than appeals to clients to adopt contraception. They need to be buttressed by a thorough understanding of the causes of organizational failings; this understanding can only derive from investigations that are empirical and/or positive in nature, and are guided by a theoretical framework.

The normative and nonempirical approach to organizational issues is one reason why most family planning programs have been located in relatively conventional public bureaucracies. In general, neither the appropriateness of this choice nor the possibility of alternative forms of public or private intervention were considered. Are there historical examples of bureaucracies which have successfully encouraged a behavioral change of the magnitude required for fertility control? Are

[5] See, for example, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Report on the Family Planning Program in India*, TAO/IND/48 (February 1966); Government of India, Estimates Committee, *Thirteenth Report: Family Planning Programme*, E.C. No. 706 (New Delhi: April 1972); Planning Commission, Government of India, *Evaluation of the Family Planning Programme* (New Delhi: March 1965), 1-12, 94-107.

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there any grounds for assuming that bureaucracies, particularly those in developing countries, have the capacity to introduce a major social change? If so, what are the organizational structures and processes within existing bureaucracies that are most capable of carrying out such a venture? What are the characteristics of existing family planning organizations, and to what extent can they be changed? Such questions must be answered before bureaucracies are charged with organizational responsibilities for family planning; yet, the importance of these issues has essentially been ignored. It is interesting to speculate about the reasons for this neglect.

Nationalist leaders who came to power in the newly independent nations after World War II were thoroughly steeped in the European Socialist tradition of the 1920's and its ideological commitment to large-scale government involvement in all aspects of social and economic life.[6] The tendency toward a massive governmental role in development activities was thus in part inspired by ideological conviction rather than by an empirical assessment of the capability of the bureaucracy to assume such responsibilities successfully. Heavy governmental involvement also appeared inevitable because of the absence of a nongovernmental infrastructure which could have assumed responsibility for finding ways to alleviate the poverty in which the bulk of the population in these countries lived.

Development activities in the Third World in general, and family planning programs in particular, were strongly influenced by international experts in various fields. They might have alerted nationalist leaders, who were steeped in European traditions of socialism and overwhelmed by ever-present crises, to the importance of assessing overall bureaucratic capabilities and organizational determinants of performance. There is little evidence that such guidance was received. International advisory teams, by the very nature of their missions, are fairly constrained in the scope of their inquiry. Many of the issues that have crucial bearing upon the functioning of a family planning program lead to questions concerning the role of the local power structure, relations between bureaucrats and politicians, attitudes of ethnic and religious groups toward family planning, and departmental as well as interdepartmental conflicts. Foreign experts are generally hesitant to broach such politically sensitive topics; moreover, given their high degree of specialization, they tend to advise in their own relatively narrow area of professional interest. For instance, the integration of

[6] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1968), 1-47, 799-900.

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administrative variables into the rational-choice models of economic planners has not yet become acceptable.[7] Also, the international experts who acted as advisors in the family planning field were heavily dominated by medical personnel with a special concern for service facilities and contraceptive technology, and by demographers with a preoccupation with the measurement of fertility behavior. Their experience with large and complex organizations was usually limited to hospitals, universities, or government agencies in an industrial world very different from the countries they were advising.

The most common overall approach to questions of organization appears to have been strongly influenced by the Weberian tradition. Weber was concerned with hierarchy, specialization, generalized rules, and procedures and patterns of authority. The Weberian model is of course an ideal-type conceptualization, and Weber himself did not establish any claims for its empirical validity. There are extraordinarily few organizations anywhere which approach the characteristics of the Weberian model, and most of the discussions of Weberian ideas are in fact based upon the recognition that a reification of his model is inherently misleading. If one examines the blueprints of family planning programs, however, one cannot help but feel that they were designed with the notion that an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy could indeed be instituted in the field.

Once family planning programs were established and located in the public (usually health) bureaucracy, the problem of program efficiency increased in salience. Out of this concern has evolved a "management school" which seeks to improve the effectiveness of family planning programs through a more thorough examination of what we will later define as "organizing" behavior. The major assumption of this approach is that "the efficiency of organizations is related in specified ways to designated factors and can be increased by deliberate manipulation of those factors on the basis of scientific investigation."[8] Organizational performance is viewed as a function of variables that are both identifiable and controllable. Some of the major variables that have been considered are the division of labor, modern management techniques and skills, and the human relations component with its emphasis on interpersonal relations, supervisory style, and group dynamics. The influence of the management tradition in family planning is re-

[7] *Ibid.*, 961-1027, 1843-1940; Kenneth Rothwell, *Administrative Issues in Developing Economics* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 1972); George Simmons, *The Indian Investment in Family Planning* (New York: The Population Council 1971), 175-91.

[8] Herbert Kaufman, "The Administrative Function," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), 66.

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flected in repeated calls, in the literature and conferences or seminars, for better and more management training of administrators,[9] for the recruitment of more administrators who already possess management skills,[10] or for better supervision.[11] The management approach represents an advance over earlier discussions of organizational issues in family planning. Although it is narrow in focus, it is more systematic and emphasizes the need for empirical knowledge.

Concurrent with the heightened interest in questions of management, we observe an increasing awareness that management technology and know-how do not necessarily provide all the answers to the problems encountered by family planning programs in the developing nations. It is recognized more and more frequently that the lack of managerial skills is not the only and perhaps not even the most important barrier to the implementation of programs. In the absence of organizational leadership and commitment, management skills may be largely irrelevant to the work of operating agencies. Donald Helbig points out that "It simply isn't enough to provide management technology and know-how to administrators whose basic attitudes may be counter-productive and who operate in a bureaucratic sub-culture which does not share the same task-oriented productivity/creativity/effectiveness values which we take for granted."[12]

John Cool maintains that management techniques are transferrable to developing nations "*if* but only *if* sufficiently high value is attached, within the society, to the importance of doing a good job in this area."[13] At the present time, however, sufficient importance does not seem to be attached to doing a good job in "this area"; and it appears that through reference to the so-called "soft dimension"[14] in family planning, the adherents of the management approach have rediscovered facets of organizational behavior already familiar to those who have espoused a sociological perspective to the study of organizations. In this latter perspective, survival goals of individuals within the organization, and

[9] James E. Austin, "The Management Bottleneck in Family Planning Programs," *Studies in Family Planning*, IV (December 1973), 343-50.

[10] Hans C. Blaise, "Who is Responsible for Population Program Management?" in *Readings on Family Planning and Population Program Management: Background Papers for a Ford Foundation Meeting on Population*, Elsinore, Denmark, June 1972 [hereafter referred to as *Readings on Family Planning*] (New York: Ford Foundation 1973), 97-111.

[11] Ford Foundation, *India's Family Planning Program in the Seventies* (New Delhi: Ford Foundation 1970), II-2-D-Pg. 1-7, II-2-C-Pg. 1-5.

[12] Helbig, "The Importance of the Soft Dimension in Training for Family Planning Programs Management," in *Readings on Family Planning* (fn. 10), 42.

[13] Cool, "Comments on the Application of Management Science to Family Planning Programs in Developing Countries," in *Readings on Family Planning* (fn. 10), 37.

[14] Helbig (fn. 12), 41-45.

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of the organization itself, have been recognized as being in competition with formally stated goals and policies.[15] Other variables such as values, motivation, process, structure, bureaucratic culture, and the interrelationships between a program and its environment are also recognized as important elements in explaining organizational behavior. What appears to be required is a broad-based organizational analysis of the determinants of family planning program performance.

The management school makes the reasonable assumption that efficiency is related specifically to the way resources are mobilized and allocated. But the closed-system logic in which the organization is conceived as an independent action tool shielded from outside influences limits the insights to be derived from management models. The closed-systems logic seems particularly inappropriate in the study of public bureaucracies, subject as they are to a wide range of political and other influences which are less significant in the private corporation. Moreover, the management approach to the organizational analysis of family planning programs is largely prescriptive in orientation. What is needed is a systematic and comprehensive description of "what is," and then to work from there to a realistic assessment of how "what is" can be ameliorated. Much progress in this direction could be made by systematic empirical efforts relating organizational factors to the performance of family planning programs.

Ventures of this kind would have to be guided by an open-systems model which recognizes that forces from both inside and outside the organization operate in concert against the direct translation of plans into action. Many of these forces relate to the survival needs of both the individuals within the organization and the organization itself. The environment in which the organization must operate exerts a particularly strong influence. Bureaucracies are, after all, more than independent factors that can act to mold societies in new directions; they themselves are strongly affected and conditioned by their society.[16] In fact, the environment sets fairly clear boundaries to the effectiveness of an organization to carry out a change program. In situations where the environment exhibits the characteristics of underdevelopment and widespread poverty, organizations operate under severe constraints.[17]

[15] Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v (September 1960), 257-78.

[16] Joseph LaPalombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963), 3-33.

[17] One advantage of the open-systems model in policy research is that it reduces the temptation to resort to personal fault as an explanation for problems that are systemic in nature. See Nathan Caplan and Stephen O. Nelson, "On Being Useful: The Nature and Consequences of Psychological Research on Social Problems," *American Psychologist*, XXVIII (March 1973), 199-211.

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A region, state, or country that scores low on a particular measure of development is likely to score low on a range of other criteria as well. Thus, organizations are also caught in the vicious circle of underdevelopment. The tragic situation is that those who are most in need of an effective development program are also those who are least likely to have the organizational capacity to institute it. To paraphrase Marx's famous statement, we may ask of all those who expect bureaucrats and social workers to perform miracles, "Who changes the change agent?"

Much of what we have said by way of asking for a fresh approach to the analysis of family planning would apply to other development programs as well. However, the argument we have made derives particular force from the fact that the family planning venture is in many respects entirely different from other development programs—it is a unique endeavor.[18] Family planning programs are directed at changing people's behavior; in this sense they are similar to agricultural programs, but distinct from public health activities. Forrest Linder points out that public health work is generally directed at "doing things to people and to the environment,"[19] whereas in family planning one has to "try to get people to do things for themselves. The successes in inoculation and vaccination programs, in school health, physical and dental programs, in developing pure water sources and urban sewage systems, in spraying for malaria control, are programs in which to a large extent the official agency can take an initiative and carry through the action. Programs that depend on the multitudinous individual persons taking action for themselves are much more difficult and less successful."[20] Moreover, even though agricultural programs are also directed at getting people to do things for themselves, a more fundamental change in behavior is required in family planning. Sex and human reproduction are sensitive subjects and of crucial social and emotional significance to the individual, the family, and the wider social groups in question. While increased agricultural production or better health fits the existing value pattern of most peasants in the developing nations, limitation of family size does not. Even to the extent that the latter is desired, the existing contraceptive technology is frequently considered threatening or extremely inconvenient. The advantages deriving from family size limitation are less tangible and harder to demonstrate than are those in agriculture or most preventive tasks within public health. Moreover,

[18] Theodore Smith has made a somewhat comparable argument using the concept *sui generis* in his recent paper, "Management and Family Planning Programs: Indonesia, A Country Profile," in *Readings on Family Planning* (fn. 10), 25-33.

[19] Linder, "Fertility and Family Planning in Relation to Public Health," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XLIX, Part 2 (October 1971), 200.

[20] *Ibid.*

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agricultural development programs may concentrate their attention essentially upon the landholding groups within the rural areas, while family planners have to cover the whole status hierarchy. To be effective, the program must change the behavior of millions of couples, not just a relative few. It must also deal with the poorest section of the population—with those who are most harassed, exploited, and discriminated against, who have the least reason and probably even a learned incapacity to trust the outsider who has come to offer help.

The task is thus more demanding than its analogue in other development activities. Any family planning program accepts a unique burden requiring a special sensitivity to organizational issues; there is all the more reason for broadening one's perspective to include a wide range of factors in the analysis.

An important consequence attends the suggestion that the explanatory framework for looking at family planning programs be expanded. The basic assumption of the management approach is that the efficiency or output of an organization can be increased by deliberate manipulation. Certainly, one of the major motives for the study of family planning programs has been the search for insights which can ultimately be translated into recommendations for program improvement. However, with a broadening of the explanatory framework comes the recognition that there are determinants of effectiveness which are not subject to change over the short run, or which may have such high political, social, or monetary costs attached as to appear undesirable. We would agree with Herbert Kaufman that "the myth of managerial omnipotence" which "implies a view of mankind as currently possessing the capacity to exercise full control over the evolution of all our institutions"[21] should be abandoned. There are serious constraints upon our ability to determine the direction and scope of change, and only a recognition of these limits will allow us to maximize whatever change is possible. The myth of managerial omnipotence "generates expectations about what can be accomplished, and how quickly, out of keeping with what is actually within our grasp. The disillusionment bred by the inevitable frustration of such wildly exaggerated hopes seldom produces improvements in the human condition. On the contrary, it often leads to apathy and indifference which allow self-seeking cliques to convert social goods to their private advantage. . . ."[22] Kaufman is

[21] Kaufman, "The Direction of Organizational Evolution," *Public Administrative Review*, XXXIII (July/August 1973), 307. Note that in our discussion we are assuming that it is the proponents of the managerial approach and not necessarily the administrators themselves who suffer from this malady.

[22] *Ibid.*

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concerned with the general limits to organizational change. But no comment could better characterize the frame of mind of many of the administrators and social workers with whom we have talked in our study of the family planning program in Uttar Pradesh. There have always been highly dedicated, energetic, and imaginative administrators and social workers in the program; and even the average member of the program brings some good will to his or her work. Yet, much of this energy and good will is dissipated in the daily confrontation with unrealistic expectations and goals.

II. A Synthesis

In the first part of this paper, we argued that the general literature on organizational issues in family planning was unsystematic and normative, and that the management approach, while representing a considerable improvement, still remains narrow in focus. As a result, the literature neither explains the gap between plan and implementation nor deals with the crucial connection between the client's behavior and the organizational efforts to change that behavior. In the present section, we will first introduce some analytic distinctions to facilitate the discussion of the goal-oriented family planning program activities, and subsequently describe the basic elements of an organizational analysis that provides the necessary connection. The examples presented are taken from the Indian context and in particular from our research in Uttar Pradesh; they should, however, reflect the trends that occur in other situations as well.

Following Lawrence and Lorsch, we define an organization as "the coordination of different activities of individual contributors to carry out planned transactions with the environment."[23] Family planning programs and subprograms thus consist of the interrelated behavior of all the people involved in a program and the systems of coordination which interrelate that behavior. Two elements in this definition merit preliminary emphasis. First, the term "activities" includes a variety of behavior. For our purposes, the most important distinction is between the organizing activities and the transactions with the client population. This distinction will presently be described in greater length. Second, the definition stresses the environment—that part of the world external to the activities that are carried out by the organization itself. We will also elaborate on the relationship between environmental factors and organizational behavior.

[23] Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, *Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action* (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley 1969), 3.

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FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM ACTIVITIES: ANALYTIC DISTINCTIONS

In order to differentiate among the goal-oriented activities that characterize organizations charged with family planning, we distinguish between the organizing and the client-oriented dimensions. Home visits by extension workers or the direct provision of contraceptive services by medical or paramedical personnel, for example, are program functions that can be unambiguously classified as client-oriented. These contacts with the clients form the most obvious and central element in family planning programs, but they represent only a fraction of the total activity which takes place. A second major type of program activity refers to what we wish to call "organizing"[24] for transactions with the client population. Supervision, reporting, evaluation, and personnel management are examples of this organizing dimension. Very often the same personnel may be involved both in the organizing and the client-oriented dimension. For example, the doctor in the clinic providing contraceptive services to clients may also supervise the extension staff who are expected to tour the villages to persuade clients to adopt a form of contraception.

Within the organizing and the client-oriented dimensions we distinguish further between those activities which are planned and those which are observed. It is a truism that there is a wide gap between plan and implementation in almost all spheres of human life, and especially in the case of government programs in developing countries. In the area of family planning, that gap may be enormous. For example, policy makers at higher levels routinely assume that workers can accomplish a much larger number of client transactions of superior quality than are observed empirically. Similarly, job descriptions often detail requirements that cannot be met by the applicants available for positions.

Taking these distinctions into account, the following four analytic constructs emerge.

[24] The term is chosen in preference to the more general term "organizational" because it puts emphasis on the process, and because the latter term would be equally applicable to the client-oriented activities undertaken by the organization. We will use the term "organizational" to refer to those general aspects of family planning programs that may include both organizing and client transactions. The term "management" is close in its meaning, but we have chosen to avoid it because of the relatively narrow range of meaning it has been given in the literature. The distinction between "organizing" and "client-oriented" is not used in the literature, but is consistent with Katz and Kahn's well-known taxonomy. See Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley and Sons 1966).

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	PLAN OR STRATEGY	OBSERVED BEHAVIOR
ORGANIZING DIMENSION	1. Organizing Strategy	2. Observed Organizing Activity
CLIENT-ORIENTED DIMENSION	3. Strategy for Client Transactions	4. Observed Client Transactions

First, there is the *organizing strategy*, the plan which policy makers and administrators in family planning programs use to describe the intended organization of program activities. Intended patterns of supervision, reporting, and personnel management are examples that have already been cited. Second, there is the *observed organizing activity* of the program—i.e., the actual patterns of supervision, reporting, and personnel management that are observed in the field. In an ideal program, these first two categories should correspond closely. Third, there is a plan or *strategy for client transactions* undertaken by the program. For example, the program may adopt a strategy of using a field motivation staff working through potential mothers to encourage the use of contraceptives. Other possible strategies for client transactions would involve plans to use commercial distribution channels, canvasser systems, or static clinics as means of encouraging changes in fertility or contraceptive behavior. The fourth category is that of *observed client transactions*—i.e., the actual transactions which take place between the program and the clients. Ideally, as in the case of organizing activities, observed client transactions would correspond closely with planned client transactions; in the real world they may differ.

One of the conditions for effective family planning work is that there be some congruence between the organizing dimension and the client-oriented dimension. For example, if the strategy for client transactions is based on an extension approach where field-workers are expected to have an intimate acquaintance with the local population, an organizing strategy based on frequent staff turnover would be highly inappropriate. In the past, questions relating to strategies for dealing with clients have received the major share of attention in the discussion of family planning. To the extent that there is a literature on organizing strategies, it has largely failed to incorporate either an

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adequate recognition of the organizational implications of the client dimension or an understanding of the existing organizational capabilities within the system.

ELEMENTS IN AN OPEN-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS

Client transactions and organizing are two analytically separate, though empirically related activities undertaken by organizations charged with family planning. This distinction imposes some analytic order upon the overwhelming mass of events which occur in government programs designed to limit fertility. But more than this distinction is needed to develop an organizational perspective on family planning programs which will help us understand why the transition from planning to implementation has been so inadequate. We prefer the open-systems approach to the study of organization because it emphasizes the dynamic interrelationships and dependencies between an organization and its environment. In this section, we will outline some of the most basic elements in such an open-systems analysis of family planning. We will place particular emphasis upon some of the environmental factors, since they have traditionally been ignored.

The open-systems perspective leads us to distinguish between two sets of factors. First, there are factors external to the organization which can be collectively termed "environment." Second, there are the internal organizational processes which in turn form a system in and of themselves. Ultimately we need to understand the complex interdependencies between the organization and its environment, but preliminary to this is the task of defining the boundaries and the key components of the environment and the organization itself. The definition of an organization's boundary is considered to be a difficult conceptual and empirical problem in any circumstance;[25] in the case of family planning, it is a particularly intricate venture.

If we define a family planning program as a set of activities designed to change the fertility behavior of the client population, then it is relatively rare that a family planning program is based in a separate organization. More commonly, the program is anchored in a health agency, with important functions dispersed over a number of other related agencies. Thus, there may be no single organization charged with family planning. In such cases, the identification of what we label the "focal organization," that is, the organization which carries the major

[25] Lawrence and Lorsch (fn. 23), 16, point out that this is due to the fact that organizations can modify their own structure. As a result, specific elements, agencies, or units may be part of the organization at one time and outside of it at another.

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responsibility for family planning, and as a result is the focus of the organizational analysis, becomes imperative.

The Indian case provides a good illustration of these intricate organizational relationships. In India, primary responsibility for family planning rests with a complicated medical, health, and family planning bureaucracy. This consists at the state level of the Ministry of Health; the Secretariat (Secretary, Medical, Health and Family Planning Services plus Additional, Deputy, and Joint Secretaries), responsible for overall policy formulation; and the Directorate of Medical and Health Services (Director plus Additional, Deputy, and Joint Directors, and the State Family Planning Bureau as one of its sectional offices within the Directorate), responsible for implementation. At the district level, there is a Chief Medical Officer of Health with three Deputies, one each for medical aspects, health, and family planning. Under their supervision fall the primary health centers with their family planning and health staffs.[26] Responsibilities for family planning have also been assigned, however, to other departments such as revenue and planning which, although part of the wider bureaucratic set-up, are distinct from health and family planning. They have their own lines of authority, hierarchy, channels of communication, and control.

Thus, there is no organization in India with exclusive responsibility for family planning. Since the medical and health bureaucracy carries the major burden of the family planning task, it seems logical to make it the focal organization of the analysis. The revenue and planning departments, without which the discussion of family planning would be incomplete, are then part of a range of environmental factors which affect the functioning of the focal organization. Having identified what unit should be at the core of the organizational analysis of family planning, we can go on to discuss the internal characteristics of the focal organization as well as the relevant components of its environment. Below we present a brief outline of some of the most relevant factors for such an analysis with reference to the Indian case.

The Focal Organization

Many of the relevant internal characteristics of the focal organization have been discussed in the management literature on family planning. The following section is not intended as a review of all important aspects of the focal organization itself. Rather, its purpose is to establish that the range of considerations important to the internal function-

[26] This is the district pattern for Uttar Pradesh. There is a good deal of statewide variation in the pattern.

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ing of the organization is broader and the complexity greater than usually implied in the management literature. We discuss these elements under the categories of bureaucratic culture, structural factors, and process variables.

In considering the internal characteristics of the focal organization, the importance of *bureaucratic culture* should be stressed. Most family planning programs are placed into an ongoing organizational context; even if a new organizational framework is created, bureaucratic personnel from other government programs are frequently employed. As a result, the existing bureaucratic traditions and patterns of behavior are perpetuated. If we are to understand the functioning of the Indian bureaucracy, we must be concerned with bureaucratic culture—that is, with the entrenched patterns of thought and action of the personnel in these institutions. In the Indian case, for example, we should recognize the origin of the bureaucracy as the agent of British colonial administration. This origin explains much of the Indian bureaucracy's consequent emphasis on law and order. Concomitant with the focus on law and order are certain other orientations which may not be appropriate for change agents. A revenue agent, for example, is concerned with enforcement of existing law; he is not nearly as involved in the process of persuading others to change their behavior. He may have a heavy preoccupation with paper work rather than with activities directed toward the field. Although such a negative impact is not inevitable, a law-and-order orientation can reduce an organization's capacity to introduce voluntary change.[27]

The term *structural factors* refers to the differentiation and patterning of relationships within the organization. One important structural factor, for example, is the level of centralization and decentralization within the organization[28]—in other words, the consistency with which responsibilities and duties are distributed and lines of authority arranged. To illustrate, in Uttar Pradesh several state officials have independent and overlapping authority over lower-level staff, with the result that subordinate staff frequently receive conflicting instructions.

By *process variables*, we mean the behavioral dimension of the organization, including the relationships among colleagues and supervisors and subordinates, as well as the amount of work performed by individuals within the organization. The type of supervisory support

[27] J. D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1967), 51.

[28] Jason L. Finkle, "The Political Environment of Population Control in India and Pakistan," in Richard Clinton and others, *Political Science in Population Studies* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 1972), 101-28.

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and encouragement received by the lower-level staff is particularly crucial in a family planning program whose major task is defined in terms of the contact between client and field-worker. One important finding that emerged from our fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh was that members of the field staff do not work as much as expected. Many do not work more than two or three hours a day. An understanding of the organizational process, and in particular of the linkages between supervisors and subordinates, should provide important insights into the causes for such low work inputs. In view of the importance of assessing organizational capabilities, it should hardly be necessary to underscore the relevance of low work inputs to program performance. When programs are designed and basic personnel needs determined, certain assumptions are made—either explicitly or implicitly—about the amount of work that individuals at various levels in the organization will put into their jobs. If these basic assumptions are unrealistic, program goals cannot be attained.

At several points in the above discussion, we pointed to a range of expectations built into family planning programs which are contrary to existing patterns of bureaucratic behavior. Field-workers are conceptualized as highly motivated and efficient, supervisors and higher-level officials as supportive, and so forth. The assumption is that the organization has the capacity to accomplish established goals. When goals are *not* achieved, the blame is promptly placed on the client, or on the laziness of the field-worker. Most of the time, however, the root of the problem is much closer to the planner than has been assumed. In many cases, plans have not been translated into effective development action because they did not incorporate a concern for the bureaucratic realities. It is true that the bureaucracy moves and action occurs. People have been hired and paid, vehicles and buildings provided and occupied, government circulars and orders passed from higher to lower levels. However, the sum total of these activities does not add up to the type of development effort in the field that was intended by the planners—because of a breakdown in the chain of events between the formulation of plans for client transactions and the actual implementation of those plans in the field.

The Environment of the Focal Organization

Here we need to distinguish between (1) the task environment and (2) the general environmental conditions.

1. *Task environment* refers to "those parts of the environment which

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are relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment."[29] For our purposes, the task environment can be divided into the *client sector* and the set of groups and agencies which significantly affect the work of the organization. We will term this latter, residual set *environmental sectors*.

The *client sector* consists of the actual or potential clients of the program and the social system and culture to which they belong. It is of course the client sector with which the anthropologists and communications experts are usually concerned. However, here we are interested in the client from a different perspective. We are not asking how the change agent influences the client; we are asking, instead, how the client influences the change agent, and what consequences this interaction has on the change agent's ability to carry out his work. The two perspectives are clearly related: they form the client-change agent interface where the ultimate test of the program occurs. Much of the logic of the various strategies for client transactions rests upon face-to-face communication between the client and the change agent. The nature of the client and his response to the change agent will affect the motivation and the work patterns of extension workers. For example, a dispersed population will require different work patterns than a population which is easily accessible. The client's response also has important implications. Family planning workers in Uttar Pradesh, for example, are often confronted with feelings of such marked hostility among the village population that the face-to-face contact never really comes about. Wherever client hostility toward the program is strong, we may expect negative repercussions upon the change agent's ability to perform. Workers who have to cope with hostility in the field are much more likely to be negligent in their duties and to avoid fieldwork than those who face a more receptive environment. They require correspondingly more support and supervision from their organization. As a rule, then, the work of the change agent and the demands on the organization are greatly affected by the nature of the task environment, i.e., social structure, geographical distribution of the population, health status, etc.

Environmental sectors are groups or agencies other than the focal organization itself, which exert an influence upon the functioning of that organization. The revenue and planning departments which were

[29] Thompson (fn. 27), 27, derives the term from W. R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," *American Sociological Quarterly*, XXIII (March 1958), 409-43. Our use of general environmental conditions as an independent factor departs somewhat from Thompson's and Dill's usage, but is in general consistent with the spirit of their definition.

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discussed above in connection with the definition of the boundary of the focal organization are examples of environmental sectors. These departments play an important role in family planning because their field staffs have been given responsibility for conducting client transactions. The staff of the revenue and planning agencies have a work style which is distinct from that of the health and family planning workers and is based upon a special relationship with the client population. The revenue worker, for example, is an important, and often feared, local influential. He is in charge of keeping land records, and thus exerts considerable control over the most fundamental resource of the villagers. There have been reports that the revenue worker's power has occasionally been misused to coerce clients into adopting family planning. Such coercion may be limited to a few revenue workers and may not extend to the regular family planning staff or to the agricultural development personnel. Nonetheless, its impact on the entire program can be significant. Coercion, even if applied by only a few workers, can damage the reputation of the program itself and seriously constrain the ability of others to work among the rural population.

Another significant issue relates to the status of the environmental sectors and the focal organization. It should be apparent that a good deal of coordination is required to render the family planning work of both focal organization and environmental sectors effective. Such coordination should come from the medical and health department, i.e., from the focal organization, in view of its key position. However, for a number of reasons, the latter has less status within the Indian bureaucracy than the more established revenue and planning departments. This fact, in and of itself, may seriously impair the ability of the focal organization to accomplish the task of coordination.

Other possible environmental sectors of importance to the family planning program are private practitioners (traditional as well as Western), medical associations, political groups, and any other organizations which can either support or undermine the organization's ability to reach its goals. For example, the degree and type of support that political and local leaders give to family planning programs may be one of the most crucial determinants of the program's success. There has been some concern regarding the commitment of higher-level politicians and leaders.[30] One might argue that political leaders give these programs low priority in political platforms because family

[30] Robert E. Elder, Jr., *Development Administration in a North Indian State: The Family Planning Program in Uttar Pradesh*, Monograph 18 (Chapel Hill: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina 1972).

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planning is not a critically felt need among the population. In fact, in an ethnically or religiously diverse society where family planning programs may be regarded as an instrument by which one group or community hopes to suppress another, political leaders may be latently or even openly hostile. Furthermore, although the ultimate goal of family limitation may have low salience, political leaders are highly interested in the side benefits which flow from the existence of family planning programs. Particularly in backward regions characterized by widespread unemployment, such programs generally create numerous employment opportunities which may provide political leaders with important job payoffs for loyal followers. We may also note in passing that the influence of political leaders and other environmental sectors is felt at various levels within the program. The interest of political leaders in the staff recruitment process or in the location of clinics, for example, is felt at the district or even the state level. Besides political leaders, other groups—private and government doctors, business organizations, town and village leaders, religious associations—may have particular interests, personal prejudices, or location preferences regarding family planning programs.[31]

2. By *general environmental conditions*[32] we mean the economic, social, political, and cultural factors that affect family planning programs. The poverty and deprivation which prevail in most underdeveloped countries, for example, act as a major constraint upon the ability of such programs to function effectively. Under such conditions, personnel are very concerned with job security; they are tempted to take multiple jobs when possible, and they are open to various forms of corruption. Moreover, there may be severe difficulties in attracting a competent medical and administrative staff. It is one thing to stipulate in the program design that dedicated, experienced, versatile people be recruited; it is quite another to find such people among the applicants for family planning positions. Thus, there is a hiatus between plan and implementation.

Cultural values and norms are another set of external influences which have to be taken into account in order to understand some of the handicaps under which family planning programs have to function. Since as a rule only females can contact women in the target

[31] Anil Bhatt, *The Location of a Primary Health Centre in Kekawada: A Case Study* (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration 1968).

[32] It should be indicated that there is a considerable amount of overlap between the categories of general environmental conditions and the task environment. The distinction holds, however, since general environmental conditions are conceptualized at a more general level of analysis. They include a broader perspective than the client sector (which only incorporates couples within the reproductive age group) and the environmental sector (which only refers to groups and agencies affecting the organization).

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population, many family planning programs rely heavily upon female personnel. However, women play a fairly orthodox role in many of the countries of the Third World: it is felt that women should be well protected and sheltered. Thus, female workers who have to move about from one village to another are likely to be considered immoral. Where these values prevail, it is often difficult to find women who are willing to do fieldwork in family planning. A thorough understanding of the cultural norms relating to the role of women in the society appears to be a necessary condition for designing effective family planning programs.

The above constitutes merely the briefest sketch of what should be the important concerns in an examination of the relationship between environmental factors and the focal organization. The influence of the *task environment and the general environmental conditions upon the* focal organization has generally been ignored in the existing literature on family planning. Only if we understand the relationships between all the agencies involved in family planning, as well as their ways of carrying out client transactions, are we likely to understand the behavior of the client and the barriers which prevent plans from being translated into action.

III. Implications for Policy Formation

In previous sections we have emphasized that, in a situation where many complex environmental forces affect organizational performance, an open-systems model of organization is particularly appropriate. In the present section we want to raise questions concerning family planning policies. One important assumption underlying much of the existing thought is that the policy dimension of family planning programs is sound, but that policies have not been implemented. The implication is that one should work on improving the quality of the implementation. However, it might also be argued that the policies or plans themselves are inappropriate. This in turn raises the question of what constitutes a "good" policy or plan. Using the analytic distinctions introduced earlier, we would argue that good policies in family planning are those that exhibit at least some congruence between the organizing strategy and the strategy for client transactions. Client strategies are appropriate if they are based upon the fullest possible appreciation of the sociopsychological and cultural context within which fertility decisions are made. Organizational strategies are appropriate if they are based upon the fullest appreciation of the organizational context within which such strategies are to be implemented.

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It follows that, if effective action is to occur in family planning, a concern for organizational capacity will have to be integrated into the planning and decision-making processes.[33] Not only does one have to be concerned with what are feasible strategies for influencing the client; one also has to ask whether the system has the organizational capacity to translate this strategy into actual, ongoing organizational behavior and into actual transactions with the client. In order to arrive at a family planning policy that complies with the above criteria, the policy formation process would have to go through the phases of (1) listing and rank-ordering of appropriate client strategies, and (2) listing of corresponding organizational strategies. Each of these organizational strategies should not only match a given client strategy, but should also indicate to what extent the organizational capacity to implement it currently exists or could be built up in the future. These relationships are outlined in the diagram presented below.



FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM COMPONENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

[33] Nicholas J. Demerath, "Can India Reduce Its Birth Rate? A Question of Modernization and Governmental Capacity," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIII, No. 4 (1967), 179-94, presents a similar argument.

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At present, the standard procedure is to make independent plans for client transactions and for organizing. Organizational constraints scarcely enter into the primary decision-making process; to the extent they are considered, the resulting organizational strategies are based upon inadequate or nonexistent empirical foundations. It is our feeling that without a thorough (and presumably empirically-based) treatment of organizational constraints in the initial decision-making process, development programs are likely to continue to fail.

To illustrate, let us assume that planners are faced with a choice between two alternative client-centered strategies, *A* and *B*. Strategy *A* is likely to be very successful with the client. However, a realistic assessment of its organizational implications reveals that this strategy would impose high organizational costs. In fact, the organizational capability of implementing this strategy simply does not exist in the present system. Strategy *B*, on the other hand, while less ideal from the point of view of overcoming client resistance, is less exacting in terms of the organizational burden which it imposes upon the bureaucracy. With the help of some organizational restructuring it stands a fair chance of being implemented. If policy choices are made entirely according to the criterion of what works best with the client, strategy *A* will be adopted. If a concern for organizational feasibility is added, the conclusion will be to adopt strategy *B*.

A practical illustration may further clarify this point. It has been suggested that traditional midwives (*dais*) be recruited as change agents for family planning programs. The suggestion has much inherent value in terms of overcoming client resistance to family planning. Because of their function in child delivery and maternal and infant care, traditional midwives are trusted by and influential with a wide section of the rural population. In this regard they stand in contrast to the average professional change agent in family planning programs. Are these reasons sufficiently compelling to warrant the large-scale absorption of traditional midwives into ongoing family planning programs? Certainly, most policy makers would feel that once questions concerning the client-midwife interface have been satisfactorily answered, everything is known that needs to be known in order to make a policy decision. Our approach would suggest that the midwife-organization interface needs to be examined before a final decision can be made. For example, one would have to consider the organization's capacity to provide adequate supervision of midwives and maintain effective communication between midwives and other members of the organization. Where midwives hold low social status, severe communication barriers are likely to exist. Unless such barriers can be

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overcome, it may not be appropriate to recruit *dais* into the program or to involve them in a traditional bureaucracy. The mere hiring of *dais* does not accomplish anything; there has to be a good deal of certainty that program goals and techniques can be effectively communicated and work procedures enforced.

As a second example, let us consider the case of a program which places heavy emphasis on the use of extension workers operating from disparate subcenters. The client strategy is to use these workers to inform and motivate the dispersed village population. A central problem is to assure that the extension staff are actually doing the hard work of visiting families in the villages. What is the appropriate organizing strategy? Clearly, the field staff need either supervision or a reward system that will reinforce their motivation. There may be more than one way of ensuring that result. In this case, for example, a system of incentives or a system of very supportive supervision might both be effective. In Uttar Pradesh, however, one tends to observe a supervisory structure that places the greatest responsibility on the medical officer of the clinic, a man who generally is so preoccupied with other important responsibilities that he has little time or interest for his supervisory functions. In such a case, the lack of congruence between client strategy and organizing strategy inhibits the effectiveness of the program.

Another important aspect of organizational capacity which should be considered at the planning stage is the identification of the particular organizational arrangements that are most conducive to successful implementation. The organizational capacity required to implement a particular strategy may exist only at certain points within the organization. For example, a particular program may stand a chance of being implemented if it is placed within a separate and autonomous agency, but not if it is tagged onto an ongoing department. In another situation it may be necessary to involve certain types of officials in a systematic manner in order to assure the success of a program. The policy maker who has an intimate knowledge of an organization's culture, structure, and processes, and an understanding of the existing environmental influences, will be able to utilize that system in the best possible manner for his particular objectives. He may not only want to use the system or part of it as it exists, but may also decide that a change in the organization is necessary and possible for strengthening its present capacity. A comprehensive understanding of the existing organizational system is an absolutely essential requirement to the successful introduction of changes within the system. The policy maker

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therefore not only has the responsibility of developing plans that consider the existing organizational capacity, but also of introducing changes that could strengthen the organization and bring it up to its maximum capabilities for carrying out specific transactions.

IV. Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that there are serious organizational barriers which prevent family planning programs from being more successful. Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that the organizational capacity required to mobilize for the desired client transactions simply does not exist in developing countries such as India. This does not mean, however, that the status quo in family planning will have to continue. Within political systems, one can try to increase the organizational capacity to translate policies into action, or one can devise policies which recognize organizational constraints. In order to accomplish either or both of these objectives, a fresh approach to both action and research is necessary.

Extensive empirical investigation into organizational structure, process, culture, behavior, and environment will be necessary in order to develop effective family planning programs. Although the present discussion has been theoretical, many of the propositions can be empirically verified. The measurement of the output from family planning programs is a controversial subject, yet few would argue that such measurement is impossible. Similarly, many of the characteristics of organizations and their environments are measurable. Thus, it should be possible to explore the extent to which performance is associated with the manner in which family planning activities are conducted or the extent to which they are affected by the nature of the various environments they face. In the examination of particular programs, two types of empirical verification are relevant. First, since many general environmental conditions, such as the prevalence of poverty, the bureaucratic culture, or the social norms in the task environment, may affect the entire program under study, it may be necessary to take a case-study approach. Second, despite the prevalence of a set of general conditions affecting the program as a whole, there may be sufficient variation in performance and in organizational characteristics or environmental conditions from one subunit to another to permit the direct testing of some selected hypotheses.

A broad-based approach to the study of family planning performance would require time, skill, and the commitment to face organizational realities without escaping to normative assumptions. Inquiries

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would have to be conducted on both a short- and a long-term basis; they would not necessarily mean that implementation has to be delayed pending the availability of research results. Although some long-term research is necessary, there is a good deal of existing information which could usefully be interpreted within the conceptual framework that asks questions about organizational capacity. The main barrier is not so much a lack of information as a lack of willingness to take organizational capacity into account.

In conclusion, we may point to some further implications of our approach by illustrating its relevance to the understanding of pilot projects, massive vasectomy camps, and the direction in which policy will have to move. Using the conceptual language developed in this paper, we may say that pilot projects have generally been designed to test strategies for dealing with the client population; for this purpose they are a useful device. However, because of the unusual combination of organizational resources employed in pilot projects—Ph.D.'s, other highly trained and highly motivated specialists, administrators, and change agents; adequate physical resources and equipment, decentralized decision making and autonomy, etc.—they are no test of the organizational capacity that exists within the program at large. This explains why client strategies which have been tested and found workable in pilot projects have generally not led to the expected success when introduced into the general program; the general program, after all, does not command the same organizational resources that are employed in a pilot project.

A similar condition prevails with regard to the massive vasectomy camps used in India. These camps constitute a major organizational innovation in which the combined energies of high-level officials, politicians, administrators, doctors, statisticians, and social workers, as well as an extraordinary array of physical resources and equipment, are gathered from all over a state to a particular division of a district for a limited period of time. In spite of a few lapses, the overall results of the first experiences with these camps were impressive. However, when the camp approach was instituted on a regular basis with the expectation that each district or division would at least have one major camp per year, serious problems developed, and the camp approach was ultimately abandoned. From the vantage point of our theoretical perspective it is quite obvious why the camp approach was unworkable once it was generalized. The highly concentrated organizational energies required could simply not be sustained on a regular basis. A handful of senior state officials and many of the state's medical and statistical

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personnel were expected to move on from one major camp to another, sustaining a high level of organization and vigilance. Many of the difficulties that developed in connection with the camp approach are generally attributed to problems arising from the large incentives which were paid to those who adopted sterilization and to those who recruited them. That is, a client-oriented dimension was blamed for the difficulties that were encountered. From the vantage point of our conceptual framework, we would argue that the organizing strategy implicit in the camp approach placed a heavy burden upon the existing organizational capacity and was at least equally responsible for these difficulties.

Once the treatment of organizational factors moves from the normative to the empirical realm, it becomes apparent that many family planning strategies would tax organizational capacities beyond present limits. Thus, rather than attempting to put into operation what cannot succeed, policy makers and experts might begin to search for ways of influencing population growth that place fewer organizational demands upon the government bureaucracy. These efforts might well lead away from approaches that require extensive networks of government employees whose function it is to contact individual clients, and point toward alternative delivery systems and ways of producing the desired reductions in family size among the population. Alternatively, policy makers should be prepared to allocate the scarce organizational resources that can assure the success of the chosen strategy for client transactions.

One example of a family planning strategy that does not tax the organizational capacity of the government excessively is the Nirodh Marketing Scheme in India. This scheme provides for the distribution of condoms at a subsidized rate through the distribution channels of six leading marketing companies in India. While at the highest level this scheme is part of the official Indian family planning program, it almost exclusively uses the organizational infrastructure of existing, well run, private companies. Condoms are sold through these companies at small tea stalls and shops in cities and towns. The organizational contribution required from the governmental bureaucracy is minimal: one person at the central level acts as general monitor and provides the linkages between government and private companies. Quite unnoticed among the many other ventures of the Indian family planning program, the Nirodh Marketing Scheme is registering an encouraging success with its steadily rising sales figures. One of the lessons to be drawn from the Nirodh experience is that policy makers

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should assess the capabilities of existing organizational frameworks and be willing to use institutions or agencies with the highest organizational capacities even though they may be located outside the governmental structure. The government is often in a better position to give subsidies and provide funds than to assume full organizational responsibility for a given scheme. Also implied is the lesson that planners should make an effort to locate organizational capacities in *existing* institutions rather than automatically assume that *new* organizational structures have to be established.

The Nirodh Marketing Scheme is one indication of where possible solutions may lie. Obviously, the market mechanism cannot provide all the answers to the complex problems of family planning. Once there is a willingness, however, to raise questions about organizational capacity and the organizational determinants of family planning, new directions should emerge. These new directions may imply a reassessment either of what client strategies are feasible within the context of existing organizational constraints, or they may point to ways in which the organizing task can be approached to accomplish its chosen ends more effectively.

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Retrospective Note

PLURALISM, THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS, AND THE WORLD SYSTEM

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX*

WHEN *World Politics* began publication in 1948, two very different schools of thought were reshaping the academic study of international relations. One school, led by Charles E. Merriam and his colleagues at the University of Chicago, had its roots in homegrown American political science, in pluralist pragmatism, and in an abiding faith in the power of the human intellect gradually to create a better world.[1] This essay assesses the impact of the Chicago school on the study of world politics. The other school, that of the political realists, had roots outside political science, and mostly in Europe. The realists were far less confident that "scientific man" could harness the tides of history.[2] Theirs is commonly but inaccurately described as *the* traditional approach to world politics. Together, the two schools give the lie to excessive claims of novelty by today's behavorists and excessive attribution of "tradition" to yesterday's realists, but these are minor matters.

With the Chicago school in the vanguard, students of politics in the interwar period had been coming to see their task as the pluralistic study of whatever groups participated in the political process. Politics, groups, process, power, and behavior were pushing aside states, governments, sovereignty, public law, and institutions as organizing concepts of political science. "International relations"—in reality inter-state relations—in this perspective expanded to become "world politics."

In *Systematic Politics*,[3] Merriam's summing-up of a lifetime of reflection about political science, international relations are discussed in a

* A revised version of a paper prepared for the American Political Science Association's 19th Annual Meeting as one of several marking the centennial year of the birth of Charles E. Merriam and appraising his pivotal role in the development of political science.

[1] On Merriam's work more generally, see Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1974).

[2] See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1946), and the careful and sympathetic evaluation of the work of the most influential members of the realist school in Kenneth W. Thompson's *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960).

[3] Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1945).

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chapter entitled "The Interrelations of Political Associations," and considered as a subdivision of a subdivision of political science. Nation-states, in this view, are only one class of associations to be related to each other and to various sub-, trans- and supranational associations. Merriam's *The Making of Citizens*,[4] a comparative analysis of a series of national studies in civic education, illuminated the relation of sub-national associations to the national association called the state. "Trans-national relations," "nation building" and "political socialization" were as familiar to students of world politics of the Chicago school in the 1930's as they are to political scientists generally in the 1970's, though not always by the same names.

I

In 1925, when Merriam's first full-scale redefinition of the study of politics appeared in print,[5] the academic study of international relations had a distinctly "international government" cast. Parsing the Covenant of the League of Nations was a congenial exercise for professors trained to teach American government as American public law. Few had the vision of political science or the grasp of European diplomatic history necessary to teach international relations any other way. At the University of Chicago, however, the Merriam paradigm was quickly reflected in both teaching and research. Frederick L. Schuman was soon teaching a pioneering undergraduate course in world politics, and producing what was to become a standard text.[6] In the early 1930's, Harold D. Lasswell's lectures on "Psychology of International Relations" offered a preview of his masterful *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*.[7] For his students at least, the idea of keeping separate the study of domestic and international politics was no longer a valid one. Finally, Quincy Wright's massive and multidisciplinary study of the causes of war burst the confines of a law- and organization-oriented study of international relations.[8]

World politics resembled metropolitan politics, in the study of which the Chicago political scientists were heavily engaged: both are politics in the absence of central authority.[9] "The units of political organization," Merriam wrote in *Prologue to Politics*, "have been put out of

[4] Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1931).
[5] Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (1st ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1925).
[6] Schuman, *International Politics* (1st ed., New York: McGraw-Hill 1933).
[7] Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1935).
[8] Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1942).
[9] Cf. Frederick S. Dunn, "The Scope of International Relations," *World Politics*, 1 (October 1948), 142-46, at 144.

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joint by modern methods of transportation and communication."[10] Unlike those who saw in international organization a panacea for every political evil, he did not, however, leap blindly from discovering that a political problem was outrunning the boundaries of existing governments to the conclusion that power should be centralized over the whole affected area. Overconcentration, he declared, "would itself result in concentrating against the new authority all the disaffected elements of excluded authority."[11] On the other hand, an organic or "seamless web" view of world politics obviates the need for any special study of "linkages" between domestic and international politics, or for any difference in the treatment of state and nonstate actors in world politics.

The process-oriented student does not divide politics into the categories specified by public law. For such a student, states, and particularly nation-states where "nation" and "state" coincide, do remain important. As Merriam observed, "the state is us";[12] indeed, most of the time it is for most of us the most important political "us" to which we think we belong. His pluralist orientation nevertheless forces attention to the many other "us"-es toward which *homo politicus* may feel loyalty and through which he may act in pursuit of his plural political goals. Merriam concluded that in fact, "many of the common distinctions between states and other societies distinguish little on close analysis."[13] The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the smaller group of its Arab members, Black September and the United Jewish Appeal, Exxon Corporation and the United Fruit Company, the Roman Catholic Church and the Third International, the World Council of Churches and the transnational groups to aid victims of political persecution, the Trilateral Commission and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the New York complex of philanthropic foundations and the Paris complex of cultural organizations—all these can be accommodated in a process approach to world politics, as they play their respective roles, great and small.

II

The inclusive pluralist net of the Chicago approach to world politics contrasts sharply with the exclusive simplifying assumptions of other students of politics who employed a power approach to international

[10] Merriam, *Prologue to Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1939), 92.
[11] Merriam, *Political Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1934), 203.
[12] Merriam, *Public and Private Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1944), 16.
[13] *Ibid.*

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relations—for example, Nicholas Spykman and Hans Morgenthau of the realist school, and Raymond Aron. For Spykman there were really only two significant units for power analysis in the world, the Old World and the New World.[14] His was a brilliantly simple model for clarifying Western choice in World War II and the Cold War that came after. It yielded an equally simple prescription: the United States, as the dominant power of the New World, could never afford to have the Old World brought under central management, no matter whose, and must therefore take timely action to preserve the independence of states in the European and Asian Rimlands.

Hans Morgenthau, who was to come to Chicago after most of Merriam's hand-raised *enfants terribles* had left, developed an elegantly simplified concept of power; but it was only the power of states and acts in the rational pursuit of national interest to which he gave attention in his analyses of world politics.[15] On the evidence, Morgenthau spoke to the needs of a whole generation of post-World War II Americans bemused by the grandeur and miseries of what was then called "free-world leadership."

The last of the triad was Raymond Aron, whom Stanley Hoffmann has called "the Montesquieu of international relations." His *Paix et Guerre* was addressed to the historical circumstances of the decade in which it was written.[16] Aron was fully aware that *homo politicus* is a multivalue animal, and that survival is not for every state and under every circumstance the be-all and end-all of foreign policy. He noted that there are both domestic politics and international politics, that there are North-South as well as East-West relations, and that there are many other states than *les deux Grands*, the Soviet and American enemy brothers who cannot make war and cannot make peace. And in his discussion of what he called "praxeology" he moved out of the orbit of power politics altogether.[17] Yet, like Spykman and Morgenthau, Aron was really mainly concerned with strategy and diplomacy in relations among the greatest powers.

Neither Morgenthau nor Aron ever embraced the vulgarities of the true Cold Warriors, or ever prescribed that unwinnable wars in Southeast Asia should be mindlessly protracted; and one may doubt that

[14] Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt Brace 1942).
[15] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (1st ed., New York: Knopf 1948).
[16] Aron, *Paix et Guerre* (Paris: Calmann-Levy 1962). A slightly revised version appeared in English as *Peace and War*, translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday 1966). There is also an abridged edition of the English version in which topical references to the world politics of the 1960's are largely deleted (New York: Anchor Press 1973).
[17] *Ibid.*, pt. IV.

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Spykman, had he lived, would have done so. Yet the politics of Common Market trade barriers, of currency manipulation and Eurodollars, of energy and raw-material scarcity and population redundance, of Third-World demands for improved living standards, of the control of protracted limited war in Southeast and Southwest Asia, and of the rising influence of Japan, China, and India in a relatively autonomous Asian system of politics—none of these are readily fitted into the framework of analysis of the three brilliant simplifiers.

Even less do the pressing political problems of the world of the 1970's fit into the framework of earlier simplifiers. They populated the world stage only with sovereign states, and among them, chiefly the European great powers. As the pluralism of mediaeval Europe gave way to a Europe of divine-right kings and then to a Europe of sovereign nation-states, it was convenient to write as if the world were a world of states. But, as the forces of nationalism, industrialization, democracy, imperialism, and disimperialism have made the European state system into a pluralist world system, where have all the divine-right kings gone? Legal fictions about absolute and indivisible sovereignty seemed plausible only in a particular state system at a particular stage in its development. Merriam concluded that in fact, "there never were unlimited sovereignties in any world of justice and rational order . . . nations never were omnipotent either in fact or in law in their relations with other nations."[18] As a mature political scientist he had little interest in the inherent divisibility or indivisibility of something called sovereignty and very great interest in who in fact was controlling what.

Merriam saw distances shrunken by advances in transportation and communication technology as providing both opportunities and threats to the holders of state power. However strong the ultimate drive for world organization, he realized that

> the prospect of national humiliation or failure may be utilized as the occasion or the pretext for the expansion of the power of those who hold the scepter. . . . Armaments, tariffs, taxes, regulations, and restrictions may flourish as never before, and the burden may be borne not as a private purpose but *pro bono publico*. In this way international relations may become an aid to power holders. . . . The brethren in the family of power at this point may strengthen each other by threatening each other.[19]

On the other hand, it is now apparent that the spread of Western technology eroded the prospects for long-term Western mastery of the

[18] *Public and Private Government* (fn. 12), 29. [19] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 61.

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non-Western world even as it provided the temporary basis for domination.[20] Merriam's pluralist world system required a complex map of social fact with at least four patterns—nation, race, religion, and class—"superimposed upon one another" to make it easier to envision the process by which "in and through these shifting systems the power competitors weave their way."[21] Moreover, he looked to a dynamic future in which the turbulent forces of education and technological advance and the democratic processes of mass politics would alter both the players and the script, in world politics as in domestic politics.

The ostensibly sovereign state was thus merely a contingent unit, important in world and domestic politics only so long as and to the extent that it commanded the loyalty of the citizens. Modern states, Merriam was careful to point out, have successfully overcome one or more of the potentially divisive threats of distance between the center and the circumference, of heterogeneity, of class conflict, and of a powerful church. The nation-state "took over the loyalties and patriotisms attached to previous forms of political association such as the city, the ethnic group, the family and . . . ecclesiastical groupings."[22] What kinds of groups were in competition, collaboration, or uneasy coexistence with the nation-state, and how numerous and effective were they? For pluralist political scientists these are questions for investigation and not merely for speculation.

III

Political power, in the political science of the Chicago school, was ethically neutral and analytically central. For Merriam and his colleagues, the word "power" had none of the tragic, and sometimes evil, overtones of the international relationists' "power politics." Marxists were wrong, he thought, because government was not inherently repressive.[23] He judged the power of governors as good or evil, depending on the uses to which they put it, rather than on the fact of its being exercised.

Merriam considered military power—and in this he would no doubt

[20] Merriam, like most other political scientists of the time, failed to foresee the speed of decolonization and disimperialism. In 1931 he wrote that "the continuing existence of the far-flung empire is a signal proof of the weakness of regionalism in our day" (*The Making of Citizens*, 252). He could not have imagined the creation of a multitude of tiny sovereignties such as those which in 1975 form a majority in the United Nations. Since in most of these states the new governing elites had the job of nation building ahead of them, the nations to be built, he might well have urged, should have been ones with more ample human and material resources.

[21] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 268.

[22] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 263.

[23] *Prologue to Politics* (fn. 10), 63.

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have included nuclear striking power—as ethically neutral, as was every other kind of power in his view. For him, "raw force" was the weakest, costliest, and most transient form of power; he wanted to narrow the gap between violence and intelligence.[24] The shotgun in the closet was far more impressive than the shotgun on the shoulder, and loyalty freely given was stronger and more durable than any kind of coerced obedience. The power whose ethical neutrality he asserted and whose benign use he proclaimed was "civil"-ized power. He saw power outside as well as inside the structures of government—power in industry, in the pulpit, in what we would today call the mass media, and in science (including political science).[25]

"Around the table of power," Merriam wrote, "another brother often sits, or stands perhaps, since he is not always offered a seat: the intellectual, the intelligentsia, science; masters of techniques important to social organization and engineering."[26] The students of politics of his day would have noted with wonder that, even in the anti-intellectual Nixon era, Harvard Ph.D.'s in government and economics were Secretaries of State and Defense, and that the Undersecretary of State, the Ambassador to India, the Supreme Allied Commander (Europe), and the Military Assistant to the President had all earned Ph.D.'s in International Relations.

Through his own experience in Italy during World War I as the American "High Commissioner for Public Information" (a title which left the Italians in some confusion as to whether Merriam or the United States Ambassador provided the better link to Woodrow Wilson), Charles Merriam had become sensitized to the scientific possibilities of symbol manipulation in the control processes of literate societies.[27] He was also sensitive to their potential threat to democratic political processes. For pluralists such as himself, checks against this or any other imprudent use of power, in world politics as in domestic politics, are to be found in the totality of power-sharing arrangements and in the prior inculcation in the power holder of the shared values

[24] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 217. A contrasting view is that of Lt. General Ennis C. Whitehead, who declared in 1951 that "wars are won with power, not brains." Karl W. Deutsch, in his *Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1963), described power as "not having to think," thus equating it with Merriam's "raw force."

[25] *Prologue to Politics* (fn. 10), 59.

[26] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 89.

[27] Thus, to build a world society he saw the need to explore "the possibilities in the direction of international symbolism" (*The Making of Citizens*, 318). Harold D. Lasswell undertook perhaps the first such exploration in the final chapter of his *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*.

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of the society in which he is powerful.[28] Concentrations of power outside government which divorce power from responsibility are, to pragmatic pluralists, as much an object of concern as those inside.[29] Thus, Merriam would clothe public government with powers needed to make private government, including private government beyond the confines of any single nation-state, exercise its powers only in ways consistent with the prevailing norms of political life. In this perspective, the Eurodollar manipulator, the air hijacker, the multinational corporation, the China Lobby, "Mr. Five Per Cent" Gulbenkian, Yasir Arafat, the Third-World market in slightly used arms, and the ocean polluter would none of them escape regulation just because they operated transnationally. So much for constraints on arbitrary power in world politics.

But what, political scientists may ask, are the real possibilities of anyone's mastering future world politics, with its rapid scientific and technological change, its host of new Third-World sovereignties, and its new nonstate actors—and with new demands welling up which do not express themselves in traditional national-security terms? Can they be more than helpless observers whose greatest skill is, with the advantage of hindsight, to make all the unpleasant surprises in world politics retrospectively plausible? Or can they in some way be midwives to a succession of deliberately selected futures and ease the birthpangs of each? In both domestic and world politics the Chicago pluralists' answer was a resounding yes.

IV

The future within mankind's grasp is not whatever future political scientists of good will happen to choose; but neither, in the Merriam view, is it restricted to some one future predicted by a Marx or a Haushofer or a Spengler. Monistic determinisms were to be rejected, both because they were monistic and because they were deterministic.[30]

[28] "The answer is, in part, that the custodians themselves would be checked by their own temperament and training" (*Systematic Politics*, 343). Carl J. Friedrich and Samuel P. Huntington have made the helpful distinction between "objective" control, including self-control, and the "subjective" control which derives from effective power-sharing arrangements. See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957).

[29] On categories of those who call themselves pluralists, and of their respective doctrinal and intellectual positions, see Henry S. Kariel, "Pluralism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 164-69.

[30] See, for example, Merriam's discussion of "Politics in Relation to Inheritance and Environment" in *New Aspects of Politics* (fn. 5), chap. 5. It remained for V. O. Key, Jr., two decades after he left Chicago, to provide an empirical base for, and the fully articulated expression of, his teacher's belief that the processes and choices of politics

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Merriam was sensitive to the feedback relationship between man and his partly man-made environment. In his somewhat Darwinian perspective there could be, and in an era when the shine was bright on the idea of progress there would be, higher forms of social as well as biological organization evolving.[31] "Peace," he wrote, "is not essentially passivity but the highest organization of the highest activities and energies on the highest levels."[32]

The prophet is not overly specific as to the details of life in the promised land, but Charles Merriam never doubted that pluralistic democracies had the greatest evolutionary adaptability. "When democracies plan for a jural order of the world," he wrote, "they are in the line of the logic of their system."[33] The margin of manipulable choice in democratic processes was wide enough, he held, for the jural world order which he asserted to be inevitable in any case to be "attainable in our time."

Merriam confidently predicted an "attainable future" based on "the solid facts of science and technology."[34] The man who rejected the notion that "you can't fight City Hall" embraced the belief that "you can't fight scientific and intellectual advance" and should not, even if you could. This last proposition, however, had a very different meaning for the John Deweys, George Herbert Meads, and Charles E. Merriams than it did for the Herbert Spencers. For the Chicago pragmatists of the Dewey-Mead-Merriam persuasion, the political process offered possibilities of deliberately accelerating change, of modestly helping social evolution do its good work.[35] "There can be little doubt," Merriam wrote, "that, when education and medicine do their perfect

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determine the relative influence of various economic and social "determinants" (H. Douglas Price, "V. O. Key, Jr.," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VIII, 366-68).

[31] "The power of the creative and constructive type," he asserted, "is slowly being ground out with infinite pains and with vast and widespread effort, often with temporary disillusionment" (*Political Power*, 303).

[32] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 277.

[33] *Public and Private Government* (fn. 12), 73.

[34] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 338.

[35] Merriam stood with Dewey and Mead when he wrote: "We cannot assume that man is created wholly by 'environment,' for he is himself a part of it, and he likewise and in some measure creates the environment just as truly as the environment creates him" (*New Aspects of Politics*, 153-54). He was fascinated by the possibilities afforded by advancing biotechnology. Genetic as well as social tinkering might be employed to build a democratic society of well-adjusted personalities, or alternatively the biotechnologist might be used to produce a genetically superior elite and a mass of obedient morons to hew the wood and draw the water (*ibid.*, 146-47). Cf. Harold D. Lasswell's presidential address to the American Political Science Association, "The Political Science of Science," *American Political Science Review*, L (December 1956), 961-79.

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work and produce stabilized personalities of a balanced type, the task of governance will be far lighter than it has been traditionally in the history of mankind."[36] Irrational and unfunctional human intractability would no longer pose problems either for the governed or for their democratically chosen governors.

The benign quasi-determinism of social evolution was, in Merriam's view, bound to bring about a progressive transfer of tasks of government to units operating over the wider areas. Ever larger economic units would in this "more spacious order" ultimately coalesce to form one inevitable unit, mankind. Merriam, however, saw the first steps along the road to world order not in building private organizations of the faithful to press this or that grand design on a less than totally willing world, but in introducing an "international component" into the civic education systems of modern nations, in what we might today call political socialization for world citizenship.[37]

V

The difference between the "grand-design" proponents of world government and the Merriam-style builders of utopias of science and reason is as fundamental as the difference between the Chicago pluralists and the realist-simplifiers.[38] Those who would substitute faith for reason would solve the world's problems, if they would solve them at all, by a single act of world federation. Those, on the other hand, whose faith is really only in reason itself would have political scientists among the leaders in "the permanent revolution of modernizing intellectuals."[39] No Unseen Hand would solve mankind's political problems; but plural interests were seen as harmonizable, even on the world scene.

It was Vannevar Bush who wrote of "science, the endless frontier"; but Merriam would have been proud to accept the phrase as his own.

[36] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 329.

[37] *The Making of Citizens* (fn. 4), 312-15. Merriam did not deal with the problem of introducing the international component on a system-wide basis or the consequences of "internationalizing" civic education in some countries while it remained nationalistic in others.

[38] "For the first time in history," Merriam wrote, "utopias need not be woven from fancy and hope but may be constructed from a wealth of science and reason to show indisputable opportunities lying before mankind at this very hour" (*Systematic Politics*, 339).

[39] The phrase is Harold Lasswell's ("Policy Sciences," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 189). Merriam himself concluded *Political Power* by asserting his basic credo: "The future belongs to those who fuse intelligence with faith, and who with courage and determination grope their way forward from chance to choice, from blind adaptation to creative evolution" (p. 326).

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The inputs into Merriam's vision of the process of social evolution perfected by intelligence were from the whole of science, not just from political science.[40]

Merriam refused to accept periodic general war as cyclically foreordained. Reason, he passionately believed, could be mobilized to break into a system that hitherto has relentlessly fostered holocaust; a virtuous cycle of self-regenerating peace could be made to displace the vicious cycle of recurrent general war. The trend away from brutality and ignorance in power relationships generally could be a trend away from war itself.[41] The trend toward human personality types "conducive to world order"[42] and the trend toward larger-scale economic organization were also portrayed as inevitable.[43]

Projecting this utopia of reason on a global scale, world politics would become, to use current terminology, one gigantic positive-sum game. If, however, only some of mankind is prepared to dream the dreams of reason, the worshippers of Reason and Science must cope with a problem familiar to the grand-design utopians—how to prescribe for the world when there is no "world" to listen.

Apart from "sounder systems of early training," including civic education for world citizenship, what would Charles Merriam as social engineer have prescribed? A first task would be the prudential organization of relevant intelligence.[44] This does not mean knowing

[40] Merriam called for a thorough, systematic, and scientific study of human nature and especially for "more facts about thoughts and feelings." What J. David Singer has taught international relationists to call the level-of-analysis problem and what economists call the micro-macro problem still remain, even after such facts have been gathered, as V. O. Key, Jr., one of the best-known members of the Chicago school, observed. He wrote that it would be "a truly formidable task to build a bridge from observation of the atoms of the political system to the system itself" (Price, fn. 30, 367, quoting from Key, "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV [1960], 60). Key's penetrating critique of survey research in this and other writings just before and after 1960 indicates that he formulated the micro-macro problem much more sharply than Merriam, and indeed more sharply than those who call attention to the level-of-analysis problem without really suggesting how to build bridges between levels.

[41] "The realists know," Merriam wrote, "that brutality is ignorance, violence is relative failure" (*Political Power*, 215). "War," he acknowledges, "may have been, and at times is still, a necessary element . . . [but] its trend is to become unnecessary" (*Systematic Politics*, 277).

[42] "Hate, fear and force are controllable impulses, not to remain masters of our fate," said Merriam while proclaiming "the inexorable trend toward their controlled existence" (*ibid.*, 341).

[43] *Ibid.*, 275.

[44] Lasswell, writing in the 1970's, describes this task as "building a social planetarium," so that the political scientist may step forward experimentally into a range of possible futures and so bring the future to bear on the present. See his essay, "Policy Sciences" (fn. 39), and his *Pre-View of the Policy Sciences* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. 1971).

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everything about everything, but it means clarifying choices in public policy in a longer time perspective and a wider context than can ordinarily be managed by persons with day-to-day responsibility for governance. The main threats to civilization, which Merriam would have described as war and depression, and to which we might today add the population problem with its attendant inundation and decay of the world's great cities, and the technological denudation of the only planet to which mankind at present has access, must somehow be dealt with in time. Furthermore, the awakening of the Orient in world political terms, the abrupt retreat of Western imperialism, the irruption of the military into political power across half the globe—all these place greater loads on the world political process than it has previously borne.

VI

Like his pragmatist philosopher-colleagues Dewey and Mead, Charles Merriam was concerned more with intermediate links in the means-ends chain than with ultimate ends.[45] He certainly did not believe that judgments about maximum social utility were to be read directly from propositions about ultimate ends.

Merriam did refer repeatedly to freedom, dignity, participation, and self-realization as attributes of his utopia of reason, and therefore presumably of his "jural world order." But, singly or in combination, they provided no precise yardsticks for measuring "relative goodness" among policy alternatives. When the promotion of one value appeared to involve some cost in terms of another, Merriam was willing to rely on the prevailing canons of judgment. Thus, he wrote of "the relativity of values to their working utility at a given time and place."[46]

Responsible and responsive statesmen in Merriam's utopia of science and reason would act on the basis of the kind of intelligence which social science and especially political science—policy science in the Lasswell terminology—provide to clarify the statesman's choice. The key word here is "clarify," for the statesman cannot choose intelligently without knowledge of the true effects of any proposed intervention in the social process.

With interests harmonized, personalities adjusted, and crosscutting nonethnic and nonterritorial associations made politically effective,

[45] Lasswell refers to the "partial moratorium among political scientists on 'normative controversy'" in "The Cross-Disciplinary Manifold: The Chicago Prototype," an essay in *The Search for World Order*, edited by A. Lepawsky, E. Buehrig, and H. D. Lasswell (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1971).

[46] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 284.

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governance both among and within states might become easy and tolerable. In a world of shared power, as in a domestic polity of shared power, the distinctions between the leadership and the led would be much less significant.

Leaders of the nation-states would no longer be preoccupied with problems of national security. With all-around security assured in a world of shared power, an amiable and enlightened competition among the advocates of alternative policies might well yield policies that would greatly increase the stockpile of things valuable enough for politics to allocate. That would, however, require that political scientists in cooperation with other scientists identify the human and material resources that can be released—by lessened arms competition, by a more rational division of labor, by better and more education and, more generally, by "the elimination of social waste through unnecessary friction, misunderstanding and misdirection."[47]

Power in world politics is already geographically dispersed and is becoming more so. This pattern, by frustrating the ambitions of successive modern aspirants to hegemony in our formerly Western but now worldwide state system, has produced a species of security.

For most states most of the time it has provided security of state survival, but it has not protected them from war or the threat of war. The system's record on this latter score is unimpressive; it is also unimpressive if one asks what kind of justice, what kind of peace, what kind of protection from pollution and the exhaustion of scarce resources, and what kind of plenty it has produced. When Charles Merriam wrote of new forms of political association on the world scene, he seemed to be saying that there should be a functional as well as a geographic dispersion of power to correspond to functional as well as geographic special interests. He foresaw "the proliferation of innumerable forms of association, in number and variety such as the world never has seen before" and declared: "There is room for and there will be many governments, public and private, in the pluralistic society into which we come."[48] Referring perhaps to what, in the 1970's, we call multinational corporations, he wrote in 1931 of "great industrial concentrations of an international nature." "Quiet changes," he continued, "at this point are forcing a revolution in interstate relations more significant than any since the rise of the modern state."[49]

Shared power—shared in crosscutting ways, both territorial and

[47] *New Aspects of Politics* (fn. 5), 162.
[48] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 284-85.
[49] *The Making of Citizens* (fn. 4), 313.

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functional—thus provides the political basis for Merriam's "jural world order." Sharing power was not just a matter of finding countervailing power to prevent bad people from doing bad things. It was a matter of releasing latent energies to enable good people to do the things they came to perceive as good, once science, reason, and education had done their perfect work. "Power functionally fitted to life," Merriam wrote, "is not oppression but release."[50] How unfunctionally the enormous power potential of the United States was fitted to world politics in Merriam's day became clear in the 1930's. The United States had little chance of deterring the Axis initiators of World War II so long as most Americans did not believe that such a war would involve them. It is ironical that in an era when a general war was expected to be protracted, deterrence might well have succeeded even without a high degree of peacetime preparedness; an unqualified promise to give military aid to the victim of aggression might have been sufficient to avert that war.

If Merriam's dream of a warless, ordered world of law is to be realized, there are preparatory tasks, other than prescribing the appropriate international civic education, in which political scientists must evidently take the lead. They must, for example, help identify the organization areas suitable for solving problems and for making choices for which existing states are unsuited: many problems beyond the capacity of today's nation-states are far from global and would be insoluble if left to today's world organizations. They must discover ways to correct structural deficiencies of a world system whose deficiencies are greater than they were when Merriam wrote. They must prescribe for a world political system in which the mightiest weapons are useful only to speak to each other, in which limited wars fueled by the advanced industrial countries rage uncontrolled for many years in less advanced countries, in which the peoples of barely viable new sovereignties find little protection from predatory neighbors or from military rulers, in which population pressures threaten to frustrate Third-World demands for improved living standards, and in which reckless consumption of the planet's nonrenewable resources and pollution of its biosphere demand that the future be represented in the policy decisions of the present.

[50] *Political Power* (fn. 11), 303. Power potential unexercised because unmobilized, and unmobilized because of inattention, miscalculation, or ignorance, because education has not done its work perfectly, is one thing. Power potential not exercised because of a considered decision not to sacrifice nonpower values is another. Merriam's concern is with the former. Robert A. Dahl's "influence gap" appears to refer to both kinds of unexercised potential.

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Yet Charles E. Merriam foresaw that even this would not be enough. "It is not merely," he wrote, "the distribution of the mineral resources of the world, or the horsepower of the world, or the racial differentials of the world, or the title to what is called 'property' in the world, or credits of gold, or the territorial boundaries called 'states,' that prevents the equitable and acceptable reorganizations of interests and institutions—important as all these are—but the antagonism of value systems which run below the obvious surface of the world."[51]

If distributive justice is to provide no surcease from conflict and war because "the antagonism of value systems" denies the possibility of universally accepted standards of what is just, what remains of the sturdy meliorism and ultimate promise of a utopia of science and reason? In what direction do cooperation and peace lie? It cannot be a matter simply of substituting new and improved formal structures of authority for discredited and parochial old structures. It is, Merriam wrote, "more than machinery and more than a conciliation of competing interests. It imperatively demands the slower and more creative development of values of an international order—of the symbolism and sets of association by and through which the masses of people may turn automatically to the larger unit for the adjudication of types of difficulties for which they now demand automatically the clash of arms and the shedding of blood."[52]

Science and pluralism, social engineering and shared power, new forms of association reflecting in their crisscross patterns the heterogeneity of human experience and aspirations, and, last but not least, international civic education—these are the elements of Charles Merriam's "more spacious order," his global utopia of reason, his warless, ordered world of law.

[51] *Systematic Politics* (fn. 3), 340.
[52] *Prologue to Politics* (fn. 10), 48.

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Review Article

PAST AS PROLOGUE: American Redemptive Activism and the Developing World

By LEWIS A. DUNN

Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, 395 pp., $15.00.

James W. Howe and the staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The U.S. and the Developing World: Agenda for Action 1974*. New York, Praeger, 1974, 211 pp., $3.95.

THROUGHOUT the past two centuries, much of American foreign policy has been a series of variations on an underlying theme: the tension between redemptive activism, proclaiming America's destiny to play a liberating and enlightening world role, and an unyielding world, frustrating these attempts to transcend power politics and to foster liberal democratic values abroad.[1] A combination of prudent statesmanship and American weakness moderated this tension during the early decades of the nation's history. In this century, however, the clash between redemptive activism and global constraints has dominated American foreign policy, as exemplified both by the Wilsonian attempt to create a new world politics and by the subsequent isolationist political renunciation of an "irredeemably corrupt world." More recently, this clash has been a significant aspect of postwar American globalism, most evident perhaps in American policy in the Third World. An understanding of redemptive activism and its roots in America's past is necessary, therefore, if future American policy in the developing world is to avoid repeating its earlier failures.

I

Robert A. Packenham's *Liberal America and the Third World* analyzes the interaction between "the liberal American ideology and illiberal societies and ideologies throughout most of the rest of the

[1] A stimulating discussion of this recurrent theme is found in Cushing Strout, *The American Image of the Old World* (New York: Harper & Row 1963), 1-61, and passim.

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world" (p. 316). Relying heavily upon Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America*,[2] Packenham reduces that liberal ideology to four main assumptions about political development: "change and development are easy," "all good things go together," "radicalism and revolution are bad," and "distributing power is more important than accumulating power" (p. 20). According to Packenham, these four assumptions, taken together, explain many if not most of the mistakes and failures of postwar American policy in the Third World: "[T]he first two liberal premises make the United States excessively optimistic or utopian; the third liberal premise often makes us counterrevolutionary and even reactionary; and the fourth assumption inclines us toward a special kind of pretentiousness and arrogance" (p. 173). In criticizing liberal America's redemptive activism, Packenham has added his voice to that of earlier critics such as Henry James, Randolph Bourne, Reinhold Niebuhr, William Pfaff, and Edmund Stillman.[3] Therefore, an assessment of Packenham's contribution to understanding the roots and consequences of postwar American activism in the developing world requires not only the examination of his argument's validity, but also its comparison to that of these earlier skeptics.

Packenham's contention that the roots of postwar American globalism were to be found in the ideology of a liberal activist America seeking to redeem a benighted world has been rejected by some contemporary critics. They propose that postwar activism resulted from either the growth of American power or, according to more radical critics, the requirements of preserving American capitalism. Speaking for his fellow noninterventionists, Senator Fulbright has depicted a United States engaged in "the exercise of power for its own sake . . . power without philosophy or purpose."[4] But Gabriel Kolko views postwar American policy as having been far from purposeless: "its function in the world was to protect and advance American economic power in the control of the world economy."[5]

Liberal America and the Third World is a needed response to these

[2] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World 1953).

[3] See, for example, Henry James, *The American* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1960); Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals, Essays by Randolph S. Bourne, 1915–1919* (New York: Harper & Row 1964); Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1952); Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, *Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House 1966).

[4] J. William Fulbright, "The Price of Empire," *North American Review* (November 1967), 12-18, esp. p. 13.

[5] Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press 1969), 83.

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interpretations. Focusing upon the ideas that infused American policy, Packenham reveals the extent to which American globalism did represent a working out of the longstanding redemptive activism within American political culture. Nonetheless, by reducing the core of American thinking to the four maxims noted earlier, his analysis skirts important issues and does not delve as deeply as it might into the roots of redemptive activism. These limitations are most clearly evident in Packenham's discussion of American opposition to revolutionary or radical groups, including its concomitant support for authoritarian regimes, and in his explanation of the persistence of erroneous ideas about political development and of the strength of the claim to a uniquely American liberating responsibility in the world.

From the beginning of the postwar era, American actions not infrequently contravened the purported commitment to encourage and support "freedom and democracy" in the Third World. As exemplified by Syngman Rhee's South Korea, many of the Truman Doctrine's "free peoples" supported by American assistance were less than free, and their governments were not paragons of democratic virtue. Rather, the scope of individual freedom, of political participation, and of opportunity to share equitably in the distribution of societal values were circumscribed in varying degrees. By its involvement, therefore, the United States frequently maintained in power authoritarian regimes which by its own standards deserved to be overthrown, or at least did not deserve support as a "free" regime.

Labeling such anomalous involvement the "Cold War approach to political development" (p. 183), Packenham essentially explains this aspect of postwar policy by reference to the third liberal premise, "radicalism and revolution are bad" (pp. 132-34). Although briefly noting the security rationale, his argument fails to give sufficient attention to the significance of conflict within postwar globalism between perceived security requirements and the political development objectives posited by liberal redemptive activism. Thus, Packenham ascribes to postwar policy a measure of coherence and consistency which it actually lacked. More importantly, he passes over the task of explaining why American policymakers consistently emphasized perceived security requirements at the expense of "larger" interests. An understanding of that tendency would require an examination of the premises of postwar policy about balance-of-power interactions, its implicit rules for choosing among conflicting purposes, and the policymakers' belief in the need to base American actions upon supposedly

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"hard" security calculations as opposed to "soft" normative propositions.[6]

In any case, to the extent that such opposition to Communist-led and radical Marxist revolutionary groups and the concomitant support of authoritarian regimes did rest upon assumptions about revolutionary change, those assumptions were more detailed than can be explained by a simple reference to a maxim that "revolution and radicalism are bad." Instead, American policymakers adhered to specific propositions about the illegitimacy of Communist or radical Marxist revolutionary movements, most of which were stated clearly, for example, in defense of American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The first proposition denied that a Communist-led revolution could represent the will of the people. Its success could only be attributed to force, terror, organizational entrapment, and/or cynical manipulation of legitimate popular grievances. The second emphasized what may be termed the "from-to" equation—a comparison of what it was a revolution *from* with what it was a revolution *to*. Postwar policymakers implicitly held that the human costs of violent revolution and of the probable outcome, "neototalitarian rule," outweighed the human costs of a non-Communist, though authoritarian, status quo. Moreover, if even a slight gradual change toward greater socioeconomic equity and increased personal freedom was occurring, that conclusion was seen to be bolstered. Finally, the third proposition argued that the establishment of neototalitarian order would be irreversible. Whereas an authoritarian regime might either moderate its practices or be overthrown, the evolution of a Communist or radical Marxist regime toward lessened regimentation, broadened individual freedom, increased respect for human rights, and an open political process was regarded as highly improbable.[7] Given these propositions, postwar policymakers squared the circle produced by American support for authoritarian rule, going so far as to equate opposition to Communism with the promotion of freedom.

None of the policymakers' three propositions are inconsistent with the maxim "revolution and radicalism are bad." Nonetheless, the payoff from a careful delineation of these critical premises is greater than reliance upon the single maxim, particularly for efforts such as those proposed by Packenham himself to develop a more policy-oriented so-

[6] Compare, on these questions, Paul Seabury, *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books 1967), 37-53; Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press 1968), 1-27.

[7] See, for example, George Ball, "The New Diplomacy," *Department of State Bulletin*, LII (June 28, 1965), 1046-47.

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cial science. One purpose of policy-oriented analysis would be to assess these implicit premises in order to develop a more refined understanding both of the empirical phenomena and of the normative consequences of alternative courses of action. That in turn would facilitate a more discriminating policy. For example, regarding revolutionary change, only a more sophisticated analysis of the conditions under which revolution and radicalism are likely to be necessary could conceivably have tempered postwar policy. So also with a more complex normative assessment of the costs of revolutionary change. Although he calls for a policy-oriented social science which would delve into these and comparable issues, Packenham has consciously chosen to skirt these issues by focusing instead upon the relationship between postwar policy and the liberal tradition. That choice partially defines the limits of his analysis.

Even within its chosen terms of reference, *Liberal America and the Third World* does not cut sufficiently deeply into the ambiguities, roots, and patterns of thought of liberal redemptive activism. If the persistence of erroneous ideas and the strength of the American claim to a unique and liberating world role are to be fully explained, Packenham's distillation of Hartz's analysis should be supplemented and amended. This requires both an examination of related explanations of American redemptive activism's limitations and a consideration of the relationship between that longstanding claim to a unique American mission abroad and the foundations of American national identity and sense of purpose.

Americans, as Gertrude Stein aptly put it, have a "belief in boundlessness," a belief in the future as a set of infinite opportunities. Packenham reduces this belief to his first two liberal premises—"change and development are easy," and "all good things go together"—and, following Hartz, explains it in terms of the United States' "singular and relatively happy history" (p. 20). But that interpretation is too simple, only partly reflecting what is involved. By contrast, other critics such as Reinhold Niebuhr or Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff point to a set of ideas and cultural attributes with which Americans first confronted the task of creating and developing a new nation. They see that "relatively happy history" as having reinforced and legitimized an already existing American "technocratic culture" in which faith in science and reason combined with belief in progress to produce an inability to comprehend the tragic and fatal limits upon human action.[8] These ideas preceded that "happy history," constituting deter-

[8] Niebuhr (fn. 3), esp. 39-40, 130-50; Stillman and Pfaff (fn. 3), 15-59.

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minants of, as much as derivatives from, ensuing events. Furthermore, once the persistence and strength of liberal redemptive activism are considered, it becomes evident that more is involved than simply a matter of emphasis.

According to *Liberal America and the Third World*, redemptive activist pursuit of pluralistic, liberal democracy abroad is explained by the liberal tradition's fourth premise. The belief that "distributing power is more important than accumulating power" is seen by Packenham as leading to that "special kind of pretentiousness and arrogance" which characterized American globalism (p. 173, pp. 163-64). Standing alone, however, the fourth premise cannot explain activist American attempts to foster "free and democratic" regimes abroad. It serves only to define the optimum political order from the American perspective; it does not reveal why encouraging that political order abroad has traditionally been regarded as a "larger" American interest. An understanding of basic and deeply ingrained American beliefs about this nation and its role in the world is required to explain that.

From its founding, the American nation has legitimized its claim to independent existence and set itself off from other nations by stressing that it represented "grounds of hope for others." In looking forward to a future which would see the increasing vindication at home and abroad of those perceived self-evident universal truths articulated in the Declaration of Independence upon which the polity had been founded, the United States acquired its spiritual cement, its sense of national purpose. Thus, the theme of the New World versus the Old, the juxtaposition of a new and better dispensation for mankind against the corrupt and degrading order of Europe, runs throughout both American literature and political discourse. As Ezra Styles, President of Yale University, put it in 1791, the United States would be "God's American Israel," a model for all mankind.[9] Truly coming to terms with liberal redemptive activism therefore entails confronting these beliefs and symbols which are central to the American sense of national purpose and identity.

II

The reorientation of American policy in the developing world proposed in *Liberal America and the Third World* and *The U.S. and the Developing World: Agenda for Action 1974* constitutes an attempt to come to terms with redemptive activism. On the one hand, Pack-

[9] On this American self-image and its varied later manifestations, see Strout (fn. 1), 12-17, and passim.

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enham proposes that a greater tolerance for radicalism and increased reliance upon government-to-government diplomacy, as opposed to more interventionist means, be joined to a redefinition of the goals of American political development policy. Of critical importance in determining American policy toward a given country would be whether its political system had "*the will and capacity to cope with and to generate continuing transformation towards whichever values seem appropriate in the particular context*" (p. 338). More specifically, Packenham emphasizes economic development, socioeconomic justice, and personal freedom as appropriate values, while arguing that "in the majority of cases liberal democratic political systems are not as likely to realize acceptable combinations of these values as relatively authoritarian regimes" (p. 338). Given that greater likelihood, Packenham proposes that the United States set aside what he labels the "explicit democratic" (p. 69) approach to political development (pp. 336-40, 358-60). Rather, American policy should support purposeful authoritarian regimes as long as their efforts to maximize the first two values do not conflict "too sharply" with the latter value (p. 339).

On the other hand, in *The U.S. and the Developing World* the Overseas Development Council calls for, first, the creation of a series of "significant flows of finance [from rich to poor countries] that would be both automatic and permanent" (p. 29), e.g., via tariff preferences, allocations of special drawing rights, and debt relief, and, second, a shift from a "growth only" developmental assistance strategy to one which "emphasizes greater participation in the development process—and a more equitable share of its benefits—by the poor majority" (p. 10). The authors consider the former to be integrally related to fostering a more general cooperative approach to global economic security and development in an "era of interdependence"; the latter is accompanied by an injunction to avoid the interventionist approach of the postwar years.[10] Both aspects of the ODC's approach represent explicit movement away from the postwar policy's articulated goal of encouraging liberal, constitutional democracy abroad.

Taken together, the preceding two sets of recommendations represent current liberal thinking on these issues. Before undertaking a critical assessment of this "liberal reorientation," however, the question should be raised why American policy should support developmental efforts of these countries while seeking to foster a broader co-

[10] See especially the chapters by James W. Howe, James P. Grant, Roger D. Hansen, and Charles Paolillo, as well as the introductory summation entitled "Agenda for Action 1974." Given the basic similarity of outlook among these authors, it is valid to refer to the argument as being that of the Overseas Development Council.

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operative framework of global economic security and development. Why reject the alternative of "benign neglect" toward the problems of most developing countries combined with self-interested attention to a few countries, of taking advantage of the relatively greater American invulnerability to an unscrambling of interdependency relationships in order to pursue increased autarky?[11]

The ODC's answer points to the long-run benefits to the United States of a more broadly defined policy. The authors begin by arguing that American interests would be better served by cooperative approaches to future global problems; they reason that needed cooperation from the poorer countries would more likely be forthcoming if their developmental needs were also being cooperatively handled. Moreover, they perceive development as reducing the intensity of a range of issues, e.g., growing world population, markets for American exports, and recurrent food shortages, which will increasingly impinge upon American well-being. Finally, the ODC's argument focuses upon the potential dangers to the United States of living in a world divided between rich and poor nations (pp. 23-24).

These arguments, reflective of the recent shift to an emphasis upon "the threat from the Third World," are not without weight. Particularly if the next decades witness the spread of rudimentary nuclear weapon capabilities to as many as five or ten developing countries, as is not unlikely, the dangers of emerging global *apartheid* should not be underestimated. Similarly, notwithstanding that greater American invulnerability, a break-up of interdependency relationships in a scramble for unilateral advantage would be costly—not least in terms of the increased risk of conflict. Nonetheless, there are reasons for contending that America's interest in the developing countries and in supporting a cooperative system of global economic security and development stems less from these and other threats than from what Packenham rightly notes is "the interest of the United States to maintain and revitalize its moral consciousness" (p. 327). Supplementing Packenham's discussion, a brief elaboration of this last point may be in order.

A hands-off approach to the development efforts of Third World

[11] Richard Cooper, as well as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, for example, note that the costs to the United States of a break-up of economic interdependence would be significantly less than for other industrialized countries. See Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies," *World Politics*, XXIV (January 1972), 160-61, 178-79; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World Politics and the International Economic System," in C. Fred Bergsten in association with John A. Mathieson, ed., *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1973), 124-26.

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countries and an autarkic rejection of efforts to articulate and implement a cooperative approach to global economic security and development would be a mean-spirited solution to the problems caused by liberal America's redemptive activism and to the tensions and costs of interdependence.[12] Such a policy would reverse the trend of the past seventy-five years toward an increased entanglement of America's fate with that of other nations and peoples. Concern for others, whether based upon a sense of common humanity and common predicament, an overblown claim to American mission, or enlightened self-interest, would be replaced by indifference. That replacement would in turn reinforce the ethic of self-interestedness and moral complacency that underlies many of the ills which currently corrode American society. A decoupling of fates abroad would reinforce a domestic approach to human relationships which is fundamentally in conflict with that blend of self-concern and broader concern for others that is essential to increased justice within American domestic life. Moreover, a pursuit of narrowly self-interested policies abroad would by definition preclude possible efforts to temper that ethos of self-interestedness and to reinvigorate our sense of national purpose by prudent commitment to a high-minded vision of a cooperative world order. Thus, the problem is, as both Packenham and the ODC recognize, to tame rather than to exorcise the redemptive activist belief in a "larger" American interest in shaping the global environment.

III

As noted above, the liberal reorientation comprises a two-level approach to American policy in the developing world. On the one hand, it recommends American action to help create a cooperative framework of international economic security and development. On the other hand, it proposes a reorientation of American developmental assistance strategy to noninterventionist support for economic development and socioeconomic equity, as opposed to political democracy. On both counts, however, current liberal thinking skims too easily over critical questions—an indication of the continued hold of residues of the liberal tradition even on the minds of its critics.

Underlying any security system is a given status quo which the system is supposed to maintain. Past experience with political-military

[12] I have developed this argument more fully in "Fortress America and the Promise of American Life: The Contours of American Responsibility" in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choices for Tomorrow's World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 1975).

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collective security systems has demonstrated repeatedly that lack of agreement among the parties upon what is to be secured, upon the peace that is at stake, is their main weakness. Therefore such global efforts as the ODC rightly proposes in order to articulate, to implement, and to make effective a cooperative system of collective international economic development must be accompanied, if not preceded, by agreement upon a conception of global economic equity. Efforts to narrow the gap between rich and poor nations, based on a recognition of the international community's responsibility for development, would be only one-half of an inclusive conception of global welfare. An inclusive, as opposed to an exclusive, approach to global equity requires that those efforts also be accompanied by recognition of the problems and dangers that confront developed countries. As long as movement toward a cooperative structure of global economic security and development is defined simply in terms of increased redistribution from rich to poor nations, as an attempt to further the rights and satisfy the needs of only one part of the world community, it will lack the required support.

Recognizing that fact, the ODC argues for an inclusive, as opposed to an exclusive, conception of global equity. But how is agreement upon an inclusive conception of global equity to be brought about? To the ODC, what is "demand[ed] of the United States and other nations [is] a new kind of foreign policy that looks beyond shortsighted national interest and sincerely aims to integrate the long run interests of the industrial countries with those of the developing countries . . ." (pp. 19-20). Given the diversity of perceived interests, amply demonstrated by recent events in the area of energy as well as by the World Food Conference in Rome, that demand is unlikely to be met. The demand itself reflects a liberal American faith in reason, a belief that "sincere," rightminded men can reach a compromise equally satisfactory to all parties. Yet, by thus skimming over these difficulties, the liberal reorientation avoids the problem of delineating American policy alternatives that are more discriminating than either global cooperation or narrow autarky. Such alternatives, nonetheless, will be needed should grand cooperative strategies founder on divergent national policies and interests.

Considering next the liberal reorientation's renunciation of intervention, it may be recalled that the postwar American strategy of developmental assistance frequently entailed pervasive and continuing intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. This interventionist thrust was perhaps most evident in the early years of the Alli-

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ance for Progress when American experts, believing they understood the keys to development, set out to reform Latin American societies.[13] Partly out of reaction to that interventionist reformism, the Nixon Administration renounced active efforts to foster more open, pluralistic political and social development in Third World countries, focusing instead upon perceived narrow national interests.[14]

The proposed liberal reorientation, while rejecting what it considers the "benign neglect" approach of recent American policy, would also propose to avoid the interventionist reformism of earlier years. For example, Charles Paolillo, elaborating the ODC's case for a poor-oriented, social-equity-focused strategy of developmental assistance, argues that "the difficult task for the outsider is how to be persuasive without being, or even seeming, interventionist" (p. 113). The perceived compatibility between the principle of nonintervention and the pursuit of a "poor-oriented" strategy presupposes a basic congruence between that strategy and the purposes of the particular country. But the validity of this assumption is far from being self-evident.

Consider only two problem areas which the ODC's argument holds to be critical to its proposed new approach: population and agriculture. The World Food Conference of November 1974 revealed significant differences of outlook on these issues. Most, if not virtually all, less developed countries regarded the population problem not as one of inadequate near-term controls upon population growth, as it generally appeared to the United States and other developed countries, but as a problem of inadequate efforts by the developed countries to transfer the needed resources for economic development. Similarly, it should not be expected that efforts to convince the elites within developing countries to give priority to agricultural development and to influence the patterns of that development in accordance with the dictates of a "poor-oriented" emphasis will be so readily accepted. It may be recalled that stimulating a change in India's agricultural policies in the mid-1960's required American manipulation of famine-relief grain shipments.[15]

The difficulties posed by American intervention in the internal policymaking processes of these countries, therefore, cannot be defined

[13] The theme of overambitious American idealism runs throughout Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1970).

[14] The Nixon Administration's choice is well defended by Lawrence E. Harrison, "Waking From the Pan-American Dream," *Foreign Policy*, v (Winter 1971-72), 163-81.

[15] See the discussion of the Johnson approach to American food aid for India in W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (New York: Macmillan 1972), 422-23.

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out of existence by positing a congruence of outlook. Once either "benign neglect" or virtually complete adherence to the priorities and objectives of the aid recipient—as implied by the "will and capacity" approach to be discussed next—are set aside, it becomes necessary both to define the legitimate purposes of intervention and to consider limits upon it. The argument within *The U.S. and the Developing World* begs these questions, assuming that its proposed "poor-oriented" strategy will be adopted by developing countries.

The adequacy of the proposed redefinition of American policy found within *Liberal America and the Third World* is also open to question. Packenham, it may be recalled, proposes American support for those governments of developing countries that have the "will and capacity" to advance economic development and socioeconomic justice, as long as those governments do not "excessively" restrict personal freedom. His argument takes its basic character from the proposition cited earlier that "in the majority of cases liberal democratic political systems are not as likely to realize acceptable combinations of these values as relatively authoritarian regimes" (p. 338). Yet Packenham remains somewhat uneasy about this focus upon authoritarian regimes. In its defense he not only emphasizes the greater "will and capacity" of such regimes, but also the extent to which personal freedom exists even within an authoritarian political order—although what he terms the "wider features" of liberal democracy, e.g., regular and honest elections, a competitive party system, autonomous interest groups, and a free press, are admittedly not present. Thus, "the conception of political development adopted here, while it surely could be abused, does not necessarily opt callously for order over liberty" (p. 340).

Notwithstanding Packenham's disclaimer, there are reasons to question the proposed reorientation toward a "will and capacity" strategy. To begin with, it is far from evident that the component of personal freedom in a liberal democratic order can be so easily disjoined from the so-called "wider features." We may grant Packenham's point about the need to avoid "a confusion of form with substance" (p. 340); still, free elections, autonomous interest groups, a free press, and political parties provide mechanisms to institutionalize, foster, and secure personal freedom and the political norms associated with it. In their absence a degree of personal freedom may exist—but only at the discretion of the ruling elite except insofar as other functionally equivalent institutional forms have emerged. For example, what partly distinguishes Mexico's authoritarian regime from that of Cuba—Packenham

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cites both to buttress his proposition—is the existence in Mexico of an institutionalized bargaining process among divergent, autonomous sociopolitical forces within the rubric of a single party.

It is also important to ask whether the existence of some measure of personal freedom is merely a temporary anomaly arising out of the regime's weakness and its current inability to bring all social forces under its regulation and control. Is the particular regime committed to an ideological vision which will lead it to attempt to increase its control and which is in principle hostile to gradual institutionalization of popular participation in and popular control over decision making? The present Cuban government with its commitment to the creation of a "new socialist man" may be such a regime.

The preceding questions point to the most important limitation upon Packenham's proposed reorientation. To constitute an adequate response to the parochialism of American redemptive activism and the risks of intervention, the "will and capacity" approach would at the very least have to operate within the framework of a more refined understanding of authoritarian regime types. Even if the low probable incidence of liberal democratic order in much of the Third World is acknowledged, it is insufficient to redress the balance by simply supporting authoritarian regimes in which the relatively successful pursuit of other values does not conflict "too sharply" with the loss of personal freedom. What "too sharply" may mean needs to be refined; and an improved understanding of those "branch points" in a nation's political development which define the limits of later evolution toward a more open, pluralistic political order is necessary. In its reaction against postwar activism, *Liberal America and the Third World* does not pay sufficient attention to this requirement. It assumes too readily that in most cases the "will and capacity" in authoritarian regimes are not going to clash with the gradual institutionalization of personal freedom and growing popular participation in and control of decision-making. Thus, it may even be appropriate to ask whether Packenham himself has fully transcended the liberal tradition's belief that "all good things go together."

IV

Neither *Liberal America and the Third World* nor *The U.S. and the Developing World*, therefore, constitutes a fully satisfactory basis for formulating future American policy toward the developing countries. Modification of the liberal reorientation is required in order to handle the complications posed by the potential for only limited agree-

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ment upon a conception of global economic equity which must support a system of collective economic security and development, to develop a more refined response to the excesses of reformist interventionism, and to minimize the risks of the "will and capacity" strategy of developmental assistance. Attempting that modification would exceed the limited confines of this review essay. Instead, it is necessary to focus upon a broader issue that characterizes the liberal reorientation's solution for coming to terms with American liberal redemptive activism: the radical downgrading, if not actual rejection, of any larger American commitment to the gradual institutionalization of personal freedom within a liberal democratic and more open political order in less developed countries. In so doing, the following also adds briefly to the previous discussion of the potential contributions to American policy of a more policy-oriented social science.

The current liberal reorientation, as suggested earlier, follows in the tradition of the previously named critics of American redemptive activism who feared the consequences of a foreign policy partly animated by a vision of the gradual realization in other countries of the political values that animate American life. Bourne, for example, rejecting both Wilson's internationalism and the belief of his fellow-liberals that the vitality of American values would be strengthened by pursuit abroad, cut to the heart of the problem: "Let there be the smallest perversity in your world, the smallest kink in your historic path, and your ideal becomes a gigantic engine that has broken loose and lies threshing about in endless havoc."[16] The liberal reorientation represents one possible response to this risk. An alternative would take as its central guideline the "proximate pursuit" of the longstanding vision of a world in which the values of liberal democratic order—personal freedom, nonarbitrary authority, the responsibility of government to the governed—were being increasingly realized.

The concept of proximate pursuit follows from the proposition that the core of American redemptive activism should be understood as commitment to a set of ultimate values, abstract principles, and broad ideals defining a decent human life, rather than to the specific institutional forms and sequences implementing those values within the United States.[17] Thus understood, proximate pursuit would entail a readiness to accept the fact that circumstantial realities will largely

[16] Bourne (fn. 3), 51.

[17] Packenham, it may be recalled, does distinguish between "form and substance." He uses this distinction, however, only in his discussion of the relative acceptability of authoritarian political order. And, as argued above, that discussion has serious limitations.

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determine how, when, and even whether a particular value is institutionalized. Abstract principles and concrete situations would blend together to delimit such proximate implementation of the values of the open society as is feasible within that particular set of circumstances.

If followed, the course of proximate pursuit would avoid the pitfalls of past American redemptive activism as well as those of the liberal reorientation. First, by distinguishing ultimate values from specific institutional forms, proximate pursuit would caution policymakers against an ethnocentric belief that American patterns represent the only way in which those values can be pursued and implemented. Concomitantly, acknowledgment that in some cases it may simply not be possible to implement these values would serve to counter potential ethnocentrism. Second, proximate pursuit, with its emphasis upon contextual diversity, would confront the problem of temporal sequences. In contrast to past policy, revealed for example by the Charter of the Alliance for Progress, proximate pursuit would recognize that all good things need *not* go together, that all desirable objectives may *not* be simultaneously achievable. It would recognize, much as does the liberal reorientation, the tendency of most "progressive" regimes to stress socioeconomic reform and increased distributional equity at the expense of political pluralism and the institutionalization of personal freedom and human rights. Beyond that recognition, proximate pursuit would involve a readiness to support efforts at socioeconomic reform and economic development when the relevant elite is not hostile *in principle* to gradual movement toward increased pluralism and decreased authoritarian rule. Third, by viewing restrained support for authoritarian rule within the framework of a broader pursuit of the values of the liberal democratic order, proximate pursuit, unlike the liberal reorientation's "will and capacity" approach, would minimize the associated risks. It would do so both by emphasizing the need to discriminate carefully among authoritarian regime types in determining American policy and by countering the tendency of such support again to become an automatic reflex. Fourth, operating within the framework of proximate pursuit, American policymakers would still be able to take advantage of whatever opportunities might emerge to support liberal democratic values. Conversely, the constraints of that framework would prevent a repetition of the past excesses of American liberal activism.

However, a more differentiated social science theory would be required to utilize the proximate pursuit framework fully. At one level, this means developing a more refined understanding—as Packenham

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notes in discussing his proposed shift away from the "explicit democratic" approach—of "the conditions under which democracy . . . will be more (and less) likely to occur in particular cases . . ." (p. 345, n. 44). A more differentiated theory of types of authoritarian rule and conditions for and patterns of the evolution of such regimes is also required. At another level, what is needed is a more differentiated concept of liberal democracy itself—one which distinguishes between substantive values and alternative modes of institutionalizing, fostering, and preserving them. And at a third level, a more discriminating conceptualization of the conditions, not of a full-blown liberal democratic order, but of the proximate implementation of elements of that order is needed. This final aspect in turn is connected with the need for policy-oriented case studies that are concerned less with theory building than with sensitizing policymakers to the types of opportunities available for acting upon the concept of proximate pursuit.

The alternative of proximate pursuit continues to articulate a "larger" American interest in the broad framework and the particular outcomes of the ongoing process of change within the Third World. Unlike the liberal reorientation, however, proximate pursuit proposes to come to terms with redemptive activism short of radically downgrading or even renouncing the longstanding American commitment to support personal freedom and other liberal democratic values abroad. In so doing, it seeks to avoid the risks of the "will and capacity" approach. But how adequate an alternative is proximate pursuit? Even in the absence of more differentiated development theories, the concept of proximate pursuit should suffice to check the worst excesses of American redemptive activism while keeping in view the risks associated with support of authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, if American policy is to realize the potential advantages of utilizing the framework of proximate pursuit rather than that of the liberal reorientation, a more refined understanding of the characteristics and impact of the diverse forces of change in particular countries is required. Insofar as such an understanding is lacking, no fully satisfactory solution to the problem of liberal redemptive activism will be possible. At best it may be argued, as has been done here, that the relative balance of limitations and risks favors one as opposed to another solution.

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Volume XXVII
October 1974—July 1975

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WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. Vol. xxvii, October 1974–July 1975. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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